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Abstract 
Research suggests that news reporting of  health, science, and environmental hazards during the 
late 1990s / early 2000s became orientated around the disproportional amplification of  risk 
information. From causal media observations, it has been speculated that the quality of  British 
risk reporting has undergone significant improvements from the mid-2000s onward. This 
speculative assertion has remained largely under-researched by empirical inquiry. This thesis 
utilised quantitative and qualitative content analyses, alongside interviews with members of  the 
press, to investigate if  British risk reporting has become less amplified over the past thirty years. 
Both sets of  content analyses were conducted on a corpus of  British risk reporting (n=63,423) 
from across the full range of  daily national newspapers. The qualitative content analysis 
investigated the changes to the volume of  risk-based news publication, alongside the expression 
of  sensationalist and politicising language. The qualitative content analysis utilised a rhetorical 
framing analysis to explore the changes to risk amplifying news frames across a sample of  highly 
amplified news stories (n= 1490). The framing analysis sought to investigate the temporal 
changes to the expression of  uncertainty, certainty, blame, trust, stigma and dread within risk 
reporting. Targeted interviews were conducted with twenty members of  the British press who 
have reported on health, science, and environmental risks across their career. The interview 
schedule was designed to explore the changes to risk-based newswork across four distinct areas: 
(1) key historic news stories, (2) changing responsibilities and skills of  newswork, (3) changes to 
the process of  reporting risk information, (4) changing newsroom dynamics.  
 
The data generated from these investigations provided evidence to suggest that amplified 
reporting of  risk information is subject to the prevailing professional conventions embedded 
across four distinct periods of  risk reporting. The first period of  risk reporting extended from 
1985-1994 can be described as a period of  low-risk amplification. The first period of  risk 
reporting is characterised by a relatively low volume of  risk reporting and high expression of  
uncertainty frames. Evidence suggests that, during this first period, risk reporters faced systemic 
difficulties in accessing reliable and credible scientific news sources. Risk reporters would have to 
rely on journalistic instincts to process the array of  information from conflicting news sources. 
The relative availability of  “pressure group” campaigners made them ideal news sources for risk 
reporters during the first period, as their agenda driven framing of  risk information contrasted 
well against Government framing of  risk within official reports and safety assurances.  
 
The second period of  risk reporting extended from 1995-2004 can be described as an era of  high-
risk amplification. The second period of  risk reporting was characterised by rapid proliferation of  
published risk reporting, and the disproportional expression of  certainty frames within news. 
Across the second period, the volume of  published risk reporting increased from 803 articles in 
1995 to 2654 articles in 2004. In 2000, the published volume of  risk reporting peaked at 3187 
articles - and would remain uncontested as the year of  most risk reporting until 2015 (3514 
articles). The increased proliferation and peak volume of  risk reporting lend evidence to suggest 
a major reorientation across British news organisation to focus on promoting risk reporting 
within their newspapers. During interviews, risk reporters established how the Government’s 
admission of  cross-species transmission of  BSE/CJD in 1995 validated newspaper information 
campaigning efforts - which had maintained that cross special transmission was possible, despite 
Government assurances otherwise. What followed was a ‘skeptical phase’ of  risk reporting, 
where government safety assurances were openly debated within ongoing newspaper campaigns 
against risky technologies. The observable increase in certainty frames during the second period 
were primarily due to the statements provided by contrasting news sources. While government 
safety assurances openly express a degree of  confidence towards the known safety of  
technologies, statements from pressure group sources were equally confident in their expectation 
of  hidden harms. Furthermore, pressure group sources drew upon historic social facts of  risk to 
confidently suggest that vulnerable populations will be damaged should risky technologies be 
permitted by government. 
 
 The third period of  risk reporting extends from 2005-2014 and can be described as an era of  low-
risk amplification. The third period is characterised by high volume of  risk reporting, but a 
correspondingly low exhibition of  certainty frames. While the volume of  risk reporting published 
during the third period constitutes 45% of  the entire sample, there is further evidence to suggest 
that risk became less amplified during this decade. Firstly, the proliferative publication of  risk 
reporting underwent stagnation during the third period. Secondly, there were also notable lulls in 
reporting, where the volume of  reporting declined sharply in the year(s) following a prominent 
risk event. It was further suggested by interviewees that risk reporting became a routine aspect of  
a newspaper’s media offering and that focus of  risk reporters pivoted away from exploring links 
between hidden hazards and institutional malfeasance. The evidence provided from the content 
analysis further supports this claim, as the proportional difference between uncertainty and 
certainty frames increased from 16.6% in the second period to 48.9% in the third period. The key 
reason for this change in the framing of  risk information was that risk reporters began to 
prioritise statements from academic sources over pressure group sources. Interviewees suggested 
that prioritisation of  scientific sources appears to demonstrate that they were attempting to 
introduce “scientific balance” into their reporting.  It was observed that the higher expression of  
uncertainty frames was generated from the generally tentative language used by scientific sources 
when discussing risk and their research. Furthermore, During the third period, risk reporters 
demonstrated a tendency to include several statements from different scientific sources as a 
counterbalance to the risk information provided within government reports.  
 
The fourth period of  risk reporting was observed between 2015-2017. However, given the 
previous trends, it is presumed by this thesis that the fourth period is still emerging. It is 
acknowledged that the observations made within the fourth period are somewhat speculative but 
may suggest the formation of  novel conventions. The data obtained so far suggests that the 
emergent fourth era of  risk reporting could be another era of  high-risk amplification. So far, the 
proportional difference between uncertainty and certainty frames has decreased by 1.9% over 
three years. This small increase in certainty framing appears to correspond with a sudden 
increase in “opinion-based” content. The average number of  opinion articles increased from 136 
per year within the third period, to 246 per year within the emergent fourth period. During the 
content analysis, it was also observed that statements from scientific news sources appeared more 
inclined to politicise risk information by including prescriptive policy recommendations. 
Interviewees also suggested that the quality of  risk reporting has also declined, as newsroom 
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Chapter 1 - The Problem of Highly Amplified Risk Reporting 
Within the British Press 
 
Introduction 
Poor quality newspaper coverage of science, health, and environmental risks has been linked to 
the amplification of public perceptions of harm from being produced by novel applications of 
technology (see Bennett, et al 2010; Fischbacher-Smith et al, 2010, Frewer et al, 2010; and 
Veland and Aven, 2013). Research that explored the relationship between media amplification of 
risk and public risk perceptions has suggested that by exaggerating particularly fretful aspects of 
novel technologies, news organisations may inadvertently facilitate ‘illogical’ public responses  
such as  protesting against safe technologies (I.e. Mobile phone masts) or needlessly avoiding 
applied technologies altogether (I.e. The MMR triple jab vaccination and GM food) (see 
Burgess, 2010;  Owens, 2002; Burgess et al, 2006; Gaskell et al, 2004; and Finucane 2002). A 
consensus has emerged where amplified risk reporting undermines the perspective that news 
media should serve the function of aiding the public understanding of science, while also posting 
a threat to the evidence-based decision making within the contemporary policy making process 
around applied technologies (See Miller; 2001; Royal Society, 1985; House of Lords, 2000; 
Covello et al., 1986; Lofstedt, 2008; Veland and Aven, 2013).  
 
By the late 1990s, amplified risk reporting on issues such as ‘mad cow disease’ and 
‘frankenfoods’ was viewed to have become such a threat to British confidence in science that the 
House of Lords commissioned a report to address the issue. The House of Lords third report on 
Science and Technology (2000) contained several recommendations which appear to signify 
systemic reforms around risk reporting which aimed to improve the quality of science-based 
journalism. The House of Lords (2000) report identified a ‘new mood for dialogue’ whereby risk 
communication strategies by key stakeholders should shift away from the traditional ‘deficit 
model’ of risk reporting and begin to embrace the ‘dialogic model’ of communication (see Irwin 
et al, 2014; Miller et al, 2009; Trench, 2008). The purpose of such a change in communication 
strategy appears to be an attempt at addressing the core contention of the House of Lords report, 
namely that scientists and journalists did not share a common outlook on the purpose of risk 
reporting (see chapter 5 for further analysis). For the most part, scientists were reluctant to be 
included as news sources, leaving journalists to rely upon the most available sources (even if their 
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scientific credentials were somewhat dubious). While the House of Lords (2000) report has been 
praised for instigating systemic changes that improved the quality of British risk reporting [REF], 
there has yet to be a broad investigation that seeks to investigate how amplified risk reporting has 
changed over time. Within this thesis, a series of empirical investigations were conducted which 
sought to address two fundamental assumptions made of British risk reporting:  
 
1) That risk reporting was particularly amplified between the mid-1990s until the early 2000s 
 
2) From the mid-2000s onwards, the scientific quality of risk reporting substantially 
improved.  
 
The remainder of this chapter will seek to establish the foundations which appear to inform 
the above assumptions. This will be conducted by cataloguing some of the key policy documents 
from government departments and other key stakeholders. Such documents are considered 
crucial for setting institutional agendas leading up to the House of Lords third report on Science 
and Technology, and provide a glimpse into the pertinent issues which have emerged since the 
turn of the century.  Following this, attention will be paid towards providing a summary of the 
subsequent chapters within this thesis.  
 
Risk information and the Public Communication of Science (1990-2000) 
Within the preface to the Royal Society’s (1985) report on The Public Understanding of 
Science, Professor D.C. Smith - then vice president - outlined the core rational for increasing the 
visibility of scientific information within the British press. Professor Smith suggests that the 
“need for an overall awareness of the nature of science” is especially pertinent as novel applied 
technologies had begun to “pervade modern life”. It appears to be hoped that the report would 
“generate debate and discussions” within the public arena on the acceptance technology, while 
“achieving lasting improvements” on the public understanding of science. The report provides 
data which suggests around 66% of the general public may be interested in reading news stories 
on science, especially in the areas of “immediate human welfare”, environmental pollution, food 
and medical issues (Royal Society 1985, pp 12-14). This argument presents the clear rational that 
increasing coverage of science within newspapers would, ultimately, be profitable for newspaper 
publishers. The report makes several recommendations for the press to improve the public 
understanding of science such as: incorporating ‘scientific material’ into general news reporting, 
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improving the contact between scientists and journalists, and to provide more physical space 
within newspapers for science-based reporting (Royal Society, 1985; pp 22-23). There was a 
further, perhaps idealistic, recommendation made within the report that newspapers should 
adopt a “much more positive attitude” towards science.  
 
During the 1990s, while the British press appear to have increased their coverage of science, 
the core focus appears to have been on the role of government in permitting and managing risky 
technologies, rather than exploring the scientific effort behind technological developments (see 
Chapters four, five, and six). Media pressure upon the government during the BSE crisis appears 
to have sponsored several revisions to government policy on the communication of health risk 
information (Jensen, 2004).  The importance of the BSE crisis cannot be understated, as it 
presents a prescient battle over the definition of a health risk between the British press and the 
government.  Much of the news reporting on BSE maintained that the British government was 
actively suppressing and manipulating scientific evidence of a causal link between British Beef 
and the human variant of BSE (CJD) so as to claim that British beef was safe.  It was reported 
that novel agricultural practices (such as feeding bone meal products to cattle) were to blame for 
the development of BSE in British cattle herds, and that consumption of BSE infected beef 
caused CJD - a claim that was rejected by the government (Delamothe, 1996).  
 
In 1996, the press was rewarded for their steadfastness in claiming the risky status of British 
beef, when the government finally admitted that the link between British beef and CJD was real 
(Washer, 2006). Following the apparent press victory, systematic reviews of institutional data 
management and communication guidelines was conducted by government stakeholders, 
concluding that that the British government should transition towards a state of transparency and 
open dialogue to prevent the amplification of risk information (Wales et al, 2006).  Following 
this, in 1997, the Governments Chief Scientific Advisor (CSA) published guidelines on the use of 
scientific advice and stressed the importance of explaining data to the public, rather than issuing 
safety of assertions (CSA, 2009). Furthermore, in 1998, the Royal Commission on 
Environmental Pollution (RECP) reported that government statements needed to articulate 
resonant social values when communicating risk information, alongside the importance of 
holding public consultations (RECP, 1998).  
 
The suggestions to improve risk communication made within both the CSA and RECP 
reports have been suggested to attenuate public amplification of risk and stymie public outrage 
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(Sandman, 1987). The RECP report also incorporated findings from sociological studies on risk 
which highlight how low trust in public institutions and high levels of uncertainty around 
technology are contributory factors for the amplification of risk within public discourses 
(references within the report included: Renn, 1998; Jasanoff, 1991; Lash et al, 1996; Slovic, 1987 
and Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982). Both the CSA and RECP reports provides evidence which  
suggests that, by the end of the 1990s, government ministers had become increasingly aware of 
the complex, psychosocial, dimensions of public risk perception, public responses to risk,  and 
risk communication. 
 
The House of Lords third report on Science and Technology (2000) seemingly codified the 
suggestions made in earlier parliamentary reports by outlining a new agenda for communicating 
risk information to the public. Within the introduction, the House of Lords report contended that 
“the future wealth and welfare of society” could be threatened if the “enthusiasm of young 
people to pursue scientific careers” is frustrated by media landscape which consistently amplifies 
the perception that novel scientific technology is risky, dangerous, and immoral (see chapter 
five). The House of Lords report used news reporting around Genetic Modification (GM) as a 
prevalent case study where public confidence in the assessed safety of science was “rocked” by 
unsubstantiated risks reported within news stories (see Augoustinos at al, 2010). The report made 
several recommendations for the press to improve the scientific quality of British risk reporting 
by minimising risk amplification and engendering public trust towards scientific institutions.  
One recommendation was that newspapers attempt tp distinguish between “proven” and 
“unproven” possibilities to avoid speculating upon uncertainty. While not explicitly stated, the 
distinction between proven and unproven possibilities appears to rely upon an established 
scientific consensus on specific risk issues. The report uses the example of the link between 
smoking and cancer as a pertinent case study where risk was substantiated by a robust 
collaboration of empirical evidence. Another recommendation made within the House of Lords 
report was that newspapers avoid “irresponsible” reporting, such as declaring scientific 
technologies as being “safe” or not. It was suggested that, rather than presenting a binary 
proposition of safe or risky, newspapers should actively attempt to inform public perceptions of 
safety by contrasting scientific information against the “subjective factors” regarding the social 
acceptability of specific risks. A final recommendation made by the House of Lords report was 
that newspapers embrace their responsibility towards fairness when dealing with scientists as 
news sources. This recommendation presumed that scientific news sources were  generally 
unaware of standard journalistic conventions, resulting in statements that were made ‘on the 




Improving Risk Reporting (2000-2017) 
The publication of the House of Lords report represents a critical step in addressing the 
“great challenge” of improving the state of risk reporting within British press. As a direct 
response to the House of Lords report, Baroness Susan Greenfield dedicated resources to 
establishing the Science Media Centre (SMC). The SMC is a non-governmental communications 
organisation with the stated agenda of being “unashamedly pro-science” in an attempt to “help 
renew public trust in science” (Kirby, 2011; Fox, 2012). One of the aims of the SMC is to 
improve communication between scientific sources of information and the British press. One 
improvement implemented by the SMC involved hosting press briefings at their London offices, 
where journalists are invited to ask a panel of experts pertinent questions during developing news 
cycles. Another improvement is the SMC’s publication of press releases on emerging risk issues 
which contextualised scientific information, and provided a selection of statements, from a panel 
of expert voices (Fox, 2012).  
 
The operations of the SMC provide some evidence to suggest that, by the mid-2000’s, the 
British scientific communication apparatus had begun to reject the deficit model of risk 
communication and adopt the dialogic model, providing journalists with the opportunity to more 
easily access a consensus of credible scientific sources. The deficit-to-dialogue journey describes a 
change in momentum whereby the scientific establishment became less focused on expecting the 
public to view risk through a lens of potential harms against possible benefits, and increasingly 
focused on allowing scientific stakeholders the opportunity to forward their perspective on how 
technology can help address resonant sociopolitical concerns (Merkelsen, 2011). Furthermore, 
during the 2007 Sense About Science (SAS) annual lecture, Professor Raymond Tallis outlined 
how the dialogic model of communication could improve the public understanding of science.  
Professor Tallis suggests that by mitigating risk amplifying narratives within news reporting the 
press could be provided with the opportunity to forward scientific balance within their stories 
and explore the future social benefits of novel applied technologies (Tallis, 2007). Professor Tallis 
reinforced his argument by presenting data that which suggested that 85% of the public thought 
the benefits of science outweighed the risks, and that news audiences had become bored of 
reading amplified stories on ‘junk science’. 
 
There is evidence to suggest that the dialogic approach to risk communication had become 
increasingly incorporated into government risk communication strategies. For example, in 2010, 
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the Chief Scientific Advisor offered guidance that, by pre-emptively addressing pertinent 
sociopolitical issues, the government could effectively suppress the public amplification of risk 
(CSA, 2010). It was further suggested by the CSA that, in times of high public uncertainty, 
government advice should attempt to establish a scientific consensus from a broad range of 
expert sources such as British researchers, international organisations (I.e., The World Health 
Organisation), and industry spokespersons. Such an approach mirrors that of the SMC within 
their press releases and briefings. Another recommendation of the CSA was that government 
departments should seek to standardise scientific assessments of risk to avoid generating public 
uncertainty from apparent inconsistencies in data and information. However, despite the 
proposition that the dialogic model of risk communication would improve public trust in science, 
a recent House of Commons Science and Technology Committee (2017) report on Science 
Communication and Engagement presented evidence which suggested that:  
 
“…while the public has developed a more positive attitude towards science over the past 
30 years, most people still lack a personal connection or understanding of science. The Public 
Attitudes to Science survey, for example, found that ‘people still do not know much about 
how scientists work’, and that there was ‘low trust in science journalism.” 
 
The above example may be read as an institutional criticism of the dialogic model, where 
attempts to improve the communication of science to the public has had little impact on public 
risk perceptions. The report suggests that, although news media has become far more positive in 
its coverage of science, there is substantial public distrust of the press when reporting on scientific 
issues in a fair and accurate manner (for a further exploration of how low trust aids amplified risk 
perceptions, see chapter two). Conclusion made within the Science and Communications (2017) 
report reiterated the key findings of the Communicating Climate Science report (2014), which 
claimed that issues such as false media balance and sensationalism are still far too prevalent 
within the British press coverage of risk-based stories.  Furthermore, the Science and 
Communications report establishes that media outlets wilfully distort risks to satisfy their own 
agenda, and that journalists still lack the necessary skills to interpret the science they are 
reporting on. The critical nature of both the Science and Communications and Communicating 
Climate Science reports marked a significant change in tone from government regarding the self-
regulatory ability of the press manage the quality of their risk reporting. The negative tone 
apparent within these two House of Commons reports presents a key question for this thesis  - to 
what degree has the press’ reporting on risk information changed over the past thirty years of 




Defining Risk Reporting 
Within the governmental reports previously mentioned, there appears to be a degree of 
overlap between science journalism and risk reporting when communicating health risks within 
news stories. A distinction must be made between the two, so as to help demarcate the 
boundaries between media studies and social studies. Science journalism identified the  
endeavours of the press to report on stories arising from the world of science which are seen to be 
in the public interest (Dunwoody, 2014). Risk reporting is the manner in which empirical and 
experiential evidence of the apparent dangers posed by selected hazards is presented within news 
stories (Kitzinger & Reilly, 1997). Both science journalism and risk reporting operate 
synergistically to build a news story around health risks. However, interrogation of science 
journalism considers the modes of news production, which risk reporting considered how the 
framing of scientific controversies can influence public perceptions and behaviour (Hansen 2000, 
Flynn, Slovic, and Kunreuther 2001). Amplified risk reporting outlines a form of science 
journalism which capitalises upon escalating the danger posed by low-probability hazards 
(Kasperson, et al, 1988). Amplified risk reporting poses a unique challenge to decision making at 
the policy level, as risk amplifying news stories can encourage public calls for government to 
manage the apparently impending doom (see Renn et al, 1992; Kasperson et al, 2003; Yeo, 2014, 
Rothstein, 2003 and Wardman & Löfstedt, 2018). Amplified risk reporting may also serve the 
profit-seeking motive pf newspapers by allowing them to adopt campaign stances on health risks 
that sells newspapers through signifying solidarity with the concerns of their readers technology 
(Agha, 2003; Höijer et al, 2006; Burgess, 2010; Burgess, 2012). Risk-based campaigning draws 
upon several core elements to inspire protracted news cycles such as:  
 
Associated risk - Statements which convey some probabilistic value of harm. 
Blame and irresponsibility - The identification of critical failings from a key risk manager.  
Projection of harm - Speculation on the future impacts if a risk is left unregulated.  
 
The structure of news stories appears to aid the amplification of risk by seeking to provide 
balance between a collection of news sources that represent binary discursive positions within a 
controversy over applied technology. The concept of false balance describes a journalistic 
convention where credible scientific information on risk is juxtaposed against the 
unsubstantiated perspectives of non-institutional actors, which include the public, pressure group 
8 
 
sources, and maverick experts (Dixon & Clarke, 2013; Dearing; 2016; and Fahy, 2017). Dixon & 
Clarke (2013) suggest that false balance within news stories can facilitate risk amplification by 
spotlighting statements regarding applied technology that sensationalises and politicises risk 
information.  One remedy for false balance is for journalists to employ scientific balance and 
writing news stories that centre around a constellation of scientific sources that outline the 
current discourses around risk management within an established scientific consensus (Clarke et 
al, 2015; van der Linden et al, 2015). 
 
Thesis Structure 
Despite the documented changes to institutional approaches towards risk communication (as 
outlined within this chapter), there has been limited research that analyses the changes in how 
the British press presents risk information within news stories. This gap in knowledge has 
informed three fundamental research questions that underpins this thesis. Firstly, are there 
observable changes in how risk information was reported by the British press over time? 
Secondly, have there been changes in how risk information was amplified by the British press? 
Thirdly, have there been changes in professional press conventions regarding risk-based 
newswork?   
 
In addressing these three research questions, this thesis provides empirical evidence and 
theoretical considerations which contribute towards furthering the interdisciplinary 
understanding of the sociopolitical nature of risk amplification. This thesis is rooted within the 
sociological understanding of risk and branches out to provide fruitful insights for an array of 
cultural studies, media studies, and communications studies which congregate around issues of 
risk and science. Chapter two better outlines how some of the major approaches to risk research 
provided the theoretical grounding for thesis. Chapter two begins with Chauncy Starr’s seminal 
observation of the seemingly “illogical” public perceptions of risk, before detailing how the 
sociological lenses of the psychometric paradigm, the governmentality perspective, the cultural 
theory approach and the risk society thesis facilitated the development of the primary conceptual 
tool used within this thesis - the Social Amplification of Risk Framework (SARF). Chapter two 
further demonstrates  how SARF aided assessment of the interdisciplinary research questions 
posed within this chapter, especially in regards to how aspects of the information mechanism and 
the response mechanism operate as defined units of analysis to explore risk amplification within 
news texts. Finally, chapter two presents some curated literature on risk and mass media to 
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provide a more robust theoretical foundation which underpins newspapers as a social station of 
risk amplification.  
  
 Chapter three details the methodology of this thesis to analyse and explore the changes to 
news-based risk amplification over the past thirty years. Chapter three begins by situating the 
epistemological approach to this thesis within the emergent discipline of constructivist grounded 
theory (CGT). Chapter three outlines how CGT was useful in addressing key contentions that 
exist regarding the suitability of the more traditional beaches of grounded theory for producing 
valid empirical works. When detailing the methods used by this study, chapter three details how 
a mixed methods approach was crucial to investigate the complex phenomena of change to risk 
amplification within the British press over time. To facilitate such analysis, the theoretical 
considerations from Documentary Analysis (DA) research informed an audit trail method, 
which permitted the construction of a selective corpus of newspaper articles to track linguistic 
and narrative changes to risk amplification. Chapter three further details how computer aided 
linguistic methods enabled both quantitative and qualitative content analyses to be performed on 
a large corpus of news articles. The quantitative analysis performed within this thesis included 
volumetric counts of risk amplifying news stories, and word count analysis for risk amplifying 
determinants. The qualitative methods performed within this thesis included framing analyses 
and narrative analyses. Finally, chapter three outlines some of the methodological difficulties in 
conducting semi-structured interviews with professional risk reporters.  
 
Chapter four presents the results of quantitative content analyses which map the longitudinal 
changes to risk amplification within the information mechanism of SARF - the volume of risk 
information, sensationalism, and politicisation. Chapter four highlights how the volume of risk 
information outlines several distinct periods of risk reporting, which may be reflective of 
conventional changes in how the press approached risk-based newswork. Such observations were 
reinforced by investigations into the expression of sensationalist and politicising language, which 
provide evidence of a differential expression of phrases across temporal periods. Overall, these 
studies present data which suggest that, while the volume of risk reporting increased over time, 
there was a periodisation effect in place where different moments exhibited defined 
characteristics of proliferative trajectory and linguistic change. Two key observations are that the 
1995-2004 period appears to be a moment of unprecedented proliferation of risk reporting, while 




Chapter five presents the results of qualitative content analyses that investigate changes to 
risk amplification within the response mechanism of SARF - the framing of dread, trust, stigma, 
uncertainty, certainty, and blame within texts. The framing analysis compared how aspects of 
risk amplification were framed, within peak moments of risk reporting, between the different 
reporting periods. A narrative analysis was subsequently performed which investigated the 
changes to risky rhetoric over time. Risky rhetoric was identified as the presentation of logos, ethos 
and pathos relating to risk information and risk governance. Observations were supported by 
examples from the text and word count analyses to support claims of change over time. The data 
presented within Chapter five provides evidence to support claims made within this thesis that 
the different periods of risk reporting are reflective of different conventional approaches to risk-
based newswork by risk reporters. Two key observations are that the 1995 to 2004 period appear 
to be a moment of intense press campaigning on risk issues that was predicated upon the framing 
of risk information by pressure group organisations, while the 2005 to 2014 period appears to be 
a moment which prioritised the tentative style of scientific communication and effectively de-
amplified risk reporting by the British press.   
 
Chapter six presents the results from interviews with British risk reporters and assists in 
contextualising some of the observations made within chapters four and five. The interviews 
provided evidence to suggest three distinct paradigms of risk reporting, which reflects some 
temporal overlap with the periods of risk reporting investigated in previous chapters. The 
paradigms of risk reporting were reported to have been influenced by several key factors such as 
technological changes which improved access to scientific sources of risk information, cultural 
pressure to improve the accuracy of risk reporting, and the economic pressure of newsroom 
cutbacks which have impacted the ability of the press to produce quality journalism. The results 
of this analysis lend further evidence to support the claims standard press conventions amplified 
risk during the 1995 - 2004 period and de-amplified risk during the 2005-2014 period. 
Furthermore, there were resonant concerns that the current state of the British press would 
sponsor a conventional approach to risk information that will produce a new era of risk 
amplification.  
 
Chapter seven is the conclusory chapter of this thesis and provides a synthesis of evidence 
presented within this thesis and the limitations of the studies. Chapter seven revisits the aims of 
this thesis and considers how well the data produced by the mixed methods approach addresses 
the research questions. This chapter further outlines the contributions made by this thesis to the 
field of sociology, alongside the wider interdisciplinary umbrella of risk research.  Finally, 
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chapter seven identifies some of the key limitations of this study and some methodological 




Agha, S., 2003. The impact of a mass media campaign on personal risk perception, perceived 
self-efficacy and on other behavioural predictors. AIDS care, 15(6), pp.749-762. 
 
Augoustinos, M., Crabb, S. and Shepherd, R., 2010. Genetically modified food in the news: 
media representations of the GM debate in the UK. Public Understanding of Science, 19(1), pp.98-
114. 
 
Bennett, P., Calman, K., Curtis, S. and Fischbacher-Smith, D., 2010. Understanding public 
responses to risk: Issues around policy and practice. In Risk Communication and Public Health 
(pp. 3-22). Oxford University Press. 
 
Burgess, A. 2010. Media risk campaigning in the UK: from mobile phones to “Baby P.” 
Journal of Risk Research, 13(1), 59–72. 
 
Burgess, A. 2012. Media, Risk, and Absence of Blame for “Acts of God”: Attenuation of the 
European Volcanic Ash Cloud of 2010. Risk Analysis 
 
Burgess, D.C., Burgess, M.A. and Leask, J., 2006. The MMR vaccination and autism 
controversy in United Kingdom 1998–2005: Inevitable community outrage or a failure of risk 
communication?. Vaccine, 24(18), pp.3921-3928. 
 
Chief Scientific Advisor, 2009. Guidelines on Scientific Analysis in Policy Making. Crown 
Copyright. Available online: 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_dat
a/file/31520/guidelines_20on_20scientific_20analysis_20in_20policy_20making_20a_20consult
ation_20by_20the_20government_20chief_20scientific_20adviser.pdf. Accessed 20/6/2019 
 
Chief Scientific Advisor, 2010. Guidance for Government Chief Scientific Advisers and their 







Clarke, C.E., Dixon, G.N., Holton, A. and McKeever, B.W., 2015. Including “evidentiary 
balance” in news media coverage of vaccine risk. Health communication, 30(5), pp.461-472. 
 
Covello V, von Winterfeldt D, Slovic P: Risk communication: A review of the literature. Risk 
Abstracts 3:171-182, 1986. 
 
Dearing, J.W., 2016. Newspaper coverage of maverick science: Creating controversy 
through balancing. Public Understanding of Science. 
 
Delamothe, T., 1996. Meltdown: the media and mad cows. BMJ, 312(7034), pp.854-855. 
 
Dixon, G.N. and Clarke, C.E., 2013. Heightening uncertainty around certain science: Media 
coverage, false balance, and the autism-vaccine controversy. Science Communication, 35(3), 
pp.358-382. 
 
Douglas, M. and Wildavsky, A., 1982. Risk and Blame: An Essay on the Selection of 
Technological and Environmental Dangers. University of California Press 
 
Dunwoody, S., 2014. Science journalism: prospects in the digital age. In Routledge handbook of 
public communication of science and technology (pp. 43-55). Routledge. 
 
Fahy, D., 2017. Objectivity, false balance, and advocacy in news coverage of climate change. 
In Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Climate Science. 
 
Finucane, M.L., 2002. Mad cows, mad corn and mad communities: the role of socio-cultural 
factors in the perceived risk of genetically-modified food. Proceedings of the Nutrition Society, 61(1), 
pp.31-37. 
 
Fischbacher-Smith, D., Irwin, A. and Fischbacher-Smith, M., 2010. Bringing light to the 
shadows and shadows to the light. in Risk, risk management, and risk communication. 
 
Fox, F., 2012. Practitioner’s perspective: The role and function of the Science Media Centre. 
In The Sciences’ Media Connection–Public Communication and its Repercussions (pp. 257-270). 
Springer, Dordrecht. 
 
Frewer, L., Van Dijk, H. and Fischer, A.R.H., 2010. Consumer perceptions of the risks and 
benefits associated with food hazards. In Risk Communication and Public Health (pp. 39-52). 




Gaskell, G., Allum, N., Wagner, W., Kronberger, N., Torgersen, H., Hampel, J. and Bardes, 
J., 2004. GM foods and the misperception of risk perception. Risk Analysis: An International 
Journal, 24(1), pp.185-194. 
 
Höijer, B., Lidskog, R. and Thornberg, L., 2006. News media and food scares: the case of 
contaminated salmon. Environmental Sciences, 3(4), pp.273-288. 
 
House of Lords, 2000. Science and Society: Select Committee on Science and Technology, 
Session 1999–2000, Third Report, HL Paper 38. 
 
House of Commons, 2014. Communicating Climate Science. Session 2013-2014, Eighth 
Report, HC Paper 254  
 
House of Commons, 2017. Science Communication and Engagement. Session 2016-2017, 
Eleventh Report, HC Paper 62.  
 
Irwin, A., Bucchi, M. and Trench, B., 2014. Risk, science and public 
communication. Routledge handbook of public communication of science and technology, pp.160-172. 
 
Jasanoff, S., 1991. Acceptable evidence in a pluralistic society. in Acceptable evidence: Science 
and values in risk management, 29, pp.345-59. 
 
Jensen, K.K., 2004. BSE in the UK: Why the risk communication strategy failed. Journal of 
Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, 17(4-5), pp.405-423. 
 
Kasperson, R.E., Renn, O., Slovic, P., Brown, H.S., Emel, J., Goble, R., Kasperson, J.X. 
and Ratick, S., 1988. The social amplification of risk: A conceptual framework. Risk 
analysis, 8(2), pp.177-187. 
 
Kasperson, J.X., Kasperson, R.E., Pidgeon, N. and Slovic, P., 2003. The social amplification 
of risk: assessing fifteen years of research and theory. The social amplification of risk, 1(01). 
 
Kirby, T., 2011. Science media centres go global. The lancet, 377(9762), p.285. 
 
Kitzinger, J. and Reilly, J., 1997. The rise and fall of risk reporting: media coverage of 
human genetics research, false memory syndrome and ‘mad cow disease'. European journal of 




Lash, S., Szerszynski, B. and Wynne, B. eds., 1996. Risk, environment and modernity: towards a 
new ecology. Sage. 
 
Lofstedt, R.E., 2008. Risk communication, media amplification and the aspartame 
scare. Risk Management, 10(4), pp.257-284. 
 
Merkelsen, H., 2011. Risk communication and citizen engagement: what to expect from 
dialogue. Journal of Risk Research, 14(5), pp.631-645. 
 
Miller, S., 2001. Public understanding of science at the crossroads. Public understanding of 
science, 10(1), pp.115-120. 
 
Miller, S., Fahy, D. and ESConet Team, 2009. Can science communication workshops train 
scientists for reflexive public engagement? The ESConet experience. Science 
Communication, 31(1), pp.116-126. 
 
Owens, S.R., 2002. Injection of confidence: The recent controversy in the UK has led to 
falling MMR vaccination rates. EMBO reports, 3(5), pp.406-409. 
 
Renn, O., 1998. Three decades of risk research: accomplishments and new 
challenges. Journal of risk research, 1(1), pp.49-71. 
 
Renn, O., Burns, W.J., Kasperson, J.X., Kasperson, R.E. and Slovic, P., 1992. The social 
amplification of risk: Theoretical foundations and empirical applications. Journal of social 
issues, 48(4), pp.137-160. 
 
Rothstein, H., 2003. Neglected risk regulation: the institutional attenuation 
phenomenon. Health, Risk & Society, 5(1), pp.85-103. 
 
Royal Society. 1985. The public understanding of science. The Society. 
 
Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, 1997. The Stationary Office. Available online: 
https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110322144249/http://www.rcep.org.uk/reports
/21-standards/documents/standards-full.pdf. Accessed: 20/6/2019 
 
Sandman, P.M., 1987. Risk communication: facing public outrage. EPA J., 13, p.21. 
 




Tallis, R., 2007. Longer, healthier, happier? Human needs, human values and science. Battle 
of Ideas. Available online: http://archive.battleofideas.org.uk/2009/battles/1016. Accessed 
23/6/2019 
 
Trench, B., 2008. Towards an analytical framework of science communication models. 
In Communicating science in social contexts (pp. 119-135). Springer, Dordrecht. 
 
van der Linden, S.L., Clarke, C.E. and Maibach, E.W., 2015. Highlighting consensus among 
medical scientists increases public support for vaccines: evidence from a randomized 
experiment. BMC public health, 15(1), p.1207. 
 
Veland, H. and Aven, T., 2013. Risk communication in the light of different risk 
perspectives. Reliability Engineering & System Safety, 110, pp.34-40. 
 
Wardman, J.K. and Löfstedt, R., 2018. Anticipating or accommodating to public concern? 
Risk amplification and the politics of precaution reexamined. Risk analysis, 38(9), pp.1802-1819. 
 
Wales, C., Harvey, M. and Warde, A., 2006. Recuperating from BSE: The shifting UK 
institutional basis for trust in food. Appetite, 47(2), pp.187-195. 
 
Washer, P., 2006. Representations of mad cow disease. Social science & medicine, 62(2), 
pp.457-466. 
 
Yeo, S.K., Cacciatore, M.A., Brossard, D., Scheufele, D.A., Runge, K., Su, L.Y., Kim, J., 
Xenos, M. and Corley, E.A., 2014. Partisan amplification of risk: American perceptions of 







Chapter 2 - Reviewing the Literature on Risk, Amplification, 
and the News  
 
Introduction 
This chapter presents some of the relevant theoretical contributions from the field of risk 
research which has directly informed this thesis and outlines where this thesis makes an original 
contribution to the sociological and interdisciplinary literature on risk. The purpose of this 
chapter is to establish how the constellation of theory on risk was synthesised by this thesis, 
producing a solid foundation which supports risk amplification as a valuable sociological 
phenomenon. Or, rather, to outline the theoretical contributions which assist in liberating ‘risk 
communication’ from being rooted purely within the domain of science and technology studies 
and adopt a more interdisciplinary perspective that considers some of the wider sociocultural 
nuances of mediated risk information. This chapter is guided by the temporal development of 
risk theorisation, beginning with the foundational observations made by Chauncy Starr (1968). 
Following this, some contributions which distinguish the four theoretical branches of risk 
research will be explored: the psychometric paradigm, the cultural theory approach, the 
governmentality perspective, and the risk society thesis. The central theorisation around the 
psychometric paradigm is based upon the empirical work of the ‘Oregon Group’ of scholars and is 
primarily concerned with how the psychological development of public risk perceptions inform 
individual attitudes towards risk.  
 
The Cultural Theory is based upon the works of Mary Douglas & Aaron Wildavsky and 
outlines how risk can be used by cultural groups within a struggle over regulatory systems. The 
Governmentality perspective is based upon the works of Michel Foucault to suggest how risk 
becomes instrumentalised by civil institutions and sponsors public coercion around levels of risk. 
The Risk society thesis is based on the works of Ulrich Beck & Anthony Giddens and suggests 
how society has become orientated around a reflexive modernity that questions the capability of 
institutions to organise capable responses to hazards. While each of these approaches provide 
valuable insights for risk research, they are often presented in conflict with one another for 
highlighting different aspects of risk as a sociopolitical construct. In an attempt to create an 
epistemological core to risk research, the Social Amplification of Risk Framework (SARF) was 
established which provides both theoretical and empirical insights into how the transmission of 
risk information by powerful social actors can produce wider social impacts. This chapter will 
further explore the general concept of SARF, paying particular attention to the role of 
newspapers as a social station of risk amplification. Finally, this chapter will address an article by 
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Vian Bakir (2010) that attempts to establish a more consolidated theory of mass media and risk. 
Bakir’s work is given special commendation within this thesis for attempting to grapple with an 
aspect of risk that has been left under-theorised by some of the more canonical risk scholars.  
 
Risk information and the 'Irrational' Public  
Chauncey Starr’s 1969 article, Social Benefit Versus Technological Risk, is often considered to be 
the origin point of socially orientated risk research (Burgess, 2017). While Starr’s statistical 
computations are somewhat antiquated, it was his general observations on the nature of public 
risk perception which have directly informed the sociological development of risk research 
(Thompson, 1990). Starr (1969) concluded that the public generally exhibited an 'irrational' 
tendency to overestimate the dangers posed form low-probability risks derived from applied 
technology. Starr contended that the public generally viewed involuntary imposed risks as more 
dangerous than voluntarily accepted risks (Starr, 1969; Starr et al, 1976). Starr also suggested that 
the general public did not incorporate the 'benefit' of relatively sage technologies into their own 
risk assessments (Starr, 1969; Starr & Whipple, 1980). This prompted Starr to ask the question 
'how safe is safe enough?' for applied technologies to be accepted by the public (Starr, 1969). 
 
 Starr’s conclusions highlighted a key failing in the assumptions of institutional risk managers 
at the time, that the public should operate upon a model of rational self-interest (also referred to 
as the benefit-risk relationship) where the proposed benefits of applied technology (in terms of 
saving labour or increasing life expectancy) should be seen to outweigh the risk of potential harm 
for a small minority of people (Starr, 1969; Otway & Cohen, 1975). Instead, Starr’s article 
demonstrates that the public hold their own social values to be self-evident, that it is the 
possibility for individuals to become one of the small minority who are negatively impacted by 
technology which informs risk perception and legitimises risk avoidant stances. Since Starr’s 
article, the field of risk research has attempted to understand what these social values are, and 
how social values directly inform public risk perceptions. Each of the four foundational sub-fields 
of risk research have made significant contributions to substantiate Starr’s initial claims. Each of 
these four foundational subfields - the psychometric paradigm, the governmentality perspective, the 




The Psychometric Paradigm 
The psychometric paradigm, established by ‘Oregon Group’ of scholars, sought to evaluate how 
different cognitive models of probabilistic choice informed public perceptions on risk (Slovic, 
Kunreuther, & White, 1974). Concordantly, similar research was published on heuristics, biases 
and probabilistic thinking that offered an explanatory basis for how people responded to natural 
hazards (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). The initial approach of the psychometric research aimed 
to establish the ‘personality of hazards' which outlined how characterising risks as (in)voluntary, 
controllable, potentially catastrophic, or dreaded, influenced the acceptance of risk (Starr, 1969; 
Lowrance, 1976). The positivist epistemology of the psychometric paradigm maintained some of 
the fundamental assumptions forwarded by Starr, namely that there was some degree of 
disjuncture between the technical assessments which produced evidence that applied 
technologies were safe, and the public perceptions of risk which viewed applied technologies as 
dangerous.  Early research within the psychometric paradigm demonstrated cross-cultural 
validity for the presumption that psychometric scaling metrics were appropriate tools to assess 
public risk perceptions. (see Slovic et al 1980; Teigen et al,1988; Bastide et al; 1989; and 
Goszczynska et al 1991). One key empirical method included magnitude estimation to assess risk 
perception derived from frequencies of fatal events (Stevens, 1958, Fischhoff et al., 1978; 
Lichtenstein et al., 1978). Later research supplemented this approach with more traditional 
survey-based designs.  
 
The work of Lennart Sjöberg has provided some of the more robust criticisms of the 
psychometric paradigm. Sjöberg (1996; 2003) contends that methods which assess the heuristic 
processing of risk information do not fully account for the variance of risk perception between 
populations. Furthermore, Sjöberg (1996; 2000; Sjöberg et al, 2004) suggests that the psychometric 
paradigm presumes that risk information processing is a wholly cognitive endeavour, and 
disregards emotional influences on perception. To this point, Sjöberg makes a criticism which is 
most relevant to this thesis, in that the psychometric paradigm often tends to emphasise how dread 
and trust inform risk perceptions, without considering how the moral implications of hazards 
modulates the public acceptance of risk (Sjöberg and Winroth, 1986; Sjöberg and Torell, 1993;  
Sjöberg 2000). Despite the limitations, the psychometric paradigm generated a wealth of 
knowledge that allows for a series of generalisable conclusions to be drawn on the nature of risk 
and public perception (Slovic, 1992). One of the key conclusions is that risk is more akin to a 
social construct that allows humans to negotiate the uncertainties and dangers of life. Evidence 
for this claim was made apparent  by demographic differences in risk perception between white, 




Risk perception, as a social construct, is a departure from the rational model of self-interest 
which suggests that risk is a calculable metric of benefit against harm (Starr 1969). The position 
that risk is a social construct undermines the conception that an ‘objective’ measure of risk is 
possible. When presented with ambiguous risk information, the lay public often rely upon their 
own set of intuitive heuristics when processing risk information (Han et al, 2006; Zhu et al, 2012). 
Research from behavioural economics suggests that there are two core heuristics which underpin 
public risk processing. First is the affect heuristic which centralises the emotional resonance of risk 
information in generating public risk perceptions (Slovic et al, 2007). Second is the availability 
heuristic, which suggests that risk perception is aided by what information individuals can recall 
from memory about risk (Tversky and Kahneman 1973). The coalescence of both heuristics can 
result in a representation bias, where the most readily recalled information is emotionally 
resonant reframing of risk information (Tversky and Kahneman 1973; Tversky and Kahneman 
1974). As such, news reporting on risk information becomes a primary influence on public risk 
reception as news stories rarely present risk without associating it with powerful affective 
imagery, such as damaged children (Folkes, 1988).  
 
Risk and Culture 
Seemingly in opposition to the psychometric paradigm’s positivist lens, the cultural theory 
approach adopts a constructivist epistemology and suggests that public risk perceptions are firmly 
rooted within wider frameworks of cultural biases (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1983; Wildavsky 
and Dake, 1990). The cultural theory approach was namely from Douglas’s background as an 
anthropologist, and reflects her criticisms of technical and psychological approaches to 
understanding risk. Douglas’s theorisation on risk aligns well with Swidler’s (1986) toolkit model 
of culture which suggests that cultural knowledge provides a repertoire of semiotic codes.  
Repeated use of a select number of codes establishes an ‘ecological space' to define the limits of 
danger and precaution (O’Riordan, 2013). The ecological boundaries of risk is demarcated by the 
cognitive limits of individuals and embedded within cultural subgroups (Tansey & O’Riordan, 
1999). As such, what could be considered risky to one cultural subgroup (e.g., cosmopolitan 
office workers) can be radically different to another group (e.g., working class van drivers). 
Douglas (1999) suggests that risk is, therefore, a social battle of dominance between disparate 
social groups to define what is considered risky and the appropriate public responses to manage 
risk.  Douglas (1990) further suggests that risk can be used as a forensic resource within sociology 
to explore the boundaries of definitional struggles by mapping the ever-shifting social attitudes 
towards risk. The forensic exploration of risk examines the sociolinguistic genealogy of 'risk' as a 
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phrase, and as a concept.  It is contended that 'risk' was originally associated with marine 
insurance markets of in the 17th century (Covello and Mumpower, 1985). By the mid-20th 
century, 'risk' had become more commonly associated with jobs and finance, before shifting to 
centre mostly on health and environmental hazards by the end of the 20th century (Zinn, 2018; 
Zinn & McDonald, 2018). The changes in expressional forms suggests that ‘risk' is subject to 
temporally bound linguistic redundancies, and has become incorporated into the language of 
populist struggles vying to utilise risk - as danger - to instrument social control (Lupton, 1993) 
 
Douglas (2013) suggests that the roots of social control is located within the concepts of sin, 
taboo, and scapegoating (blame).  Despite the Judaeo-Christian connotations of these phrases, 
Douglas suggests that the underlying concepts have cross cultural validity and exist 
independently of sociocultural and temporal contexts. Sin refers to a process of cultural 
homogenisation that stigmatises objects of risk as embodying future danger (Douglas, 2013; 
Lupton, 1993). Taboo details a cultural logic of ‘cause-and-effect’ and presupposes that 
transgressing established moral boundaries of acceptable (and therefore decidedly safe) 
behaviours, individuals invite future harms onto themselves and into their community (Douglas, 
2002; Tansey, 2004). Finally, Scapegoating defines a process whereby blame is collectively 
allocated onto a socially targeted victim (Douglas, 2002). The allocation of blame is 
unwarranted, misinformed, or misdirected, and relies upon directed social cognition to justify the 
victimisation. One justification is that the proceeding punishment of the stigmatised is believed 
to absolve the community of Sin in an attempt to control the expected future harms (Dimitrova 
& Strömbäck, 2005; Cox & Wood, 2017). By collectively engaging in scapegoating, community 
members also experience the emotional rewards from having (indirectly) participated in the 
collective action of seeking shared justice (Taylor, 2006; Zak & Barraza, 2009). Douglas is not 
alone in attaching theorisation to superstitious symbology. Concepts such as ‘phantom risk’ and 
‘voodoo risk’ identity risks which have been generated from cultural responses to a belief of 
danger (Park, 2002; Moore & Burgess, 2011). Often this is derived from court cases based upon 
dubious claims of harm, or reporting an adverse reaction to an inert stimuli (the 'Nocebo' effect) 
(Foster et al, 1999; Chapman et al, 2003; Colloca & Finniss, 2012). Voodoo risk extends the 
forensic resource of cultural theory to identify the mechanisms by which totemic behaviours in 
response to phantom risks become dispersed across culture through mediated information 
(Moore & Burgess, 2011).  
 
Douglas’s second major contribution to the cultural theory of risk is the Grid / Group typology. 
Douglas’s typology presents a polythetic scale which is occupied by at least four competing 
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cultural worldviews which reflect different preferences for risk management (Douglas, 1982, 
2007). The x-axis of the polythetic scale represents grid, which reflects social preferences for rules 
and established regulation. Positionally across the grid axis is suggested to be determined by four 
underlying desires: insulation from risk, degree of social autonomy, control over uncertainty, and 
preference for competition (Douglas, 1978). Those who prefer low grid (grid -1) can be expected 
to orientate towards risk responses which rely upon the spontaneous application of an 
individual’s skills, abilities, and resources (Altman & Baruch, 1998). Examples of preferred low 
grid responses to risk could include supporting volunteer rescue organisations (such as the Royal 
National Lifeboat Institution), spontaneous financial donations to charity appeals (such as 
Children in Need) or undertaking personal precautionary measures (such as doomsday 
prepping). Conversely, those who prefer high grid (grid+1) can be expected to orientate towards 
proscriptive risk responses from established, and trusted, sources (Altman & Baruch, 1998). 
Examples of preferred high grid responses to risk could be acting on institutional advice (such as 
advice from Public Health England), supporting organisations which campaign for policy change 
(such as Greenpeace), and relying upon tradition as a form of risk mitigation (such as organic 
farming methods). Group, the second variable within Douglas’s typology, identifies the 
preference for risk management solutions which are orientated around group identity. Group 
preferences are suggested to be determined by four key social elements: frequency of social 
interactions, expected mutuality between groups, scope of group activity across society, and 
scope of definitional boundaries when managing risk (Altman & Baruch, 1998). Those with a 
preference for high group (group +1) risk orientate around collective risk management strategies 
such as established organisations (such as Weight Watchers), or bureaucratically enforced policy 
changes (such as the ban on public smoking). Conversely, individuals who express low group 
(group -1) are expected to prefer individualistic responses to risk management such as personal 
lifestyle choices, application of consumer technologies, and access to risk information.   
 
From placement within the grid/group typology, four primary word views have been 
suggested (Douglas, 1982):   
(1) Hierarchist  (Grid +1 / Group +1) 
(2) Fatalist (Grid +1 / Group -1) 
(3) Enclavist (Grid -1 / Group +1)  
(4) Individualist (Grid -1 / Group -1) 
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Adherents to the Heirarchist worldview appear less inclined to identify risks, but more likely 
to prefer bureaucratic risk management strategies which utilise credentialed experts to define risk 
and prescribe public responses (Xue et al 2014) . Heirarchists can be expected to prefer risk 
responses which preserve power within public institutions and the state apparatus and may not 
consider a hazard which draws attention to failing policies as a risk. Adherents to the 
Individualist worldview appear likely to identify risk, but only within the context that a hazard is 
seen to threaten their own preferred way of life (Wildavsky & Dake 1990; and Kahan et al, 2012). 
Individualists are generally in favour of deregulation and assume personal responsibility to 
manage risk exposure (Xue et al 2014). Adherents to the Egalitarian worldview are more inclined 
to recognise risks as inherent forms of social injustice (Wildavsky & Dake 1990). Egalitarians are 
generally in favour of participatory democracy which aims to curb the production of harms by 
industry (Kahan et al, 2012). Adherents to the Fatalist worldview are generally inclined to be 
indifferent towards risk. It is not that Fatalists are blind to perceiving risk, but rather they tend to 
be distrustful of institutional risk information and risk management efforts (Brenot et al 1998).    
 
Risk and Governance  
The governmentality approach to risk centralises the wider sociological concerns around power, 
fairness, and control, regarding the management of  public behaviour around (and towards) 
suspected hazards (Powell and Steel, 2012). As such, the governmentally approach can be seen to 
be inherently structuralist and drew upon Michel Foucault’s analysis of  political power, to 
suggest that Governments (and other powerful institutions) deploy ‘technologies of  the self ’ to 
identify and control risky groups (Foucault, 1988). The application of  ‘technologies of  the self ’ 
outlines the precautionary nature of  political regimes, which endorses technologies that 
instrumentalises human resources to coerce public (through the threat of  force) to achieve 
desired policy goals  (Ewald, 1999; Dreyfus & Spinosa, 2003). As an abstract concept, risk can be 
considered a 'technology of the self' when institutions implement precautionary policies which 
attempt to manage the exposure of risky populations to the general public (Rose, 1993; 
O’Malley, 2008). The result is the personification of 'risk factors' which signifies specific social 
groups as a threat to the ongoing security of regulatory regimes (Castel et al 1991).  For example, 
the association between homosexuality and HIV / AIDS during the 1980s/1990s saw the 
establishment of policies which banned homosexual men from donating blood in an effort to 
protect the ‘safety’ of the blood supply (Hurley, 2009). The HIV example demonstrate how 
'objective' factors (I.e. Homosexuality) can be used to denote risk, and warrant institutional 
interventions to protect the general public from harm (Pratt, 1997). This raises substantive 
questions regarding the formulation of 'objectivity', which is often based on an aggregate of 
16 
 
expertise and evaluation (Castel et al, 1991). Expertise is used by regulatory regimes to illuminate 
what the hidden risk factors are, and prescribe preventative strategies (Rose, 1992). It is 
suggested that focus of preventative strategies has changed over time, from emphasising the role 
of institutional control towards internalised risk management. For instance the governance of 
pregnancy has moved from the institutional control of women’s bodies - for the safety of both 
mother and baby - towards identifying the mother as wholly responsible for the health of her 
unborn child (Weir 1996; Ruhl 1999).  
 
The media has been identified as a key resource which aids the self-governmentality of risk 
(Colombo, 2013; Castells et al, 2009). Columbo (2013, pp310) contends that the media reinforces 
the self-governmentality of risk by presenting hegemonic values of precaution as a form of social 
control. Risk-based news reporting is also used to define a framework of new objectivities on risk 
(in lieu of technical risk assessment) (Perreault 2005:198; Maclean, 2013). Often, this approach 
utilises social expertise to explore the interplay between risk and control, especially at the 
margins of society. Where examples of risk and control (or lack thereof) is made apparent, social 
actors are regularly observed utilising blame to redefine the boundaries of risk and coerce the 
political process (Hood, 2002). Given the focus on policy and control, the governmentality 
approach is often criticised as emphasising a top-down perspective rather than situating risk 
within wider cultural contexts (O’Malley et al. 1997; Frankel 1997; Novas and Rose 2000) 
 
Risk and Society  
The Risk Society thesis, based primarily on the work of Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens, 
contends that society has entered a new phase of modernity (dubbed reflexive modernity) where 
prevalent sociopolitical flux has resulted in a social order where populations frequently confront 
the lack of personal control over the risks produced by an increasingly globalised world (Beck, 
1994; Hughes and Ferguson, 2000; Tomlinson, 1999; and Mythen, 2004).  Mass media has been 
central to this process by framing discourses around risk as ubiquitous; contrasting public 
assumptions of safety and order, with novel information regarding danger and chaos (Adam and 
van Loon, 2000; Lupton, 1999; Lyng, 2008; Mythen, 2004). From the televised atrocities of the 
9/11 terror attacks, to the ongoing social media debates around climate change, childhood 
vaccinations, and artificial intelligence, the fluidity of information has facilitated public discourse 
which presents challenges for the antiquated ability of state power to control mass perception 
(Mythen, 2004). Improved access to information has enabled the public to build social identities 
around lifestyles which aim to limit risk exposure (such as veganism or doomsday preppers) 
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(Beck-Gernsheim, 2000; Adam & van Loon, 2000). The rapid proliferation of fragmented social 
identities has also encouraged conflict across the social order over definitions of risk amongst 
competing groups (Beck, Giddens & Lash, 1994).     
 
Individualisation has been identified as the process by which risk information is distributed 
across the risk society (Engel and Strasser, 1998; Goldblatt, 1995; Mol and Spaargaren, 1993). 
The distributional logic of individualisation outlines a set of organisational principles where 
ethical concerns, ideological connotations, and perceptions of institutional risk management 
shape the flow of risk information across the social strata (Beck, Lash & Wynne 1992; Mythen, 
2004). In essence, the general public have become increasingly concerned with the social 
distribution of the ‘bads’ produced by global commerce, which are seen to outweigh the ‘goods’ 
produced by industrial output (Beck, 1992). Access to risk information that outlines the 'bads' of 
global commerce works to  disembed individuals from traditional social relations and re-embeds 
them within an unsettling sociopolitical reality (Beck-Gernsheim, 2000;  Lash, Urry & Urry, 
1994; Giddens, 1994) The new, unsettling, sociopolitical reality of reflexive modernisation extends 
beyond traditional class-based struggles and allows the public to reflect on how their own 
personal biography has aided the development of predatory techno-capitalism (Beck-Gernsheim, 
2000; Giddens 1991; Beck, 1995; Beck et aI., 1994).  
 
The disembedding and re-embedding process of individualisation is theorised to be facilitated 
by organised irresponsibility, observable examples where powerful social actors contend that they 
are managing risk exposure, which their manifest behaviour seemingly permits the production of 
further risks (Beck, 1995).  The lack of political will to ensure public safety is linked to the 
increasing technological dependency of contemporary politico-economic contexts (Krusell and 
Ríos-Rull, 2002; Lancia and Prarolo, 2012). As such, the Risk Society thesis is positioned within 
a realist - constructivist epistemology, which holds that levels of risk can be quantified, but that 
the use of such evidence is dependent upon socially constructed acceptance (Mythen, 2004). Risk 
can become detoxified by scientific authority, which relies upon repeated assertions that data 
provides reassuring evidence that control of risk is possible in the future (Adam and van Loon, 
2000). Mythen, (2004) suggests that the symbolic detoxification of risk could be harmful to 
public health when: (1) at risk populations may falsely presume their own personal safety is 
assured. (2) potential crises could be exacerbated through institutional concealment of risk 
information. Beck (1992; 1995) contends that increased public awareness of symbolic 
detoxification will result in a crisis of confidence, causing a 'social explosion' of risk perception 




The Social Amplification of Risk Framework - an integrative approach to 
risk research 
The Social Amplification of Risk Framework (SARF) is  designed as a comprehensive mode 
of inquiry to explore the cascade of risk information across society. SARF synthesises key 
theoretical and empirical contributions from the psychometric paradigm, cultural theory, 
governmentality, and the risk society thesis, into a robust analytical tool which maps the process 
of how the information emerging from a single risk event can result in wider sociopolitical 
impacts (Kasperson et al, 1988; Renn, 1991;  Kasperson et al, 2003; Breakwell, 2007). SARF 
adopts a realist-constructivist epistemology. It presumes that the technical assessment of risk 
works in tandem with the affective factors of risk to influence public perceptions of risk. Central 
to SARF is the metaphor of risk amplification, which conceptualises risk information as socially 
constructed signals (imagery, signs, and symbols). Risk signals are (re)produced by various social 
actors, who populate increasingly sophisticated social stations as risk information ascends 
through established social hierarchies (Frewer et al, 2003).  
Under SARF, amplification stations are theorised as social institutions or public groupings 
which engage in the symbolising, processing and representing of risk information (Fellenor et al., 
2020) News media occupy a position as an amplification station, alongside informal social 
networks, non-profit organisations, and government departments (to name a few examples). 
Conceptually, social stations amplify risk information by emitting risk signals that exaggerate the 
probability, or extent, of potential future harms from an identified hazard (Bakir, 2005). While 
social stations are able to bring risk issues to public awareness, there is often the tendency for 
social stations to oversimplify and misrepresent the risk information produced by technical 
assessments (Smith and McCloskey 1998). Amplified risk then adopts new meaning by different 
sections of the general public who interpret such signals through their own intuitive lens of 
psychosocial information processing (Kasperson et al, 2003). While SARF gives a conceptual 
overview of how social stations amplify risk, the differences in how risk becomes amplified by 
different social stations has yet to be fully explored (Pidgeon and Barnett 2013). Fellenor et al., 
(2020) suggests that specific amplification stations should be considered as a nexus for risk 
information that are composed of 'actual and virtual objects' which act upon risk information to 
produce the representational status of risk. While it was not the intent of this thesis to better 
establish how news media functions as an amplification station, the data provided by chapters 
five and six provide some evidence which outlines how journalistic conventions operate to help 




One of the core contentions of SARF is that the amplification of risk produces a set of 
anticipated social responses (Renn, 1991). The first anticipated response is that, as the volume of 
information available about a specific risk increases (due to a focus from technical assessment) it 
becomes likely for risk information to be incorporated into the apparatus of powerful social 
stations (Breakwell and Barnet, 2003). News media seemingly occupies an intermediary space as 
a social station of risk amplification, in that news organisation have the resources to access risk 
information produced by other powerful social stations (such as government or universities), 
while also being receptive to the concerns over risk from interpersonal information channels such 
as informal social networks. The second anticipated response occurs when newspapers decide to 
focus a substantial degree of resources to provide protracted coverage of a specific risk, rapidly 
proliferating the volume of risk information available within the public sphere by leveraging a 
range of news sources to maintain a news cycle (Kasperson et al, 1988; Kitzinger, 1999). As 
Bauer et al (2006) observed, protracted news cycles on risk exhibit a tendency to proliferate the 
volume of risk information until a peak reporting volume is achieved and, while interest in the 
risk becomes muted within newspapers, the story never fully disappears from the news agenda. 
The third anticipated response is that as news media popularise risk within their reporting, this 
will facilitate the production of more risk information from a constellation of sophisticated social 
organisations (Slovic, 1993). Such a positive feedback loop generates a substantial volume of 
information that knowledge of risk becomes salient within society, encouraging easy recollection 
of information by members of the public which is filtered through their personal values and 
media diet (Petts et al, 2000; Tulloch & Lupton, 2001). The fourth anticipated response is that, 
when amplified, risk information produces second order ripple effects and third order impacts upon 
various organisations across society. The ripple effect concept outlines a temporal process whereby 
the responses to amplified risk information begin to be observed within increasing auxiliary 
organisations (Kasperson et al, 2003).  
 
Ripple effects draw upon the metaphor of a stone being thrown into a pond, where the largest 
ripples occur at the point of impact and dissipate outwards across the pond. At the point of 
impact, only a limited number of individuals and organisations can be expected to be impacted 
by a risk - the immediate victims and the organisations held directly responsible. As the ripples 
dissipate across the social landscape, more distal associations may also be impacted (by being 
brought into the public discourse or identifying the need for policy change) and alter their modes 
of operation accordingly.  For example, during the BSE crisis beef farmers saw a decline in 
revenue as the general public avoided risky British beef. However, exotic meat farmers, and 
importers, observed a short-lived increase in orders as supermarkets began to stock novel beef 
substitutes for their customers (Adams & Revell, 1998). The third order impacts of risk 
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amplification have been established by SARF, and include factors such as changes to public 
behaviour, organisational restructuring, regulatory changes, and litigation,  (Kasperson et al, 
2003, Renn, 2011). Changes in consumer behaviour are often witnessed as abstaining from 'risky' 
purchases and choosing 'safer' (healthier) market alternatives instead (Horgen et al, 2002).  
Regulatory changes can be observed as an expedient way for government to garner favour with 
the electorate by being seen to protect the public from (potential) harm (Leiss 2003).  
Organisational restructuring occurs after a publicised risk event in an attempt to restore lost 
public confidence in a company, institution, or government (Beelitz & Merkl-Davis, 2012).  
Litigation is one way in which victims of risk can seek justice within a court of law (Pirk, 2002). 
Litigation describes a process whereby blame and compensation is ultimately established by the 
judicial system in situations where it is argued that damages were accrued from the inappropriate 
management of risk.  
 
The role of news media is central to the social amplification of risk through the process of 
framing risk as a dangerous stimulus for a large proportion of the general public, which can 
trigger risk perception processing pathways (see Binder et al. 2014, Petts et al. 2001; Horlick-
Jones, Sime and Pidgeon 2003; Häcker et al, 2014). The 'framing of risk as danger' is broad and 
context dependent (Henwood et al, 2008). In some cases, risk is framed as a danger of physical 
harm, or death, posed by a hazard or technology (e.g. radioactive emissions from nuclear power 
plants) (Fillmore & Atkins, 1992). In other cases, risk is framed as a moral hazard, where shifting 
policy outcomes could disadvantage vulnerable groups (e.g., victims of improper drug regulation 
being left without social support) (Baker, 1996). Chapter five further explores the multifaceted 
way that 'danger' is communicated by a newspaper to their readership.     
 
Newspaper framing of 'risk as danger' serves as an example SARF’s conceptualisation of risk 
information as signals. Risk signals are designed around communicative artefacts which suggest 
a possible future that anticipates harm, conflict, and struggle (Van de Brug et al, 2014). The 
amplification of risk signals relies upon the four key elements of the sender-receiver model: (1) the 
sender; (2) the message; (3) the communication channels; and (4) the receivers (Murdock et al, 
2003). The signal sender is an actor that is embedded within a social station of risk amplification. 
The sender relies upon their credibility as an information source to communicate risk across 
interested parties (Jenkins-Smith and Silva, 1998) Credibility can be established through the 
presumptions of reliability, expertise, authenticity or authority of the sender (Richardson, 2003). 
Where credibility can not be established (or presumed), the sender’s message may be rejected as 
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lies, fabrication, or ‘tall tales’ that omit the sender as an information source. The message is the 
specific packet of risk information issued by the sender (Lundgren and McMakin, 2018).  
 
The message can be a specific statement form a single source or, as is the case in news stories, 
a coalition of statements from a variety of sources. The message is often composite of hard data, 
social facts, and narrative framing devices which outline the potential severity of risk, and the 
danger from (a lack of) regulation.  Communication channels refers to the flow of information 
across communication stations (Griffin et al, 1998). Communication channels may be formal or 
informal, planned or ad hoc, and provide a site whereby the message can define risk and suggest 
methods of risk management (see Johnson and Covello 1987; Dake 1991; (Renn, 1991; Rayner 
1992; Peters and Slovic, 1996; Marris, Langford, and O'Riordan 1998). Communication channels 
often work to shape the message of risk by applying their own worldview, institutionalised bias, 
and preferred ideologies to risk information.  
 
The criteria for news selection demonstrates how news media, as a social station, has a 
clearly established bias towards some aspects of risk information as ‘newsworthy’ (I.e. novelty, 
sensation, relatable, risk affirming) (for a more substantial review on risk and news values, see 
Kitzinger, 1999).  Finally, the receivers are the target audience of risk information (Bradbury, 
1994). The receiver is presumed to decode the amplified risk message, resulting in the formulation 
of risk perceptions. Receivers do not passively internalise risk information, as it is filtered through 
an individual’s decision-making heuristics. During decision making processes, the framing of risk 
information is contrasted against an individual’s resonant cultural values before being accepted 
as ‘probably true’, or rejected as ’complete bullshit’ (Pennycook et al, 2015). In order to aid the 
heuristic acceptance of risk information, message senders capitalise upon known narratives of trust, 
blame, stigma, and dread to tailor their products towards an established demographic of receivers 
(an audience) (Vaughan 1995; Palmer, 2003).  
 
To date, there is limited research available which substantiates the theorised link between 
risk amplification and higher order impacts. However, this dearth of data is more a result of 
different research priorities than an inability to demonstrate a phenomenon. Over the past twenty 
years, the core focus of SARF-based research was to empirically validate the constituent factors 
of risk amplification (Kesperson, 2003). The factors of risk amplification have been clustered into 
two groups: the information mechanism, and the response mechanism (Adekola, 2020). Aspects of the 
information mechanism are primarily concerned with how the creative process of news media 
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facilitates the amplification of risk information through the overall volume of risk information, 
the dramatisation of risk information, and the degree of dispute over facts (Kasperson, et al 
1988). Mazur, (1987; 1990) suggests that the media production of a volume of risk information 
amplifies risk through four distinct means.  
 
Firstly, intense media coverage of a specific hazard raises the residual public concerns 
regarding risk. Secondly, the public demand for risk management is dependent upon the volume 
of media coverage on a specific hazard. Thirdly, powerful news organisations are privileged in 
their ability to shape the national conversation on risk issues through their coverage. Fourthly, 
event-orientated coverage speaks to broader issues of danger and control in the minds of the 
audience. Renn (1991) advices caution in emphasising the effect of volume as an amplification 
factor without taking into account how news organisations can modulate and frame risk 
information to satisfy their audiences (see also Wilkins and Patterson 1987; 1991; Freudenburg et 
al. 1996; Boholm 1998; Kitzinger, 1999).   
 
The dramatisation of risk information has been linked to the disproportionate overstatement 
of risk within news reporting due to the sensationalisation and politicisation of information 
(Covello & Johnson, 1987; Wahlberg and Sjoberg, 2000). The dramatisation of risk result from 
the selective inflation of quantified levels of harm. This is usually achieved by selecting the upper 
boundaries of a technically assessed hazard (Combs and Slovic, 1979). Alternatively, the 
dramatisation of risk can be narratively driven within news articles which capitalise upon 
alarming language to generate intrigue in the story (Frewer et al, 1998). However, Freudenburg et 
al (1996: p. 38) provides evidence to suggests that news reporting is generally orientated around 
presenting a factual summary of events, statements, and information, rather than fabricating 
drama. More recently, Molek-Kozakowska (2013) suggests that sensationalist elements are be 
more common within the headlines of news stories, while the body of the story seeks to balance 
alarming and reassuring statements (Wahlberg & Sjoberg, 2000; Kitzinger, 1999).  
 
The degree of dispute over facts outlines the popularisation of conflicting definitions over risk 
(Dunwoody, 2014). Within popular mediated disputes, 'facts' do not exclusively refer to objective 
measurements of risk, but rather the collation of evidence that supports (or rejects) a perception 
of reality (Mooney and Nisbet, 2005). Evidence, in this regard, can incorporate objective data 
alongside experiential observations, authoritative claims, and socially entrenched modes of 
thinking (e.g., 'common sense') (Whitmarsh, 2008; Brossard and Nisbet, 2007; Greenspan et al, 
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2001). By highlighting the conflicts between experts, politicians, and victims, news media 
manufactures public uncertainty over the over the legitimacy of facts, the credibility of expertise, 
and the intent of risk management policies (Mazur, 1987). Dispute between experts within the 
public arena often feature a dissenting expert opinion that challenges the 'scientific consensus' - 
data used to support risk governance (Drope & Chapman, 2001). Often, dissent is focused upon 
claims which challenge the impartiality of experts, suggesting that their research has been 
influenced by external pressures to produce a specific result (Munnichs, 2004). This brings into 
question the privileged position that experts hold within democratic societies, and the expected 
role of mediation between knowledge production and ethical application (Grundman, 2017). In 
other cases, dispute is generated between the public and scientific experts. These disputes often 
cast doubt on the legitimacy of the scientific method to accurately consider the social reality of 
risk or suggest that scientific experts are immorally detached from victims of technology (Shapin, 
2009).  
 
The remaining elements of risk amplification are grouped together under the response 
mechanism. These elements include the framing of trust, blame, stigma, and dread in relation to 
risk information (Kasperson et al, 2003; Breakwell, 2010; Flynn, 2003; Burgess, 2012). The 
response mechanism emphasis how narrative appeals to preconceived biases on sociopolitical issues 
can amplify risk correspondingly. The framing of trust aids risk amplification by expressing a 
degree of confidence in institutional actors to operate in a socially responsible manner (Lofstedt, 
2005). Generally, high degrees of trust afforded towards civic institutions permits organisational 
agendas to be pursued without much scrutiny, scepticism, or resistance (Rykkja et al, 2011). 
However, as a social currency, the value of trust is in continual flux and must be constantly 
reinforced through trust-building actions. Trust can also be destroyed when the actions of civic 
institutions are framed as unfair, ineffective, and/or incompetent (Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2004). 
Negative framing of trust can amplify risk  by suggesting that the evidence which assures safety 
was achieved by an information source with vested interests in the proposed technology (Frewer, 
2003). Löfstedt (2005) suggests that Western nations currently operate as a ‘post-trust society', 
where trust in civic institutions are so low that the public are more inclined to trust non-scientific 
sources provide honest information on risks.  
 
 Blame is the next element of amplification within the response mechanism (Susarla, 2003). 
Functionally, blame works to identify where institutional actors are seen to fail in their 
responsibility to protect the public from harm (Gephart, 1993). Within newspapers blame 
requires a centralising human actor, often within a position of power, in order for risks to be 
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amplified (Burgess, 2012; Frumkin, 2010). Failure to protect the public from harm can be framed 
as a problem with regulatory inaction, deliberate risk obfuscation, or immoral negligence of duty 
(Bickerstaff & Walker, 2002). It has been suggested that blame is  embedded cultural practices 
that identify, and ostracise, those who introduce danger to the community (Douglas, 2002; Lash, 
2000).  
 
Hood (2002) makes a direct link between 'the blame game' and 'the risk game'. For Hood 
(2002), the ‘game’ is a process whereby exposure to blame must be managed to limit future 
institutional impacts. Blame management usually takes place as a precautionary measure through 
adherence to regulation, control over risk information, and positive public relation campaigns. 
However, in the aftermath of a risk event risk management becomes significantly more difficult, 
given the prevailing negativity bias carries by the press (Hood, 2010). Given that newspapers 
have positioned themselves as the public watchdog, especially when campaigning on risk issues, 
organisations would much prefer to not attract the attention of journalists during a time of crisis 
so as to avoid profit-threatening impacts (Burgess, 2012). It is suggested that the media’s 
negativity bias further shapes public opinion by framing the statements and actions of 
institutional actors as socially irresponsible, while also omitting examples of good governance 
(Koren and Klein 1991; Kasperson 1992). It has been suggested that exposure to negative 
framing of events, and direct attribution of blame, can serve as a stimulus for collective action 
from an outraged public (Sandman, 1993) 
 
Another element of amplification within the response mechanism is stigmatisation. The core 
concept of stigmatisation processes is that technologies, products, people, or locations become 
readily associated with abnormal hazards. (Goffman, 1963; Slovic et al, 1991; Gregory et al, 
1995). Stigmatisation occurs when prejudiced imagery is utilised to normalise behaviour which 
rejects a marked target to control risk exposure (Satterfield 2001; Phelan et al, 2008). 
Stigmatisation processes exhibit a triangular relationship between affective reactivity, cultural 
worldviews, and cognitive appraisal to appraise hazards and influence risk perceptions (Peters et al; 
2004). Affective Reactivity outlines how individual’s identity and respond to to dangerous or 
disgusting stimuli, to limit their exposure to risk (Haselton and Ketelaar, 2006). It is suggested 
that, after exposure to emotionally or physically unpleasant stimuli, people become sensitive to 
prejudging harm from similar hazards and overcompensate in their actions to avoid harm 




 Exposure to unpleasant stimuli can be based on direct experience, or through mediated 
content which juxtaposes risky behaviour with negative experiences (e.g., Sex and HIV/STD 
scares) (Johnson, 2013). Next, Cultural worldviews outline how behavioural responses are 
mediated by both social relationships and generalised attitudes towards sociopolitical issues 
(Dake 1991). Cultural worldviews aid stigmatisation by pre-packaging the intolerance of perceived 
threats to cultural systems and legitimising disproportionate responses to cleanse society of an 
apparent danger (Oyserman & Swim, 2001). Cultural worldviews are instrumental in framing an 
individual’s attitude towards risk by providing a lens to imputes significance and value to 
information (Jenkins-Smith, 1993).  
 
Finally, Cognitive appraisal of risk incorporates a higher order processing of factors such as 
probabilities and coping-potential into decision making schemas (Smith and Ellsworth, 1985; 
Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003;). Cognitive appraisal does not assume that probabilistic information 
is derived from technical assessment, but from evolved intuition (Lieberman, 2000). Individuals 
are presumed to cognitively assess threats to their either their survival or social opportunities and 
respond to avoid extensive damage (Looney & Liang, 2003). The quality of responses resulting 
from cognitive appraisal of risk is susceptible to emotional flux (Frijda et al, 1989; Karasawa, 1995). 
Emotions such as fear, anger and happiness are assumed to exert direct and causal influence over 
cognitive appraisal. Research by Lerner and Keltner (2000; 2001) has demonstrated that anger 
exacerbates risk estimates and risk seeking behaviour, while fear acts as a suppressant. In 
situations which provoke outrage, this may suppress logical responses to stigmatised groups, and 
facilitate collective or individual actions to which seek to control the targets of stigmatisation to 
‘protect’ society.  
  
The final element of amplification within the response mechanism is Dread. As an affective 
component of risk, dread factors are constituent aspects of risk which heighten the expected 
likelihood of a catastrophe (Slovic and Weber, 2002). The mass communication of risk 
information can influence the perception that low-probability, high-impact risks (such as nuclear 
disaster) are, in-fact, imminent existential threats (Langford, 2002). The communication of dread 
frames risks as an existential threat to the survivability of social order (Abulof, 2009).  It is 
suggested that dread-induced decision making is achieved by drawing conclusions from a dual 
system of association-based and experientially based information processing (Slovic & Weber, 2002; 
Weber, 2006. Association-based processing details a system where affective imagery and semantic 
codes construct a logic of symbolic interactions. Decision making under the logic of symbolic 
interactions is often rash and speculative, allowing individuals to create linkages from limited 
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evidence where an impending disaster is believed to be real.  Alternatively, experientially based 
processing outlines a system of logical deduction based upon the known rules of reality. 
Perceptions of risk are generated from a rule of 'most likely to occur' developed from existing 
knowledge architectures. Such architectures include previously encountered technical 
information and historiographical experiences. Where mediated risk information provides the 
framing stimulus for dread-based decision making, individuals may actively try and control their 
presumed exposure to risk, even if the statistical assessment does not warrant policy intervention 
(Fetherstonhaugh et al, 1997).  
 
Risk and News Media  
 News organisations have been elevated to prominence within risk research due to their 
intermediary role in disseminating risk information between public and institutional sources 
(Binder et al, 2014). Despite many of the canonical approaches to risk acknowledging the 
importance of news media to facilitate a mass understanding of risk, there is still a relative lack of 
theorisation which specifically focuses on risk and the media. Where work on risk and the media 
exists, it has not been collated under a unifying theoretical approach and is at risk of falling into 
esoteric irrelevance. Bakir (2010) attempted to address this issue by consolidated the loose 
strands of research on risk and news media to suggest four key theoretical perspectives: (1) News 
as an informative medium; (2) News and the modulation of risk acceptance; (3) News as encouraging 
accountability; (4) News as providing an imaginative schema. While Bakir’s article only goes part-
way in addressing the under theorisation of risk and the media, it still provides a worthy 
contribution to this theory.  
 
As an informative medium, news media is presumed to assist in developing an informed public 
body by holding government, and institutions, to account for failing policies (Habermas, 1989, 
1992; Curran et al, 2009). This process involves journalists seeking to report on the information 
that is obfuscated and less readily available for interrogation by the general public. It is also 
presumed that the relative power of mass media news organisations allows them to set the public 
agenda for discussion, especially where the government is seen to permit the introduction of risks 
into society (Frost et al, 1997). The ability for news organisations to set the public agenda is 
derived from the selective nature of reporting. 
 
 News reporting often ignores complex and long-term risks in favour of exploring a limited 
selection of issues resulting from a crisis event (Kitzinger et al. 2002; Kitzinger, 1999; Hansen 
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1991; Kitzinger and Reilly 1997). While the press maintain that they are dedicated to 'balance 
and truth', this is often shaped by the ideological orientation of news organisations (Carvalho 
and Burgess 2005; Smith 2005). News organisations adopt differential stances in framing risk by 
spotlighting some aspects of information while omitting other aspects (Kitzinger et al. 2002; 
Quigley 2005; Woods 2007). It has been suggested that the ideological drive of news 
organisations sees them framing the public perception of risk to exert pressure on institutional 
decision makers and exert control over the policy making process (Bakir 2005; Driedger 2008; 
Nisbet and Huge 2006; Quigley 2005; Schuck and de Vreese 2006). As such, the information 
provided to audiences is tailored to their interests, concerns, and cultural insecurities rather than 
providing a neutral and unbiased understanding of risk embedded within a wider sociopolitical 
context. 
 
 Ideally, to obtain a neutral understanding of risk information, the public are expected to 
purchase their news from multiple, conflicting, sources. However, this practice is far from the 
norm for media consumers, who seemingly prefer that their interests be catered to (Nadler, 
2016). The consumer demand for specially tailored risk information has aided the contemporary 
development of news as an entertainment market, with many newspapers dabbling in 
'infotainment' to attract new customers, despite constantly falling circulation figures (Sumner et 
al, 2014; Murdock, Petts, and Horlick-Jones et al 2003; Tanner, 2004; Hallin & Mancini, 2004). 
 
 'Infotainment' poses a novel challenge to the 'fair and unbiased' communication of risk 
information; in that it is the proactive adoption of politically partisan and hyper-sensationalist 
positions on issues by news organisations. Furthermore, risk as ‘infotainment’ places 
disproportionate value on the value of controversy, publicised failures of expert value systems, 
and public conflict between stakeholders (Taylor-Gooby and Zinn 2006, Bakir 2005; Peters 
1995). News as ‘infotainment’ can further amplify risk by eroding public confidence in sound 
expert advice by being highly critical, and unnecessarily adversarial, towards public institutions 
as a capitalist venture (Bakir and Berlow 2007, Paek & Hove, 2017). Furthermore, news as 
‘infotainment’ has the tendency to promote fringe actors whose radical policy recommendations 
for risk management are appealing platitudes that rely upon blaming the government for not 
having secured public safety in the first place (Wynne 1996; Critcher 2008). 
 
The second branch of risk and media research focuses on the modulation of risk acceptance 
within the news. News modulation on risk acceptance occurs within the ongoing media 
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discourse regarding the contested nature of judgements, moral acceptability of risk, and the 
ethical arguments around governance (Taylor-Gooby and Zinn, 2006; Bakir, 2007; Critcher, 
2007; Michelle, 2007). Ongoing media discourses on the acceptability of risk contribute to wider 
sociocultural narratives on power and control through varied media products, including 
newsprint, digital content, and documentary film (Elam, 2005; Allan, 2002; Gorke and 
Ruhrmann 2003; Haran et al. 2008; Hughes, Kitzinger, and Murdock, 2006; Kitzinger et al, 
2002; Tulloch and Lupton 1997). Furthermore, narrative forms of news media are suggested to 
be an effective way for the public to engage with contemplation on the structural consequences of 
mismanaged risk (Gorke and Ruhrmann 2003; Kitzinger and Reilly 1997; Kitzinger et al, 2002). 
Media narratives on risk generally adopt a 'post-normal' approach to scientific communication, 
now that sacrifices factual accuracy, and conventional structures of scientific reports, to capitalise 
upon the ‘tabloidisation’ of urgency, uncertainty, and dispute (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1992; 
Ferreira 2006).   
 
The post-normal approach to scientific communication is often more readily accessible to 
wider audiences, due to the informal structure and the tendency to wrestle with relatable moral 
questions regarding hazards, danger, and threats (Althaus, 2005; Bakir 2010).  Recent studies 
suggests that news narratives on risk can undergo a process of 'storification', where the 
revelations and event bound within news coverage of a risk become ingrained in cultural 
memory (Sellnow et al, 2018) . These cultural narratives on risk serve as cautionary tales of risk 
governance through iterative retellings of the moral, ethical, or practical failings of government 
to manage risks for the public (Burgess, 2019; Mairal, 2011.) 
 
The third branch of risk and the media investigates how the news encourages accountability.  It 
is suggested that news media promotes accountability by encouraging individuals to adopt 
personal responsibility for their exposure to risk (Cottle 1998). Alezewski (2006) suggests that 
news organisations dedicate significant resources towards risk information campaigns in an 
attempt to ‘positively’ influence their readers’ attitudes and behaviours when adopting personal 
responsibility. What constitutes as a ‘positive’ change is very much framed by the news 
organisation’s selective framing of scientific evidence, expert advice, and moralistic arguments. 
While Bakir (2010) argues that there is limited theorisation on news-based risk information 
campaigns, Eide and Knight (1999) suggest that 'service journalism' promotes mass responses to 




Service journalism is identified as a form of hybrid journalism where news stories are 
designed around expert publications that offer guidance and advice as a public service (Ferrucci, 
2015). Service journalism is presumed to offer news audiences with the motivation to accept 
personal responsibility by suggesting technological, political, and behavioural strategies to 
manage risk exposure (Eide and Knight, 1999; McCurdy, 2011; Lester, and Hutchins, 2012). By 
providing news audiences with the motivation and strategies for change, individuals may alter 
their personal exposure to risk en masse by abstaining from unwise, risky, lifestyle choices and 
choosing safer alternatives. The media’s individualised approach to encouraging accountability 
appears to be closely related to the privatisation of risk (Cottle, 1998; Castel et al, 1991; Althaus, 
2005).  
 
Conceptually, the privatisation of risk suggests a cognitive route whereby aggregate risk data 
for an entire population is internalised by the individual, who then personally accepts the 
responsibility to improve the metrics by contributing to perceived mass behavioural change 
(Castel, et al, 1991; Althaus 2005). One theory which aids the privatisation of risk is the perceived 
similarity of news organisations. This theory suggests that the public are more inclined to accept 
prescriptive behavioural changes that are published from media outlets which are believed to 
reflect their own personal characteristics, worldviews, and cultural values (Andsager et al, 2006; 
Austin & Meili, 1994). Research suggests that, where perceived similarity is high, audiences are 
more trusting of risk information and more inclined to follow prescriptive advice (Andsager et al, 
2006; Aldoory & Van Dyke, 2006).  
 
The final branch of risk and media research focuses on how news organisations provide 
imaginative schemata for individuals to process risk information. Generally, news organisations 
present risk as a threat to be avoided. However, in rare cases, informative media presents risk-
seeking as aspirational, socially daring, and utilitarian. Bakir (2010) suggests that the theoretical 
development of news media providing imaginative schemata draws heavily from Lyng’s (1990; 
2004; 2005; 2008) work on edgework, and Lash’s (2000) work in conceptualising risk cultures. The 
central thesis underpinning edgework is that informative media has increasingly framed elite-class 
risk seeking activities (I.e. skydiving, ultra-marathons, cycling, etc) as a positive emotional 
experience. which relies upon mastery and skill to avoid death while bordering on the ‘edge’ of 
catastrophe (Ferrell et al, 2001; Lyng, 2004). Conversely, mundane risk-seeking behaviour (e.g., 
excessive drinking, recreational drugs, unprotected sex, etc) is presented by news media as an 
indulgence of human nature which places the individual at unnecessary risk (Hickson, 2018).  
Lash’s (2000) concept of risk cultures suggests that social groups exist across society that are 
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differentiated according to accepted realities on risk and harm. Lash (2000) suggests that 
‘sublime judgements’ on risk inform a group’s foundational understanding on risk. ‘Sublime 
judgements’ are achieved by applying a well-defined schema to acquired risk information, 
resulting in speculation on future harms. Lash (2000) suggests that ‘sublime judgements’ are 
derived from cognitive processing of risk information but from reflexive, reactive, and 'raw' 
emotion.  
Generally, groups constructed around a specific judgement on risk are small and concerned 
with local risk management (e.g., electromagnetic radiation and the siting of mobile phone 
masts). These are usually defined by news media as pressure groups, special interest groups, or 
campaigning groups due to the highly specific focus and goals of the group. However, as Burgess 
(2003) demonstrates, news media can increase the public profile of pressure groups, seemingly 
legitimising their ‘sublime judgement’ on risk as a valid regulatory concern. Furthermore, by 
attributing statements to pressure group sources, news reporting enables geographically distal 
pressure groups to conglomerate under a specific definition of risk.  
 
The conglomeration of pressure groups may not result in the creation of a formal 
organisation, but conglomeration enables subscribers to a ‘sublime judgment’ to share resources, 
information, and strategies between one another (Diani and Donati, 1999). Through news 
coverage and group conglomeration, ‘sublime judgements’ move from the fringes of society and 
into the popular mainstream media narratives. Once embedded within popular media narratives, 
the national discussion (or Overton window) shifts towards debating the staged reality of 
‘sublime judgements’ for personal entertainment (Kilborn, 2003). It can be argued that public’s 
desire to engage in debate on the staged reality of ‘sublime judgements’ serves to counter more 
grounded discourses on risk management (Stranger, 1999).  
 
Potential Utility of Theoretical Perspectives  
While each of the different theoretical perspectives of risk research explored within this 
chapter contribute towards addressing the research questions of this thesis, some are considerably 
more valuable than others. Starr’s foundational insights are crucial for this thesis by moving the 
analytical lens away from assessing the scientific accuracy of risk reporting towards considering 
the narrative framing of risk information and the more performative elements of news reporting 
on risk communication. Research findings from the Psychometric Paradigm also provided a 
strong, empirical, foundation for this thesis by illustrating how ‘public risk perception’ is not a 
hegemonic phenomenon. Psychometric studies have consistently demonstrated that, when ‘the 
31 
 
public’ is disaggregated along spatial/temporal/demographic lines, definitions of risk (and how 
risky an object seems) can vary greatly. For this thesis, findings from the Psychometric Paradigm 
assisted in conceptualising news audiences as stratified social demographics. For example, it was 
not presumed that readers of The Sun were the same readers of The Guardian. This informed 
considerations of how newspapers may frame risk information to not only appeal to different 
cultural values but may also rely upon exploiting cultural values around risk to help grow their 
audience base.  
 
Perspectives from Cultural Theory provided a key insight for this thesis by suggesting that 
risk is a contest for dominance over definition between ideologically aligned groupings. This 
insight brought into stark contrast the relationship between journalists, their information sources, 
and the temporal modes of newswork. While it was presumed that such relationships are 
somewhat fluid, such fluidity may be temporally fixed and illustrate changes in how risk is 
communicated within newspapers. As such, through assessing the narrative framing of risk 
information, these relationships may become apparent and further outline the needs of key 
sociopolitical actors across the timeline of risk reporting. The Risk Society thesis better solidifies 
the fluidity of relationships by forwardly asserting that the late 1990s/early 2000s was the period 
emergence/dominance of the Cosmopolitan worldview (and definitions) of risk. Rather than 
assuming that all risk reporters became aligned with Cosmopolitan definitions of risk, this thesis 
considered how aspects of news production were brought into line with neoliberal modes of 
work through technological advances and economic pressure. To this point, the 
Governmentality perspective contributed some limited insights. The crux of the argument 
underpinning the Governmentality perspective is that the application of technologies used to 
define and communicate risk are, themselves, in danger of being coerced by powerful social 
institutions to suit institutional goals. Technologies that are used to communicate risk 
instrumentalises the person to (re)produce definitions of risk which endorses (or apologises for) 
the control of public bodies. For this thesis, the relationship between technological advancements 
in communications technology and changes in newswork is unavoidable. However, presuming 
that advances in technologies of newswork is distilled from dominant power structures risks 
removing journalistic agency. Furthermore it seemingly presupposes that observable changes in 
risk reporting are insignificant, as communicating risk inevitably reinforces social control.  
 
SARF was the theoretical perspective which contributed the most to this thesis. SARF 
provided this thesis with a well-established framework for risk communication which centralises 
newspapers as an intermediary social station which mediates discourses over risk between the 
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general public and institutional actors. Furthermore, SARF places a specific focus on the value of 
risk communication in informing and justifying public responses to amplified risk information.  
SARF also contends that the impacts from responses to amplified risk information are 
multidirectional, suggesting an ongoing cycle of action and reaction across social and policy 
domains. This presupposes that the modes of newswork are in flux, the imperfect result of an 
iterative process where agents across the social strata reflect (and improve) upon their practice of 
attracting media attention to their framing of risk information. As such, SARF grants leniency 
for this thesis to explore the temporal contexts around more dominant approaches to risk 
reporting. Beyond this, research under SARF has produced a body of work which has defined 
the characteristics of risk reporting and assists the analysis of news texts (see chapter three).  
 
Finally, Bakir’s insights regarding risk and the media fill a substantial gap in the literature. 
Despite other approaches acknowledging the importance of news media in communicating risk 
broadly across society, there appears to be a general lack media theory incorporated into other 
theoretical perspectives. Bakir’s insights more directly grounds risk reporting within the wider 
framework of news production, outlining how the pressures and limitations of journalism can 
have a substantial influence over the narrative framing of risk. This perspective highlights 
considerations over source acquisition, turnover time, and the entertainment value of risk 
reporting which provides journalists with greater agency in shaping their stories compared to 
other theoretical approaches. This perspective shifts the ontological focus of risk reporting away 
from considering it as a vehicle to improve the public understanding of risk, towards risk 
reporting as a product of hyperreality. As such, the value of risk information becomes relative to 
shifting journalistic needs across temporal contexts. Above all else, the approach presumes that 
conventional approaches to risk reporting within temporal contexts is framed by (what is 
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Chapter 3 - Methods to Researching Changes in Risk 
Amplification within Newspapers 
 
Introduction 
This chapter outlines how the mixed methodological approach of this thesis aided the 
analysis into the changes in amplified health risk reporting across the past thirty years of British 
news production. This chapter will begin by outlining how the epistemological considerations of 
Constructivist Grounded Theory (CGT) provided a useful epistemological approach to analysing 
health risk amplification within news texts. Next, this chapter will detail Document Analysis 
(DA) provided useful methodological considerations that aided the data gathering methods of 
this thesis and helped to build a specialised and robust corpus of health risk-based newspaper 
documents. Finally, this chapter will detail how the theoretical considerations of the Social 
Amplification of Risk Framework (SARF) provided a practical scaffold for identifying, 
measuring, and analysing the amplification of health risks within news texts.  
 
There were several studies conducted across this thesis which involved quantitative content 
analysis, qualitative content analysis, and interviews with professional journalists.  Quantitative 
content analysis included counts of published news articles and word count analysis of news 
texts. These were used primarily to analyse the changes to amplified news production within the 
Information Mechanism of SARF. Qualitative content analysis included framing and narrative 
analysis to investigate the changes to risk amplification within the Response Mechanism of 
SARF. The semi-structured interviews were conducted with health risk reporters to explore how 
risk-based newswork has changed since the 1980s. This chapter concludes by outlining the 
procedures and ethical considerations of interviewing members of the British press.    
 
Aim and Research Questions 
The overall aim of this thesis was to investigate the observable changes to amplified risk 
reporting within British national daily newspapers between 1985-2017. Several research 
questions were designed to achieve this aim:  
 





2) What has been the observable changes in the framing of risk information within news 
stories over time? 
 
3) What have been some of the changes to risk reporting as a form of newswork?  
  
Constructivist Grounded Theory as a Theoretical Approach to Research 
Constructivist Grounded Theory (CGT) offers one of the most comprehensive 
epistemological approaches to investigating risk as a sociological phenomenon. CGT aids this 
thesis by advocating for a constellation of mutually reinforcing research methods to interrogate a 
series of chronologically ordered texts (Charmez, 2016,). The use of CGT, as the epistemological 
approach for this thesis, allowed for analytical units of research to emerge from existing 
empirical data (the information and response mechanisms of SARF), rather than being arbitrarily 
defined by the researcher. CGT emerged from the work of Kathy Charmaz and made significant 
headway in repairing the methodological divisions between more traditional branches of 
Grounded Theory. Chamaz (2016, p127) considers CGT to be appropriate for research projects 
which satisfy two key criteria:  
 
 1) Where the field of study demands diverse and substantive inquiry  
2)  Where the research project necessitates a novel approach to conceptualising data.  
 
The research conducted within this thesis satisfies both of those criteria. Firstly, the field of 
risk research is founded upon an interdisciplinary approach to investigating risk as a social 
phenomenon. The central concept of risk amplification relies upon the relationship between 
institutional agendas, public perception, and news production to embed risk information within 
standardised forms of communication (i.e., News articles) (Kasperson et al. 2003).  Research 
under SARF has sought to generate substantive evidence which validates sociological 
theorisation on risk (see Chapter 2). Secondly, the premise of this thesis - the longitudinal 
investigation of news-bound amplification of risk information - is relatively novel within the field 
of risk research. Most SARF based research contends with a limited number of newspapers and 
are restricted to analysing a single moment of risk amplification (i.e., MMR, BSE, Chernobyl, 
etc). The investigations within this thesis seek to explore a diverse range of temporal, textual, and 
institutional contexts to analyse the changes to the formulation of newspaper-amplified risk 
56 
 
information. Limiting the methodological scope of this study would limit the ability for this 
research to explore the broad contexts of amplified risk reporting.  
 
CGT is well suited as the epistemological approach of this thesis by presuming a relativist 
position, where knowledge (of risk) is both socially constructed and managed through the social 
interactions of conflicting standpoints (Charmaz, 2016). CGT permits research that 
acknowledges that the formulation of public risk perceptions is constructivist in nature and 
mediated by the modulation of information across social stations (Jasanoff, 1998; Weber and 
Morris, 2010). This is not to deny the value of empirically assessed risk information within the 
wider sociopolitical realm, but rather this approach acknowledges that such empirical evidence 
holds little value within mediated communication which seeks to depict the sociocultural 
struggles over conflicting risk definitions.  
 
CGT is prevented from collapsing into absolute relativism by acknowledging a realist-
constructivist ontology. Charmaz (2014) acknowledges the existential reality of a stable natural 
world, and that social understanding of the natural world is constructed through perspective, 
observations, and attempts at measurement. Charmaz’s considerations is similar to Beck, who 
considered himself “both a realist and a constructivist” and that a pragmatic differentiation 
between the two positions grants empirical research the ability to reveal the “contradictions” in 
the social governance of risk (Beck, 2006; pp62).  For Chamaz (2006, p130), CGT permits 
researchers to investigate how meaning is constructed during times of tumultuous uncertainty, 
and how the value of definitions changes over time. This is achieved as CGT views social 
conditions as being simultaneously hierarchical and comparative between social stations 
(Charmaz, 1990). SARF also views social conditions in a similar manner, as risk amplification 
underpins institutional policy directions and describes different meanings across social groups 
(Finucane et al, 2000; Joffe, 2003). CGT allows researchers to enter differentiated empirical 
realities by allowing generalisable themes to emerge from data by comparing the diversity of 
perceptions, while remaining isolated within their contextual boundaries (Charmaz 2016, p139-
140). 
 
Document Analysis as a Data Gathering Methodology 
One of CGT’s core contributions to this thesis is the idea that the data collection methods 
should flow from the research questions  (Charmaz, 2006). This introduces methodological 
eclecticism to the thesis, prompting a stratified approach to investigating risk. Stratification, in 
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this regard, encourages multi-layered approaches to research which support and validate one 
another (Charmaz, 2014). Document Analysis (DA) is a methodological approach to research 
design which presumes that data collection protocols directly influence the proceeding analytical 
process (Altheide et al, 2008). In many ways DA could be considered to be an applied version of 
CGT, in that it acknowledges the realist-constructivist nature of organisational knowledge 
production and the ways in which published documents reframe reality in accordance with 
policy, ideology, or agenda goals (Atkinson and Coffey, 2004; Bowen, 2009). Newspaper articles 
serve as exemplary documents for sociolinguistic analysis of news stories by rendering public 
uncertainties, stakeholder conflicts, and organisational agendas visible to researchers as a 
struggle over sociocultural issues (Granero-Molina et al., 2009). DA also permits comparative 
document analysis between distinct temporal contexts to investigate how linguistic signifiers 
have changed over time (Shaw et al, 2004).  
 
The principal issue for DA research is ensuring that the corpus of documents is robust 
enough to yield valid empirical evidence on sociolinguistic changes (Bowen, 2009). DA 
advocates for a systematic approach to data gathering and analysis in order to assure the 
reliability, generalisability, and of research observations (Bowen, 2009). DA acknowledges the 
limited representativeness of individual documents to reflect wider societal changes and 
encourages triangulation methods to compensate for this deficit (Altheide, 2000; Bowen, 2000; 
Crombag et al., 2014.) To inspire trust in the data collection protocols DA recommends an audit 
trail methodology, where the chronological order of documents are considered alongside factors 
such as authenticity, credibility, representativeness and meaning (Bowen, 2009; Brown et al, 2002; 
Scott, 1990. p19-35).  
 
Authenticity refers to concerns about how genuine a document is, and the authority of the 
document source. Authenticity is assured in this thesis as newspapers corporate adherence to 
British Press Standards, which outline how factors of newsworthiness, accuracy and balance 
inform ‘quality’ press reporting (Editor’s Codebook, 2019; Frost, 2004). Credibility encourages 
researchers to consider how typical a document is within its literary genre. Credibility is achieved 
in this thesis as news stories organise factual events chronologically. By utilising information 
from credible sources, news stories achieve a level of institutional access which is unavailable to 
the general public (Lashmar, 2013, Lewis et al, 2008). Representativeness addresses questions as to 
whether the sample of documents can be generalisable to the wider literary form. In regards to 
this thesis, the question of representativeness is addressed as news reporting has previously been 
used to serve as a site of social documentary which outlines temporally defined intersections 
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between the public lives of individuals, the managerial power applied technologies, and natural 
hazards as external threats (see Boon et al, 2009; Teräväinen et al, 2011; and Himmelsbach et al, 
2015;). Meaning refers to the legibility and comprehensibility of documents to convey concepts to 
an intended audience. Newspaper articles satisfy all four criteria and are well suited for use 
within DA research. Within this thesis, Meaning is presumed to be verified through professional 
standards, as news stories are published by profit-seeking entities which trade on the production 
of written texts as an informative medium (Trussler and Soroka, 2014). While clarity and 
coherence of communication can be presumed it is also acknowledged that style and form of 
language varies between British newspapers to appeal to different audiences. Within news 
articles, meaning is conveyed through literal and interpretive meaning (Lester, 1980). The literal 
meaning of information within news articles coalesces around the presentation of data, statistics 
and the ordering of facts that underpin a story. The interpretive meaning of information reflects 
the framing, rhetorical, and sophistic devices expressed within the news stories.   
 
Document Data Collection Methods 
The data collection method for this thesis involved building a large corpus of health risk-
based newspaper articles from a newspaper archive. The decision to prioritise health risk 
reporting over other forms of risk (such as crime, economics, or terrorism) was made primarily 
due to the focus on misreporting around health risks embedded within the House of Lords (2000) 
report on science and technology (See chapter 1) and the suggestion that arises from sociological 
risk research (see chapter 2) which suggests that amplified reporting on health risks can 
encourage negative public responses towards novel applied technologies (such as choosing to 
avoid childhood vaccinations or conducting criminal activity to destroy field trials). As such, 
health risk reporting is defined within this thesis as news stories which prioritise the probability 
(risk) that a novel applied technology (hazard) poses some kind of threat to physical health.  
 
 Newspapers were chosen as the primary data source for this thesis as news articles function, 
primarily, as a document of record for public discourse. Newspapers exist as tangible artefacts 
which have subsequently been digitised for online archival. All of the currently circulating British 
daily newspapers were included for analysis within this thesis (Table 1). The News of the World 
was not included in the corpus, as archived documents were removed from archival services 
since the newspaper folded. National newspapers were chosen as the primary data source for 
several reasons. Firstly, there is a parity in scale of circulation across a national geography and 
they have the ability to escalate local issues onto the national stage (Burgess, 2010). It can be  
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presumed that the financial considerations and 
workload pressures are similar across the national daily 
newspapers and are more intense than their local 
counterparts (Deuze and Marjoribanks, 2009). The second 
reason why newspapers were chosen as the primary 
source of data is that all national daily newspapers have 
agreed to self-regulation through the Independent Press 
Complaints Organisation (IPCO). Press guidelines are 
outlined within the Editors Codebook (2019) and detail 
good practice around issues of accuracy, fairness, and 
privacy. Regional and online news platforms were omitted 
from this analysis as there is no guarantee that they 
subscribe to British press standards. Another issue 
regarding online news platforms is that it raises questions 
as to what “type” of news organisation can be included within the corpus. It would be arbitrary 
to discount specialist news platforms (I.e. PinkNews.co.uk) as ‘illegitimate’ news sources as it 
could be argued that they adhere to traditional journalistic principles within newswork, but have 
a refined focus which serve a culturally identarian audience. International news platform (such 
as HindustanTimes.org) are also readily accessible by British news readers, and it would be 
arbitrary to discount them for not being “British” enough. This thesis is not well equipped to 
distinguish what constitutes as British risk reporting within an online media landscape. As such, 
this thesis chose to discount all web-based news articles from analysis, including the online 
counterparts to physical newspapers. 
 
 LexisNexis was selected as the primary platform to access and download digitised 
newspaper articles for several reasons. Firstly, LexisNexis provides a pre-established library of 
daily British newspapers which standardised the search procedure and reduced the possibility of 
selection errors during the corpus building process. Furthermore, LexisNexis is the only online 
news archive which provides access to a broad selection of British news sources. Secondly, 
LexisNexus permits news articles to be downloaded common file formats which enabled content 
analysis within Nvivo12.  Thirdly, LexisNexis provides the ability to refine searches by date. For 
this thesis, a timeframe between 1985-2017 was decided upon. The starting year of 1985 was 
selected as this coincided with the Royal Society’s report on the Public Understanding of Science 
(1985). The terminal year of 2017 was selected as this was the last completed year prior to data 
collection. Next, LexisNexis provides keyword search functions, which can be augmented by 
Boolean logic (Altheide and Schneider, 1996. pp94; Diesner et al, 2016; and Xie, 2009).  
The Guardian / The Observer  
The Daily Mail / Mail on Sunday 
The Times / Sunday Times 
The Independent  
The i 
The Financial Times 
The Mirror 
The Daily Express / Sunday Express 
The Sun / Sun on Sunday 
The Daily Telegraph / Sunday 
Telegraph  
The Daily Star  
Table 1. List of daily national 
newspapers included in this study 
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LexisNexis provides a string of up to four different key words to be used to return results, further 
refined by date ranges. From a scoping exercise, it was discovered that using “Health AND 
Risk” (the capitalisation denotes a Boolean operator) as suffixal terms returned results which 
were specific to health, science, and environmental risk reporting. Similarly, using popular fields 
of science as prefixal search terms allowed for further refinement of the corpus. From the scoping 
exercise, five distinct search strings were designed for data collection within this thesis (Table 2). 
Finally, LexisNexis provided search tools that further refined the searches. One tool ensured that 
news articles were returned where “Health AND Risk” constituted ‘major mentions’ within the 
news article. This tool was useful to remove articles where the reporting of risk was auxiliary to 
the story - such as within coverage of political party manifestos.  
 
Story Type Term 1 Boolean Term 2 Boolean Term 3 Boolean Term 4 
Health Risks Health AND Risk     
Food Alerts Food OR Diet AND Health AND Risk 
Radiation 
Risks 
Radiation OR Nuclear AND Health AND Risk 
Disease 
Stories 
Disease OR Vaccine AND Health AND Risk 
Environmental 
Pollution 
Environment OR Pollution AND Health AND Risk 
Table 2. String of search terms and Boolean operators used within this study 
 
The ‘remove duplicates’ tool also allowed for the removal of articles which shared “high 
similarity” with one another.  From scoping exercises, it was understood that the ‘remove 
duplicates’ tool encouraged the search algorithms to not return articles which presented minimal 
variation between news texts. Such a tool was useful for minimising the duplication of news 
stories between different editions of the same newspaper (such as the morning and evening 
editions, or the Scottish or English editions). From the scoping exercise, it was observed that 
such duplications essentially published the same text of a news article or included minor 
additions which did not substantively alter the overall meaning of the story. Scoping exercises 
also illustrated that this tool had zero impact on the reporting between different newspapers, 
even if target news stories utilised the same information sources. This was because the remainder 
of the text within the story was substantially different enough to not be considered a duplication 




The last useful tool was the “exclusion of web-based news”. This tool was useful to ensure 
that returned news articles had been published within newspapers, maintaining data consistency 
across the entire thirty-year period. The decision to omit the web-based counterparts of the daily 
British newspapers identified in table was also made to avoid the issue of duplication, as a 
scoping exercise demonstrated that some stories tended to be published online first, before being 
reformatted for physical publication the following day. As there was little in the way of online 
news prior to the mid-2000s, this would have caused an overinflation of news stories within the 
final decade of analysis. This would have exaggerated all quantitative assessments throughout 
this study and raised concerns over accuracy. As such, this thesis only includes and considers 
news stories printed within newspapers.  
 
 Also presented within Table 2 is a list of search terms with reflect four popular fields of 
health risk reporting and included: Food Alerts, Disease Stories, Radiation Risks, and 
Environmental Pollution. These four fields of popular health risk reporting were built around 
broad categorisation of themes present with both the extant literature and risk reporting (see 
Singer and Endry (1993), Lupton, 1999; pp14). Food Alerts identifies news reporting on 
emergent risks from farming technologies, genetically engineered crops, and modern food 
consumption (see McCluskey and Swinnen, 2011; Lofstedt, 2006; and Cope et al, 2010). Disease 
Stories identifies news reporting on novel threats from pathogens, pharmaceutical side effects 
(including vaccinations), and neurological disorders (see Young et al, 2008; Tchuenche et al, 
2012; and Leask, 2002). Radiation Risks identifies news reporting on the dangers of nuclear 
technologies, radioactive material, and electromagnetic emissions (see Burgess, 2010; Covello, 
2011; Perko, 2014; and Gamson and Modigliani, 1989). Environmental Pollution identifies news 
reporting on the perils posed by chemical pollutants, anthropogenic climate change, and 
industrial emissions (see Wilson, 2000; Weingart et al., 2000; and Horlick-Jones et al, 2003).   
 
Using SARF to Inform Content Analysis  
This thesis utilised both quantitative and qualitative content analysis methods to investigate 
the changes to amplified risk reporting within British newspapers. Mixed content analysis 
methods were selected for the capacity to analyse the sociolinguistic structures of risk-based news 
reporting and framing of amplified media messages. Both sets on content analysis were designed 
around the theoretical contributions of SARF to define analytical units. Quantitative content 
analysis sought to analyse changes to risk amplification under the information mechanism of 
SARF, such as the volume of information, sensationalism of risk information, and politicisation of risk 
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information. Conversely, qualitative content analysis sought to analyse changes to risk 
amplification under the response mechanism of SARF, such as the framing of Uncertainty, 
Certainty, Blame, Trust, Dread, and Stigma (See chapter 2 for a more comprehensive discussion 
of the information and response mechanisms of SARF). 
 
 Nvivo12 was selected to facilitate the content analysis as the software boasts a range of tools 
to conduct qualitative and quantitative content analysis. NVivo’s ‘word count’ function provides 
the ability to quantify the expression of phrases across a corpus (Leech and Onwuegbuzie, 2011). 
The tolerance of NVivo’s word count analysis can also be set to include pluralisation (e.g., 
“Risks”) and stemmed words (e.g., “Risky”). The ability to include plural and stemmed words 
improves the validity of the analysis by better reflecting the general use of language by risk 
reporters and quoted news sources. NVivo also assists qualitative analysis through enabling the 
coding of digital documents, organising codes as ‘nodes’. The hierarchical architecture of nodes 
aids the comparative analysis of risk amplifying frames by providing ease of access to coded 
sections of texts, while also providing a count of recorded instances. 
 
Quantitative Content Analysis  
The quantitative content analysis conducted within this thesis was concerned with 
investigating the differential expression of risk amplification factors, as outlined by the 
information mechanism of SARF (see chapter 2). The quantitative content analysis involves two 
principal aspects: (1) Volumetric counts of risk reporting to investigate the changing volume of 
risk information published by British news organisations. (2) Word count analysis across 
published risk reporting to investigate the changing sensationalisation and politicisation of risk 
information. By conducting both a volumetric count of published news, and a word count 
analysis of amplifying language, it was possible to map the longitudinal trends in reporting and 
identify distinct periods of risk reporting (see chapter 4).  
 
The analysis of published news volume was based upon the perspective that high volumes of 
risk reporting reflects a high transmission of risk information to the general public (Renn, 1992). 
Therefore, observably high volumes of published risk reporting can suggest the potential for risk 
amplification. However, any observations made from this analysis must be contextualised 
against other sociolinguistic factors of amplification (Kesperson et al, 2003). Assessing high 
volumes of reporting is somewhat contentious if left poorly defined. Given that this study is 
investigating the longitudinal changes to amplified risk reporting, there is a need to set the 
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definition of high-volume for the different temporal contexts under investigation. When taking a 
broad, multi-decade, view of risk reporting, high-volume can be observed as long-term changes 
in the proliferative trajectory of yearly news publication. On a more refined scale of less than a 
decade, high-volume risk reporting can be observed as notable peaks in reporting volume. 
Notable peaks in reporting describe a rapidly proliferative state of news publication over a short-
term period (usually one to two years). A peak in risk reporting is further defined by the way in 
which the volume of published news returns to rates that are comparable to the pre-peak 
trajectory.  
 
Mapping the trends in published risk reporting was achieved by performing a yearly count of 
news articles returned through the keyword searches on LexisNexis. The count of news articles 
was presented as an artefact on the documents downloaded from LexisNexis. The count of news 
articles presented by LexisNexis ensured accuracy by reducing the opportunity for errors during 
data entry. The count of news articles was translated from the downloaded documents of yearly 
risk reporting (I.e. 1985, 1986, 1987, etc). The yearly timeframe was set to capture risk reporting 
from the 1st of January to the 31st of December for each year between 1985-2017. The count of 
published risk reporting was conducted across the five distinct searches outlined in table 2. 
 
The data for each of these searches was input into both excel and SPSS for further analysis. 
One analysis involved graphically visualising the trajectory of reporting. From these graphs, 
notable trajectory shifts, and moments of peak reporting could be observed. Next, a liner 
regression analysis was conducted to ascertain the overall trend in yearly reporting volume over 
time. Finally, the data wan interrogated upon the count of published health risk reporting to 
ascertain if the temporal differences between the volume and proliferation of news articles 
generated evidence which assisted in establishing the existence of specific periods of risk 
reporting. A supplemental analysis of news volume was conducted which assessed the median 
change in the word count of published risk reporting. The median word count was calculated by 
translating the number of words per article within each of the yearly documents downloaded 
from LexisNexis. Accuracy for this word count was ensured by LexisNexis, who include the 
word length for each news article as an artefact within the downloaded Word document.  
 
The next stage of quantitative content analysis involved word counts of sensationalising and 
politicising language across the corpus of risk reporting. Word count analysis are well suited to 
identifying patterns in linguistic expression, especially when applied to exploring a psychosocial 
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phenomenon - such as risk amplification (Pennebaker et al., 2007). Word count analysis 
presumes that words form the fundamental expression of meaning within a published text 
(Groom and Pennebaker (2002). Categorial linguistic hierarchies are formed when a 
constellation of words with similar meaning are used concordantly to denote a specific 
phenomenon. Word count methods have been readily utilised to analyse news-bound changes to 
risk reporting, and on writings of emotion and control (Pennebacker et al, 2001). The use of 
word count methods to analyse sensationalism and politicisation resulted in a count of instances of 
target phrases per year, rather than a count of news articles which featured the target phrases. 
This provides more detailed rich data for analysis by allowing linguistic tendencies to become 
realised, rather than omitting repeated expression of target phrases. This permits a comparative 
analysis between the use of alarming and reassuring phrases,  rather than simply capturing the 
number of articles in which alarming or reassuring phrases occur.  As a theory of media effects, 
SARF suggests that news-based risk amplification is achieved through the disproportionate 
expression of certain categorical linguistic hierarchies of risk communication (such as 
sensationalism and politicisation) (Duckett and Busby, 2013).  
 
There is some debate as to whether risk reporters tend to sensationalise or attenuate risk 
information. Kitzinger (1999) highlights some of the conflicting evidence which has emerged 
from risk research. However, it should be noted that many of these early studies were based upon 
case studies and limited sample sets - issues that this study aims to address. With the disputes in 
mind in mind, the question is not “to what degree does sensationalism and politicisation take place, 
it is more a question as to whether changes in the expression of sensationalism and politicisation 
suggest wider sociocultural reorientations around reporting risk. There are significant 
methodological issues around defining sensationalism and politicisation within risk reporting, in 
that they are somewhat nebulous terms.  For this thesis, several steps of verification and 
validation were performed within the word count methods when analysing the sensationalism and 
politicisation of risk. The verification and validation of sensationalism adopted a top-down 
approach, while a bottom-up approach was adopted to analyse politicisation.   
 
The top-down approach of analysing sensationalism was developed from the work of Frewer 
et al (1998), who demonstrated that alarming phrases fit within the linguistic hierarchy of 
sensationalism. For Frewer et al (1998), alarming phrases within texts disproportionately 
exaggerated the dangers of a hazard. Frewer et al (1998) also noted that reassuring phrases 
operated to attenuate risk amplification by offering audiences safety and security when 
confronted with a hazard. The antonymic difference between alarming and reassuring phrases 
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presents comparable variables to measure the proportional expression of sensationalism against a 
linguistic determinant of risk attenuation (see chapter 4). The degree of sensationalisation was 
investigated by analysing the proportional difference in expression between alarming and 
reassuring phrases. It was presumed that, given the reputation of the British press to sensationalise 
news stories, that there would be a tendency for alarming phrases to be more readily expressed 
than reassuring phrases within news texts. The purpose of this analysis was to identify the 
moments where either alarming or reassuring phrases were disproportionally expressed within 
news texts. Where disproportionate expression of alarming or reassuring language can be 
identified over a prolonged period, this provided partial evidence to suggest the emergence of 
novel conventions towards  health risk reporting by the British press.  
 
The analysis was conducted by first 
identifying alarming and reassuring phrases. A 
scoping exercise demonstrated that ‘alarm’ and 
‘reassure’ were not particularly common within 
risk reporting, as such there was a need to 
broaden the target phrases. To compensate for 
this, a series of synonyms were used as target 
variables within a word count analysis. A list of suitable synonyms (table 3) was built using  
powerthesaurus.org. Unlike other online dictionary platforms, powerthesaurus.org lists 
synonyms based upon user generated rankings. Initially, the top ten synonyms for ‘alarm’ and 
‘reassure’ were selected for analysis. However, a scoping exercise demonstrated that only the top 
three phrases returned any notable results.  
 The user generated raking system of 
powerthesaurus.org better reflects 
common language, making it a viable 
tool to reflect the audience-centric 
language of popular daily newspapers. 
To further strengthen the validity of 
Powerthesaurus.org, Amazon’s Alexa 
rankings reveal metrics that the website 
is a reasonably popular online linguistic 
resource (table 4). The 
disproportionately high user visit time 
suggests that users are highly engaged 




Table 3. List of popular synonyms of alarming 
and reassuring phrases acquired from 
powerthesaurus.org 




Powerthesaurus.org  5:32 #3,635 
Thesaurus.com 3:14  #327 
Merriam-webster.com 2:57  #608 
Macmillandictionary.com 2:43  #3,296 
Wordhippo.com 2:36  #2,858 
Collinsdictionary.com 2:29  #1902 
Synonym.com 1:53  #10,951 
Synonyms.com 1:39  #17,716 
Table 4. User metrics for popular dictionary / thesaurus 
websites provided by Alexa.com. Items are listed 
according to average time users spend on the site.  
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with the website, spending time ranking synonyms and becoming involved with the online 
community. Having selected the phrases of alarm and reassurance, a word count analysis was 
performed within NVivo which targeted these terms. Tolerances were set to include ‘stemmed 
words’ so as to better capture a fuller range of linguistic contexts (i.e., ‘Alarm’, ‘Alarmed’, 
Alarming, etc). The word count analysis provided a count of expression for alarming or reassuring 
phrases across all news articles per year. The data was recorded into Excel and SPSS for further 
analysis, which included mapping the proportional difference between alarming and reassuring 
phrases and the proliferation of sensationalist phrases over time. Both analyses presented evidence 
to further reinforce the establishment of specific eras of risk reporting.  
 
The bottom-up approach to analysing politicising language involved a series of exploratory 
protocols to identify common relationships between the politically connotative language and risk 
information.  This approach involved building a categorical linguistic hierarchy for politicisation 
based upon a series of word count analysis. Politicisation, in the context of this study, is defined as 
phrases used within risk reporting which specifically denote social actors which some degree of 
political currency to define health risks within public discourse. From an initial word count 
which returned the 50 most common words, per year, common politicising phrases were observed 
(Table 5). The word count was conducted using 
NVivo’s ‘stemmed words’ function to pool all 
the different linguistic contexts as grouped 
counts (i.e., Government, Governments, 
Governmental would all count towards the 
results for a single phrase).  These phrases were 
grouped into three categories to facilitate a 
comparative analysis between different political 
news sources: (1) Institutional Source, (2) 
Institutional actor, (3) Institutional Publication.  
 
The Institutional Source category was 
constructed around roles of science or government to operate as an arbiter of health risk 
information within the public sphere. Whilst science or government are abstract systems of 
governance, they are seemingly personified as social actors within news reporting. Both 
government and science hold some claim in their ability to render risk information as a tangible 
reality of future harms, which is further used to legitimise coercive statements that are designed 
to alter public behaviour (either through policy change or changes to personal behaviour around 





Institutional Actor Expert 
Chief 
Report Institutional Publication 
Parents Unassigned 
Table 5. List of common political phrases 
generated by word count analysis of the Health 
Risk corpus. Unassigned items were due to the 
inability to differentiate phrase from common 
linguistic use.  
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risk). The key distinction between the two information sources is that ‘government’, is presumed 
to readily manipulate risk information to suit stated policy goals, where as ‘science’ is presumed 
to have a more benevolent influence over risk - producing information that is both independent 
of government aims, and in the pursuit of a public good. To this point, the ‘public’ were similarly 
identified as a potential social actor that could have been included within this category. 
However, the term ‘public’ had also been used by the government apparatus with the 
establishment of Public Health England, which demonstrated to be difficult to separate with 
word count analyses.  
 
The Institutional actor category was constructed around phrases which denoted a class of 
social actors who provided statements to the press within ongoing discourse around risk 
information. Government ‘Ministers’, Scientific ‘Experts’ and Industry ‘Chiefs’ were clearly 
defined as general characters within news narratives who represented the different aspects of an 
institutionalised class of actors. Government Ministers were usually identified as individuals who 
were responsible for the operation of government ministries/departments which were perceived 
to have some influence over health risk policies. Such ministers often included those within the 
realms of agriculture, food, public health, energy, and the environment. While it would have 
been reasonable to map the references to specific ministries, such as the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Fisheries and Food (MAFF), issues arose when government restructuring resulted in the 
construction of new departments with altered names and a different remit of responsibility (Such 
an example as when MAFF and the Department of the Environment (DoE) was abolished 
around the turn of the century in favour of the Department for Environment, Food and Rural 
Affairs (DEFRA). However, while specific government ministries / departments were liable to 
altered nomenclature, the press were observed to maintain a convention whereby members of 
parliament who offered public statements on health risk issues were referred to as ministers.  
Similarly, those who purported to hold some degree of scientific credibility to offer public 
statements on health risks were generally characterised as scientific ‘experts’ by the press.  
 
While the credentials of purported ‘expert’ news sources within news reporting certainly 
warrants further examination, this thesis is more concerned with how the press use the represent 
the character of the scientific ‘expert’ within news narratives. Given the cultural value of 
established scientific principles (especially political independence) the relationship between 
expertise and government power may hold some value in the amplification of risk information 
within newspapers. Being able to map the references to Scientific Experts within health risk 
reporting may provide evidence to suggest the changing value of ‘experts’ within the British press 
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to offer an authoritative claim or refutation regarding health risk information. The term, Industry 
‘Chief’ was generally used to spotlight the statements provided to the press by a corporate 
executive that has, for whatever reason, been brought into the public discourse over health risk 
issues. The role of corporate voices within amplified risk has, so far, been under explored by the 
wider field of risk researchers. It appears that the phrase “Chief” is used by risk reporters as a 
narrative shorthand to signify the authority of corporate actors to have some legitimate interest in 
the wider public debate on health risk issues. Furthermore, the decision to include statements 
from Industry Chiefs may be an attempt by risk reporters to identify individuals for be held 
responsible for risk issues, or as an attempt at PR-spin by corporate entities to mitigate blame. 
Either way, the identification of ‘Industry Chiefs’ introduces another news source for analysis 
which may provide evidence to highlight the shifting power of institutional sources to define risk 
within the public debate and further prescribe the desirable sociopolitical response to manage 
risk.  
 
The Institutional Publication category seemingly highlights the value of official documents in 
transmitting risk information between institutional sources and the press. A scoping exercise 
identified that “report” was commonly used to denote documents issued by government 
departments, while “research” was commonly used to denote the scientific papers produced by 
scientific research. Such a differentiation in documentary sources by the press may again carry 
different connotations regarding the methods used by institutional sources to measure and define 
health risks. “Government Reports” carry inherent questions over the biases inherent to the 
methods by which risk information is collected and manipulated to suit institutional agendas. 
Conversely, “Scientific Research” may be presumed to be politically independent and risk 
assessments could be presumed to be approached in good faith attempts to better improve public 
health. By measuring the expression of these two terms over time, this thesis is better able to 
investigate the value of specific institutional publications to the British press. Where “Government 
Reports” is prioritised within reporting, it may be presumed that risk information could be 
viewed as a coercive tool of government that aims to influence the behaviour of the British 
public. Where “Scientific Research” is prioritised within reporting, it may be presumed that risk 
information could be viewed as arising from a neutral source that is encouraging the British 
public to make more informed (and therefore better) decisions to manage their own exposure to 
health risks.  
 
Having established the politicising phrases to be used within analysis, the context by which the 
phrases were used was varied identifying two hundred random instances where each phrase was 
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used within news texts. Using Nvivo, the instances where politicising phrases were identified were 
allocated a number, and a random number generator was employed to identify the two hundred 
instances for each phrase. Using Nvivo’s “broad context” function, the wider context for each of 
the two hundred instances were returned by the software, which provided several lines of text 
both in front and behind the text. From this contextual analysis, it was confirmed that the 
phrases of politicisation reflected the categorical functions determined by this thesis. The context 
analysis also further confirmed that the term “public” was too broad to denote any specific 
aspect of politicisation, being used simultaneously within the corpus to identify the general 
public and specific government departments (such as Public Health England). As such, the 
phrase “public” was discounted from the overall analysis.  “Parents” was another phrase that 
was discounted from the analysis. While “Parents” was sometimes used to denote a specific 
victim class - those whose children had been harmed or were threatened by health risks - there 
were far too many idiosyncrasies between newspapers and/or temporal moments for this phrase 
to be properly assessed. For example, in many cases newspapers would choose to use “child” to 
connote parental status. In other cases, were a parent had become a key pressure group 
spokesperson, newspapers would simply refer to them by name and omit their parental status 
(such as Jackie Fletcher within the MMR reporting). With the phrases of politicisation fully 
identified, a targeted word count analysis were performed across each year of the chronology. 
Analysis was conducted using the “stemmed word” function within NVivo. Word count data 
was input into Excel for further analysis. Within Excel, data was visualised as general trends 
across the chronology of risk reporting and proportional differences between phrases within 
different categories of politicisation were also explored.  
 
Qualitative Content Analysis 
The qualitative content analysis conducted within this thesis was concerned with 
investigating the framing of risk amplification factors, as outlined by the response mechanism of 
SARF (see chapter 2).  Framing analysis provides an analytical lens to analyse how perspectives 
on sociopolitical issues can be informed by communication between social actors (Scheufele, 
1999; and D’Angelo, 2002). Newspapers present a site of social conflict where framing of events 
(and risk information) are openly contested for public consumption (Coleman, 1995; Berkowitz 
and Beach, 1993). News framing is contested by actors from across the social strata who position 
themselves as stakeholders within an ongoing sociopolitical debate (Hänggli and Kriesi, 2010). 
Actors usually emerge from organisations such as government officials, academic experts, 
industry leaders, and spokespersons from interest groups (see Schnell, 2001; Brewer and 
Sigelman, 2002; and Pride, 1995). While public stakeholders seek to forward their own agenda-
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driven framing of events, it is ultimately the decision of journalists, editors, and news managers 
to set the framing of information within their news products (Gamson and Modigliani, 1989). 
Frame setting within newspapers is usually conducted by journalists as a normative convention 
of newswork, rather than with the intent to influence public opinion (Brüggemann, 2014). While 
unintended, the rhetorical function of framing information cannot be ignored. The framing of 
risk information is rhetorical in nature, as it is a persuasive use of language with the intent to 
achieve a specific goal (Bazerman 1988). The profit seeking motive of newspapers is linked to the 
selective framing of information to generate stories that audiences are interested in reading - even 
if the amplification of risk is a consequence (Olive and Delshad, 2017).  It has been demonstrated 
that several key archetypes exist in the rhetorical framing of risk information (Gamson and 
Modigliani 1989; Nisbet, 2009). However, it is not presumed that newspapers adopt a rigid 
stance on framing risk. One principal aspect of this study was to investigate how the rhetorical 
framing of risk information was modulated between different temporal contexts. The framing 
analysis was conducted by using Nvivo12 to code for risk amplifying frames across moments of 
peak reporting volume.  
 
The codes used within the framing analysis were adapted from Gamson and Modigliani’s (1989) 
codebook to better reflect the factors of risk amplification under the response mechanism of 
SARF. The six factors of risk amplification include Uncertainty, Certainty, Blame, Trust, 
Stigma, and Vulnerability. The rhetorical framing of  Uncertainty outlines the contention 
between the limits of public knowledge regarding hazards and the institutional knowledge of 
danger posed by hazards (Lewis and Tyshenko, 2009; and Spiegelhalter et al., 2011). The 
Uncertainty frame was developed from the “Scientific /Technical Uncertainty” frame within this 
original codebook. The “Scientific /Technical Uncertainty” details Uncertainty as a question of 
“what is known versus unknown”, where expert consensus or scientific authority is undermined 
by news sources. Uncertainty has been linked to risk amplification through bringing into contrast 
the institutional ambiguities in identifying and managing risks  (Breakwell, 2000; Breakwell and 
Barnett, 2003, and Beck, 2009). Expression of Uncertainty within news reporting often relies 
upon sources who question the proposed scale of a hypothesised threat, the adequacy of 
resources to respond to a crisis, and the fair distribution of benefits / harms (Adams, 1998; 
Fowler et al., 2007; Krishnan and Bhattacharya, 2002). Newspaper-based information 
campaigns have been suggested to capitalise upon Uncertainty by seeking answers to prevailing 
institutional ambiguities (Burgess, 2006; Djerf-Pierre, 2007). This involves a “balancing” of 
conflicting statements, from a range of institutional and non-instutional sources, to provide news 
audiences with an array of “facts” for them to reach their own decision on preferred risk 




Proportional differences in frame expression were produced from a count of instances where 
specific frames identified within news texts. Nvivo 12 provides function whereby instances of 
coded text for each document are stored as a node. A node architecture was established where a 
specific node was used to store the coded section of text for a specific frame. News stories from 
each of the sixteen different moments of peak amplification which was analysed by this study 
were re-imported to Nvivo 12 as individual files, allowing the program to independently count 
the number of identified frames across each of the sixteen moments of peak amplification. By 
aggregating the count of frames across the four periods of risk reporting allows the proportional 
expression of single frames to become apparent.  It was found that aggregating the count of 
frames across the four periods of risk reporting produced a more robust means of tracking the 
expression of frames over time by producing a more generalisable data set which was not unduly 
influenced by one dominant news cycle.  
 
Robustness of the framing analysis was assessed using a supplementary exercise where 
participants were invited to code a selection of news articles and attempt to replicate results. Ten 
participants were selected through snowball sampling and invited to conduct a framing analysis 
on five news texts. Two participants were place into a control group. All participants were 
provided with five news texts, which had been previously identified as reflecting a broad range of 
frames. The sample was selected so as to represent a similar proportion of frame distribution as 
the data set used within this chapter. The control group were provided with five news texts 
which were previously identified as being absent of frames. Participants were not made aware of 
what had previously been coded. All participants were provided with a copy of the codebook 
used by this study. The results typically ranged from -3.38% to +4.30% of conning instances 
compared with researcher framing of the same texts. Stigma appeared to be an outlier, which 
was coded at +12.6% by participants. However, this result may have been an artefact of sample 
text selection and participant demographics. Several news texts related to coverage of MMR and 
BSE, while participant demographics tended to skew towards those between the age of 55-70. It 
may be that some of these participants held residual feelings towards MMR and BSE as events 
(or media coverage of those events) and were particularly sensitive towards the Stigma frame. 
Within the control group, two instances of Certainty and one instance of Uncertainty were 
coded. Due to the overall lack of other coded frames these instances may be due to observer bias, 





The rhetorical framing of Certainty has received little attention from risk researchers. 
However, recent research on “anti-vaccination truthers” has demonstrated how entrenched 
beliefs on risk management can inform the perception of danger from suspected hazards 
(Capurro et al, 2018). The Certainty frame was inverted from the “Scientific / Technical 
Uncertainty” frame, and identifies Certainty as a matter of social fact, which calls on experiential 
knowledge and socially constructed truths. Van Zoonen (2012) describes Certainty as a cultural 
practice where ‘truth’ is an expression of “individual experiences and opinions” as fact.  
Furthermore, socially constructed facts about risk hold some inferential value to social groups by 
guiding speculation upon how vulnerable demographic groups will become victimised by risk 
management policies (Kasperson et al, 1988). The ‘truth’ which underpins the social facts of 
Certainty draws from a salient distrust of institutional knowledge by non-government actors 
(Sunstein and Vermeule, 2009). Highly sceptical, non-governmental, actors provide value to 
newspapers as information sources who challenge the ethics, completeness, or accuracy of 
institutional knowledge (Low and Morrison, 1984). Institutional knowledge refers to the 
constellation of credible data, evidence, and opinions which are (presumed) to have been 
incorporated into public policy decision making (Olausson, 2009).  Institutional knowledge is 
also a form of rhetorical Certainty expressed within newspapers. Journalists often cite 
institutional sources who make appeals appeal to scientific evidence, accepted theory, and 
scientific authority, to offer safety assurances and justify policy decisions (Peters, 1995).     
 
Within rhetorical framing of Blame, news sources seek to establish how institutional risk 
managers have failed in their social responsibility to protect the public from harm (Susarla, 2003. 
pp185-185). The Blame frame was adapted from the “Public Accountability / Governance” 
frame within the original codebook. The “Public Accountability / Governance” frame is 
concerned the identifying relationship between public policy making and the ownership, control, 
and abuses of technology (Kitzinger, 1999). Blame amplifies risk by providing the ongoing news 
story with a villain, someone whose actions and suspected motives can be expounded upon and 
linked to policy failures (Freudenburg, 1993; Burgess, 2012). Blame can also be attributed by 
cited social experts who accuse policymakers of violating a social contract by foisting unwanted, 
unknown, or unnatural risks onto the public (Wolff, 2006). As a principle of journalistic balance, 
newspapers may publish statements from the targets of Blame. Often, such statements attempt to 
limit liability and attempt to negotiate with aggrieved stakeholders (Hood, 2002). However, 
attempts at mitigating Blame can initiate further news cycles by providing fuel to renew public 




The Trust frame was developed from the “Conflict/Strategy” frame within the original 
codebook. The “Conflict/Strategy” frame is concerned with how the management of risk is 
presented as a competition, or game, between elite actors. The rhetorical framing of Trust 
features two principal components: trust building frames and trust destroying frames (Slovic, 
1993). However, given the asymmetric nature of trust, Trust destroying frames are more 
apparent within risk reporting  (Poortinga and Pidgeon, 2004; Cvetkovich et al, 2002; and 
Kasperson et al, 2003. pp32). Trust frames revolve around outwardly accepting or rejecting the 
legitimacy of risk managers to offer assurances and safety advice (Hughes et al, 2006. Pp253-
255). Within risk reporting, news sources from across the social strata provide statements which 
either support or doubt the efficacy of government to faithfully protect the public from harm 
(Covello and Sandman, 2001). In response, government sources may ‘spin’ their message in an 
attempt to use available risk information to validate contentious policy decisions (Anderson et 
al., 2005. pp191-195.). Trust has been conceptualised as a form of social currency, which is spent 
by civil institutions to facilitate the implementation of new policies (Ter Huurne and Gutteling, 
2009). As a rhetorical strategy, Trust destroying frames offers the public a rationale to start 
doubting institutional assurances and seek alternative possibilities for risk management (Garzio, 
2018). 
 
The rhetorical framing of Stigmatisation, associates emotional, symbolic, or metaphysical 
conditions of an object with prima face evidence of catastrophic, and avoidable, future harms 
(Kurzban and Leary, 2001; Kasperson et al, 2013).  The Stigma frame was developed from the 
“Morality / Ethics” frame in the original codebook. The “Morality / Ethics” frame encompasses 
discussions of hazards and risk management in terms of respecting or transgressing sociocultural 
boundaries. Stigmatisation has been linked to the amplification of ripple effects by incorporating 
distal social groups, geographical locations, and technologies into wider narratives of danger and 
control (Kasperson et al., 2003; Ichinosawa, 2006). Within risk reporting, Stigmatisation 
functions to demarcate, and appeal to, the normative values of a newspaper’s presumed 
readership (Malterud and Ulriksen, 2010). Stigmatisation offers a locus for contested discourses 
over the identification, definition, and control of unknown hazards.  
 
The final rhetorical framing device is Dread. Framing Dread is a key factor in risk 
amplification as it highlights personal vulnerability to harm and inability to control danger 
(Slovic et al., 2005; Satterfield, et al 2009). The Dread frame was developed from the from the 
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“Pandora’s Box” frame in the original codebook. The “Pandora’s Box” frame outlines calls for 
the precautionary management of hazards or else face a ‘slippery-slope’ into catastrophe. The 
rhetorical framing of Dread draws upon affective cognition whereby risk information is 
presented as a indeterminate threat towards progeny, social security, or cultural identity 
(Kesebir, 2011, Loewenstein, Weber, et al., 2001; Slovic and Peters, 2006).  Risk information 
becomes Dreaded when disproportionate public attention is focused upon the catastrophic 
potential, uncontrollability, and inequitable distribution of a hazard (Slovic et al, 1980; Slovic, 
1987). News reporting utilises Dread by narratively associating objectionable technologies with 
potentially chaotic futures, where contemporary comforts have been replaced with an ongoing 
and irreversible state of strife (Nisbet and Mooney, 2007).  
 
The framing analysis was conducted across sixteen moments of peak risk reporting.  The 
moments of peak risk reporting were identified during the qualitative analysis and evenly 
distributed across the identified reporting periods and fields of popular science. The sample 
period was refined to a six-week news cycle around the month of most voluminous risk 
reporting. A six-week news cycle was decided upon as it extended beyond the expected 
timeframe for media saturation of news items (Rowe et al, 2000). All news articles within each of 
the six-week news cycles were read and coded within Nvivo. Coded sections of news articles 
were saved as nodes within Nvivo, which provided a count of frames and allowed easy 
comparison of frames across the sample documents. Once the news articles were performed, two 
different analysis were performed. Firstly, the proportional changes in frame expression were 
analysed using the comparative count of frames across the sample documents. Secondly, the 
changes in rhetorical expression of frames were analysed using the classical considerations of 
rhetoric (logos, ethos, and pathos) to guide observations (Higgins and Walker, 2012).  
 
Interviews with Risk Reporters - Changes to Professional Newswork 
The final element of this research’s mixed methods approach was conducting a series of 
interviews with professional risk reporters. The interviews were designed to contextualise the 
changes observed during the content analysis phase of this study, through the experiential lenses 
of professional news reporters. The term “risk reporters” is used throughout this thesis to denote 
members of the press that regularly report on health, science, and environmental risks. While 
“risk reporter” is not a professional job title, the term is functional in that it navigates around 
contentions regarding work identities and addresses ethical concerns regarding the anonymity of 
participants.  This study managed to secure twenty interviews with risk reporters whose 
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experience ranges across the thirty-year sample 
period (Table 6). Securing twenty interviews with 
reflects a 40% buffer on the suggested number of 
interviews required to achieve thematic saturation 
when interviewing professional participants (Baker 
et al, 2012). The large buffer was necessary to 
compensate for the range of professional 
experience reflected by the sample of participants. 
 
Participants were secured using targeted sampling methods. Targeted sampling identifies 
individuals within a specific field, who are then screened for suitability and approached to 
participate in interviews (Peterson et al, 2008). Targeted sampling methods have been well 
utilised for identifying research participants from hard-to-reach populations (Shaghaghi et al, 
2011). Although members of the professional press operate as pseudo-public figures, as a 
demographic they exhibit several characteristics which makes them “hard to reach” for academic 
research (Faugier and Sargeant, 1997).  The first criteria for a hard-to-reach population is their 
active engagement with a sensitive phenomenon. News-based risk amplification is a sensitive 
phenomenon within professional circles as the act of risk reporting encompasses a prevailing 
scepticism towards government policy, academic research, and proposed benefits of applied 
sciences.  
 
Risk reporters, as a professional identity, may feel marginalised as the very nature of their 
work could provoke legal action from organisations and individuals who feel aggrieved by 
negative coverage (Goldacre, 2010). Freelance risk reporters are particularly vulnerable to 
“lawfare” - vexatious legal claims of liable, slander, and invasions of privacy which are 
implemented to deter the press from covering a particular issue or on a specific entity (Goldstein 
and Meyer, 2008). Next, individuals within hard-to-reach populations may expect prejudice and 
discrimination. Due to the nature of their work, risk reporters may feel marginalised by other 
elite professional identities. The press has regularly been investigated by academics and blamed 
for exposing the public to poor quality science within misinformed news stories (Kininmonth, et 
al; 2017). As members of the British press, risk reporters must also reconcile the fact that they 
work in a generally distrusted profession and face public criticisms of being deceitful and 
manipulative (IPSOS, 2019). Risk reporters may internalise the resonant institutional and public 
distrust targeted at the press and be less inclined to trust academic research to approach their 
concerns in good faith.  
General period of 
professional activity 
No. of participants 
Pre1980s – 2000s 3 
1980s -2000s 9 
1990s 2010s 5 
2000-2010s 3 
Table 6. Distribution of interview participants 
by period of professional experience in 




Another issue is that hidden populations face complex insecurities. The ongoing decline of 
newspaper circulations, and difficulties of generating revenue online, has placed many risk 
reporters in precarious employment situations - especially within the oversaturated field of 
health, science, and environmental reporting (Levi and Nielsen, 2010). Freelance journalists may 
face further uncertainties from irregular work and not knowing how their professional profile 
may impact future job opportunities. As such, risk reporters may be particularly reticent to 
engage with news-focused academic research in fear that assurances of anonymity will not be 
upheld, and their statements will be read by newspaper editors and senior management. Finally, 
the limited population of hard-to-reach demographics are incompatible with random sampling 
methods (Marshall, 1996).  Despite the size of news organisations, and the public visibility of 
press members, there are only a handful of correspondents who work on health, science, and 
environment news desks at any one time. There is also the career trajectory of risk reporters to 
consider, with members of the press retiring and moving onto other career opportunities outside 
of news publishing. The factors described above validate targeted sampling as a viable method to 
recruit participants for this study.  
 
Participant recruitment was conducted in two phases. The first phase utilised the Science 
Media Centre (SMC) to mediate contact with receptive risk reporters and invite them for an 
interview. Through the SMC’s resources, four interviews were secured. It was hoped that, 
through these interviews, respondent driven sampling could be conducted. However, risk 
reporters were apprehensive to suggest other potential participants without first learning who else 
had been contacted. As this would have violated ethical guidelines, an alternative method to 
participant recruitment was considered. The second phase of participant recruitment was 
conducted using the public list of risk reporters made available by Association of British Science 
Writers (ABSW). The ABSW list provided publicly available contact details for risk reporters 
with varying degrees of experience. Fifty potential participants were randomly selected and 
screened for suitability. The screening process involved using professional social media platforms 
to gauge the credentials of potential participants. From the screening process, thirty-two potential 
participants were identified as having the suitable experience of working as risk reporters within 
the British national daily newspapers over the target timeframe. Of these thirty-two potential 
participants, sixteen interviews were secured. The interviews were conducted across a three-
month period, taking place either in-person or via telephone / Skype. All interviews were 
recorded and transcribed using Google’s voice-to-text software. The interviews were designed to 
be semi-structured in nature. However, the practicalities of exploring the past thirty years of risk 
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reporting dictated that issues were often discussed out of order. It was found that a more open 
style of interview was well suited to prompting further questions which explored the salient 
changes to risk reporting, while also navigating around the pervasive animosity towards 
academia from participants.  The interview schedule was designed around four spheres of 
inquiry. 
 
The first sphere of inquiry involved questions which encouraged participants to reflect on key 
examples of poor risk reporting. The key examples of risk reporting were not prescribed to 
participants but were drawn from their own experiences and observations. Questions from the 
first sphere were designed to establish a general consensus on what constitutes as “poor risk 
reporting” looks like from the perspective of media professionals. By linking several temporally 
isolated examples of poor risk reporting, participants provided the opportunity to prompt for 
further details on change.  The second sphere of inquiry explored the changing role of risk 
reporters/reporting over time. Questions from the second sphere encouraged participants to 
reflect on the changing responsibilities of their work, and the skills necessary to pursue a career in 
risk reporting. This line of questioning prompted participants to reflect on the impact that 
improved training and education of risk reporters has had on the media landscape. The third 
sphere of inquiry explored the changing processes of reporting risk information. Questions from 
the third sphere invited participants to reflect on how the relationships between risk reporters, 
news sources, newspapers, and the public have been shaped by wider sociocultural changes.  
 
These questions prompted participants to outline how the flow of information from news 
sources into newspapers has been modulated by different temporal contexts. The final sphere of 
inquiry explored how changing newsroom dynamics has generally impacted risk reporting over 
time. Questions from the fourth sphere invited participants to draw upon their own experiences 
to highlight how the pressures of newswork shape the final form of risk reporting. These 
questions prompted participants to suggest how shifting newsroom dynamics, such as funding 
and staffing, can influence the overall quality of British risk reporting. Once the interviews were 
completed and transcribed, they were imported into Nvivo12 for analysis. The interview 
transcripts were anonymised using the Greek alphabet as an identifier. Interview analysis 
involved a thematic comparison across the twenty transcripts. The analysis sought to identify the 
general themes which emerged within each of the spheres of investigation. Themes were 
identified using ad-hoc codes (stored as nodes within Nvivo). Analysis was conducted within 
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Chapter 4 - Changes to the Character of Risk Reporting 
 
Introduction 
This chapter explores the data generated from the quantitative content analysis performed 
across the corpus of British risk reporting. The quantitative content analysis sought to map and 
investigate longitudinal changes to the amplification of risk information. The analysis was 
guided by the information mechanism of SARF, which highlights the volume of information, the 
sensationalisation of risk, and the politicisation of risk as markers of risk amplification within news 
media (Adekola, 2020). This chapter begins by demonstrating how temporal differences in the 
volume of risk information published by the British press, outlines four distinct periods of risk 
reporting since the mid-1980s. Changes to volume of risk information were mapped through 
observable changes in the proliferative trajectory of published news articles regarding health, 
science, and environmental risk issues. The periodisation of risk reporting was confirmed 
through statistical analysis of news volume over time. This chapter will then explore how the 
expression of sensationalist and politicising language changes across the distinct periods of risk 
reporting. Changes in sensationalist language was assessed as the relative difference in expression 
between alarming and reassuring phrases, quantified through word count analysis within the 
corpus. Changes in politicising language was assessed as the longitudinal change in expression of 
phrases across the corpus that juxtapose risk information and institutional systems of risk 
management.  
 
Establishing the Periods of Risk Reporting Within British Newspapers 
 
So far, this thesis has presumed that health risks are of particular significance to the British 
press, however the value of health risk reporting within newspapers has not yet been fully 
investigated. Health risk reporting is considered to be a subgenre of the wider news genre of 
Health reporting. As such, the value of health risk reporting may be ascertained by first 
identifying the proportion of British news dedicated to health reporting, and then further 
comparing the proportion of health risk reporting against the proportion of risk reporting within 
other news genres. The decision to focus on mapping the number of health risk news articles (as 
a defined news genre) rather than mapping the instances where health risks were mentioned 
across all forms of reporting was based upon a consideration where a genre of health risk-
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reporting would better reflect the quantity of health risk information (facts, data, and potentials) 
that audiences may have been exposed to. 
 
This investigation began by using a series of key word searches within LexisNexis to provide 
a count of news stories across six key news genres: Sport, Entertainment, Health, Crime, 
Economic, and Lifestyle.  The parameters of the key word searches were set to include the full 
range of British daily newspapers and date ranges outlined in chapter two. The six news genres 
were built around an intuitive understanding of news products and sought to capture distinct 
aspects of British news reporting. As such, potential news genres such as ‘politics’ or 
‘government’ were omitted, as robustness testing demonstrated that such phrases appeared 
consistently within other news genres. In total, 3,464,807 news stories were returned by 
LexisNexis. Analysis of the data demonstrated that Health news (n=485,948) constituted 14% of 
the sample and was notably lower than other news genres. For instance, Sport news (n=937,411) 
constituted 27.1% of the sample, Economic news (n=776,704) constituted 22.4% of the sample, 
and Crime news (n=741,123) constituted 21.4% of the sample. However, a trend can be observed 
where there is generally more news published across all news genres over time.  
 
When viewed as defined temporal periods, certain characteristics of British news reporting 
become apparent (fig 1). When viewed at ten-year intervals general trends are observed, which 
were not apparent at lesser timescales. Between 1985-1994, there appears to be a low level of 
news reporting which focused upon a limited 
number of news genres. Between 1995-2004, there 
appears to be a general proliferation of all news 
genres. Between 2005-2015, there appears to be a 
stratification of news genres. By convention, an 
incomplete period appears to emerge from 2015 
onwards where the volume of printed news 
appears to decline. While analysis of the data at 
fifteen-year timescale is possible, this broad 
overview would have permitted fewer periods for 
comparative analysis.  
 
While the overall volume of reporting increased for each news genre, there does not appear 
to be much variance in the proportional difference between news genres when ranked by volume. 
 
Fig 1. Volume of news reporting across six 
popular news genres within the British press.  
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For instance, in the 1985-1994 period, the three most common news genres were Economic news 
(39%), Crime news (22.9%) and Health news (16.4%). In the 1995-2004 period, the three most 
common news genres were Crime news (26.1%), Sport news (23.5%), and Economic news 
(17.1%). In the 2005-2014 period, the three most common news genres were Sport news (31.8%), 
Economic reporting (26.1%), and Crime news (20.3%). While the profile of news published by 
the British press seemingly shifts periodically, it is worth noting that the proportion of  
health news ranged between 16.4% to 13.2% of news stories. The not insignificant media profile 
of Health reporting is further reinforced by evidence that the average volume of health stories 
increased from 11 per day to 69 per day between the 1985-1994 and 2005-2014 periods. This data 
suggests that, overtime, the public’s exposure to health-related news increased, even though the 
proportion of health stories remained largely consistent.   
 
It was acknowledged that not all stories published within a specific news genre were 
inherently orientated around risk. As such, to investigate how the volume of risk reporting 
changed over time another investigation a count of news stories was conducted, within each 
news genre, for stories which contained stemmed phrases of “Risk”.  To improve the clarity of 
data, Lifestyle news and Entertainment news were omitted from the analysis. As fig 2 illustrates, 
the volume of risk-based news reporting generally increased across the reporting periods. 
Between 1985-1994 and 1995-2004 periods the volume of risk reporting increased by 204%, from 
18,695 to 56,785 news stories.  As it pertains to 
this thesis, overall, the volume of Health risk 
reporting represented 22% of all risk reporting. 
While it was noted that, in 1999 and 2000, 
Health risk reporting was the more dominant 
form of risk reporting within the sample, there 
appears to be an intense media focus on 
Economic risk from 2007 onwards, which 
seemingly corresponds to the Global Financial 
Crisis.  To compensate for this, the proportion 
of risk reporting within news genres was 
assessed (fig 3) to provide a more reliable overview of changes to risk reporting over time.  
As fig 3 illustrates, the proportion of risk reporting appears to be somewhat independent of 
increases to the volume of news for each news genre.  
 
 
Fig 2. Volume of news reporting across four key 
news genres within the British press.  
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While the volume of Health and Health Risk 
reporting generally increased over time, there 
appears to be sustained over-representation of 
risk from 1993 to 2000, followed by a sustained 
decline in representation between 2001-2017. 
While the proportion of risk reporting within 
Economic news continuously increased across 
the reporting periods, the peak proportion of 
Economic risk reporting was comparable to the 
peak proportion of Health risk reporting (23%). 
The proportion of Sport risk reporting was 
largely underrepresented over time. The period between 1994-1997 where Sport risk reporting 
appeared above the mean seemingly correlates with the initial years of the English Premier 
League and may be related to coverage of Manchester United’s quest to win (and subsequently 
defend) the cup. 
 
 The proportional profile of Crime risk exhibits temporal changes which seemingly mirror 
those of Health risk reporting. The proportion of Crime risk appears largely under-represented 
within Crime news between 1990 to 2000, before becoming increasingly overrepresented from 
2001 onwards. While this late stage shift towards overrepresentation appears to correspond with 
the 9/11 and 7/7 terror attacks (and subsequent ‘war on terror’), this does not explain the 2016 
peak in proportional risk reporting (28%). While the proportional changes in Crime risk 
reporting certainly warrants scholarly attention, the emergence of the late-stage peak in 2015 
suggests that journalists may have been undergoing some reorientation around risk at the time 
that data was collected for this thesis. As such, it would have been premature to conduct analysis 
of change before they had time to be resolved.  
 
Data provided from the analysis so far provides both a general overview of the changes to British 
risk reporting and strong evidence to substantiate the focus of this thesis. Although the volume of 
Health news and Health risk reporting did not dominate the British press landscape, they both 
form a substantial part of the British news diet. Furthermore, while the volume of published 
news and risk reporting increased across news genres, Health risk reporting exhibits a unique 
profile of early-stage over-representation of risk reporting, followed by a consistent period of 
under-representation. Given that this shift in trajectory appears to hinge around the year 2000, 
this warrants further investigation into the Health Risk which compares the temporal profiles of 
 
Fig 3. Risk reporting as a proportion of published 
stories across news genres  
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risk reporting to provide more refined explanations of changes. Finally, there is a wealth of data 
which suggests that using ten-year time periods works well to capture distinct temporal contexts 
more holistically for more robust comparative analysis across this chapter.  
 
Comparing the Periods of Health Risk-Reporting Within British 
Newspapers 
Using the ten-year timeframe to guide the analysis of changes in the volume of risk reporting 
appeared to demonstrate distinct periods of Health risk reporting (fig 4).  Whilst this 
periodisation is coarse, the data does suggest shifting trends in the proliferation of Health risk-
reporting which describes stratified levels of health risk information being made available to 
audiences. The first period seemingly extends 
from 1985 to 1994; it is characterised by a 
steady proliferation of around 54 additional 
articles yearly and a comparatively low volume 
of overall risk reporting (5246 articles). The 
second period seemingly extends from 1995 to 
2004; it is characterised by a rapid proliferation 
of around 200 additional articles yearly and a 
notable increase in the volume of risk reporting 
(20,624 articles). The third period seemingly 
extends from 2005 to 2014; it is characterised 
by a decline in proliferation of around 35 
additional articles and a further increase in the 
volume of risk reporting (30,141 articles). From this established convention, a contemporary 
fourth period of risk reporting emerges from 2015 to 2017. Whilst this period is expected to 
extend  
until 2024, it was not possible to capture any data from 2018 onwards. There is currently not 
enough data to suggest any changes in the proliferation of risk reporting, However, within the 
three years made available for analysis, there already exists a higher volume of risk reporting 
(10,253 articles) compared to the first period. As such, this emergent fourth period was not 
omitted from analysis, as comparative qualitative analysis may yield notable insights (see chapter 
five).    
 
 
Fig 4. Periods of risk reporting outlined by 
proliferative changes in news volume from a 
more refined corpus of Health risk reporting. 
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When comparing the reporting trends across the reporting periods, evidence emerges which 
reinforces the claim that the second period (1995-2004) was a moment of particularly high risk 
amplification. It appears that a moment of intense proliferation of Health risk-reporting extends 
between 1996 to 2000, which corresponds with a period between the apparent press victory over 
BSE in 1996 and the publication of the House of Lords report on Science and Technology in 
2000. The rapid proliferation of risk reporting between 1996 and  2000 and suggests a 
reorientation of the press around Health risk-based news reporting. Such a reorientation suggests 
that the value of Health risk-reporting to newspapers had increased, and that journalists were 
actively seeking to embed the language of risk within health reporting Konfortion et al, 2014). 
The 1996 -2000 peak is notably different comparted to other reporting peaks which generally 
signify specific years of press focus on Health risk-stories. For example, the reporting peak in 
1989 seemingly corresponds with emergent reporting on BSE, while the 2013 peak corresponds 
with reporting on the Horse Meat Scandal.   
 
 
 Peaks in risk reporting provide reasonable grounds to assume that these are the specific 
moments where risk amplification is most likely to be located. The existence of peak moments of 
risk reporting across periods of risk reporting provides an opportunity for comparative qualitative 
analysis which assesses how the nature of amplified Health risk reporting has changed over time 
(see chapter five). However, when the volume of Health risk-reporting is disaggregated according 
to popular field of health reporting, the general profile of Health risk-reporting becomes more 
refined (fig 5). 
Overall, 49.8% of Health Risk-reporting is 
constituted by Food Alert stories (n= 33,030), 
suggesting that the general profile of amplified 
health risk-reporting is going to be biased 
towards Food Alert stories. However, there 
were changes in the proportional constituents 
of Health Risk-reporting over time which 
suggests that there are temporal differences in 
the value that specific fields of popular health 




Fig 5. Proliferative changes of popular fields of 




Within the first period, Food Alert stories constituted 30.5% of Health Risk-reporting, while 
Radiation Risk stories constituted 22.1% of reporting, Vaccine and Disease stories constituted 
16.9% of reporting, and Environmental Pollution stories constituted 30.5% of reporting. Such a 
relatively equitable distribution of news stories across the four popular fields of Health reporting 
provides some evidence to suggest that the British press quite evenly allocated resources towards 
covering a range of issues. To assess the robustness of this data, a set of further analyses were 
conducted with substituted the target phrases with appropriate synonyms (i.e., Atomic instead of 
Nuclear / Radiation, Bug and Jab instead of Disease / Vaccine, Diet and Consumption instead 
of Food, and Chemical instead of Environment / Pollution). In many cases it was found that the 
target phrases returned the optimal set of results, with substituted phrases either returning 
comparatively suppressed results or were demonstrated to lack a degree of specificity upon 
further interrogation. However, it was noted that the phrase Atomic was far more common in 
news reporting between the 1950s to the 1980s. This finding would greatly benefit further 
archival research conducted upon an older data set.  
 
Within the first period, two notable peaks in reporting were observed. There was one peak in 
1986, which was primarily constituted by Radiation Risk reporting (36.5%) and appears to be 
related to coverage of the Chernobyl disaster. The second notable peak occurred in 1989, which 
was primarily constituted by Food Alert stories (45.9%) and appears to be related to coverage of 
emerging concerns around BSE and wider concerns about meat safety standards. Within the 
second period, the proportion of Food Alert stories grew to constitute 40.1% of reporting, while 
Radiation Risk stories declined to 16.8%, Vaccine and Disease stories declined to 14.2%, and 
Environmental Pollution stories declined to 28.9%. The shift in proportional distribution 
between the four different fields of health reporting lends evidence to suggest that, within the 
second period, risk reporters began to dedicate resources towards reporting on stories which were 
believed to resonate better with general news audiences.   
 
Within the second period, there appears to be an extended peak across 2000 and 2001. In the 
2000 peak, the reporting overwhelmingly consisted of Food Alert stories (64.6%) and seemingly 
coincides with concerns over GM foods and the publication of the Phillips report - a public 
inquiry into the BSE crisis. Also, within the 2000 peak, the proportion of Radiation risk stories 
represented 9.7% of reporting, while Vaccine and Disease stories and Environmental Pollution 
stories represented 13.4% and 13.6% respectively.  In the 2001 peak, the proportion of Food 
Alert stories declined to 44.8%, while the proportion of Radiation Risk stories increased to 11.4% 
of reporting, Vaccine and Disease increased to 24.9% of reporting, and Environmental Pollution 
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stories increased to 18.9% of reporting. The data suggests that the 2000 peak was predicated 
primarily upon reporting around the MMR triple vaccine controversy. This data suggests that, 
for the British press, Food Alert stories are a key driver for risk amplification, followed closely by 
Vaccination and Disease stories.  
 
This observation is further reinforced by data from the third period, where Food Alert stories 
represented 56.4% of news stories within the 2013 peak. The 2013 peak appears to coincide with 
reporting around the Horse Meat Scandal, which was unexpected as the core focus of the Horse 
Meat scandal was around the lackadaisical enforcement of government (and EU) regulation 
rather than the specific threat to health from tainted meat products (for a more detailed analysis, 
see chapter six). Furthermore, when the reporting around other major risk events was analysed, 
it was observed that Vaccine and Disease stories represented 33.3% of reporting during the 2009 
Swine Flu Pandemic, but Radiation Risk stories only represented 18.3% of reporting during the 
2011 Fukushima Nuclear Disaster. Such data lends evidence to suggest that, by the third period, 
the British Press had come to understand that there was a differential value held by specific fields 
of Health risk reporting, with some being seen as more appealing to news audiences than others.  
 
Despite the observations regarding the shifting profile of Health risk reporting over time, 
such data should be considered alongside analysis conducted earlier in this chapter which 
highlighted the declining preference for Health Risk reporting over time. For instance, during the 
2000 peak, Health Risk reporting represented 22% of Health reporting as a news genre. The 
reporting in 2013, which was seen as the ultimate peak in Health Risk reporting, only constituted 
11% of Health reporting as a wider news genre. Such changes in the proportional profile of 
Health Risk reporting may be illustrative of observable reorientations within news texts (which 
will be further analysed in chapter six). The data presented within this chapter lends some 
tentative support to the suggestion that Health Risk reporting had become increasingly 
individualistic over time (Cadburnay et al, 2003; Clarke and Van Amerom, 2008; Malikhao and 
Servaes, 2011).  
 
The increased proliferation of Food Alert reporting supports this claim, as the proportion of 
Diet-Based stories increased from 32% of Food Alert reporting in the first and second periods to 
39% in the third period and 51% in the emergent fourth period. The increasing emphasis on diet 
within Food Alert stories may be a result of both a wider acknowledgement that government 
regulation can only do so much to impact health through dietary controls, and that market forces 
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are more readily able to provide journalists with stories regarding new popular diets which 
purport to address modern health risks from poor diet. At the same time, and perhaps 
contradictorily, the British press may have become increasingly aware of the need for new 
government policies in situations where individual control over risk exposure is a virtual 
impossibility (Anderson, 2009; Schmidt, et al; 2013; Schäfer et al, 2014).  
 
It was observed that, over time, Environmental Pollution stories grew from representing an 
average of 19.7% of Health Risk stories during the second period to representing an average of 
26.5% of stories in the emergent fourth period - becoming the second most common field of 
Health Risk reporting. Furthermore, the proportion of Environmental Pollution stories which 
were focused on Climate Change grew from 6.2% of stories in the second period, to 23,7% of 
stories in the emergent fourth period.  The degree to which Environmental Pollution reporting, 
and Climate Change reporting, reflects a wider demand for regulatory control over risk exposure 
is embedded within the argument put forward by Beck (1996) which suggests that there is little 
ability for the individual to control their exposure to the environmental risks which are produced 
by globalised industrial output. Within a British context, those individuals who are increasingly 
at risk from seasonal flooding resulting from adverse weather events have little ability to protect 
themselves and are reliant upon environmental policy reforms which aim to address 
environmental risks. While the data suggests that the British press has become less inclined 
towards amplifying emergent risks, there is some evidence to suggest that the pandemic potential 
of novel diseases still holds the potential for amplification.  
 
The data from within Vaccine and Disease stories across the third and fourth periods 
describes several moments of media interest which correspond with reporting around Bird Flu 
(2006), Swine Flu (2009) and the Zika Virus (2016). Frost et al suggests that stories around 
potential pandemics hold greater value to the press then more general epidemiological issues as 
they provide journalists with the opportunity to explore a contested political arena where news 
sources debate the provision of healthcare resources, the legitimacy of expert assessment, and the 
presumed effectiveness of risk management policies. While research into the contested nature to 
disease prevention strategies has primarily focused on developing nations (see Upton, 2011; 
Kennedy, 2016; Martinez-Bravo, 2017), the data presented within this thesis suggests that there 
is scope to explore such issues within Western nations. Outside of emergent diseases, news 
media appears to have declining interest in general reporting stories regarding pathogenic risks, 
and an increasing preference for stories regarding carcinogenic risks. For example, during the 
first period of risk reporting there was only 7.1% more Cancer-based stories compared with 
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Disease-based stories. Within the second period of risk reporting, the difference grew to 33.8% 
more Cancer-based stories compared to Disease-based stories. Within the third period of risk 
reporting, there was 48.3% more Cancer-based stories compared to Disease-based stories. The 
overrepresentation of Cancer-based stories within the Health risk corpus does lend some further 
evidence to explain why Food Alert stories are also overrepresented, as diet is readily linked 
personal management of cancer risks (see Boyle et al, 2008).  
 
Changes in Amplifying Language Across Newspaper Reporting on Risk   
Research has demonstrated that sensationalist and politicising language within news reporting 
can amplify risk information across social stations (Frewer et al, 1998). However, these linguistic 
markers of risk amplification have yet to be subjected to longitudinal enquiry across the periods 
of risk reporting. Sensationalist language has been identified as a narrative modifier of 
amplification. By juxtaposing risk information alongside alarming phrases, risk reporting can 
confer an exaggerated sense of impending danger (Kitzinger, 1999; Gorney, 1992). It has also 
been identified that risk reporters seek to provide balance within their news stories by including 
news sources who seek to offer reassuring statements (Frewer et al, 2002). Reassuring phrases are 
expected attenuate the amplification of risk information by conferring a sense of safety and 
control, especially in relation to risk management policies (Sandman, 1994; and Ungar, 2008). 
Politicising language is another narrative modifier of risk amplification. By juxtaposing risk 
information alongside political terms, risk reporters appear to be constructing news stories which 
intertwine risk information with political angles regarding control and risk management, rather 




Analysing Sensationalist Language  
Analysis indicates a linear increase in the expression of both alarming and reassuring phrases 
within risk reporting (fig 6). Across the entire corpus of Health risk reporting, there was 23,036 
instances of alarming phrases, and 17,482 instances of reassuring phrases. There are periodic 
differences in sensationalism which suggests 
that expression of risk amplifying language 
is bound by temporal contexts. Across the 
first and second periods of risk reporting, the 
proportional difference between alarming 
and reassuring phrases increased from 
20.6% to 33.7%. This data suggests that the use 
of alarming language underwent a period of rapid 
proliferation between 1995 to 2004. Following 
this, the proportional difference between alarming 
and reassuring phrases decreased to 25.2% in the 
third period. There was near parity of 
sensationalist language within the emergent 
fourth period of risk reporting, with 
reassuring phrases being expressed 0.2% more than alarming phrases. The observation that 
alarming and reassuring language became more equitable between 2005 to 2017 lends some 
evidence to suggest that the use of alarming language became increasingly unpopular within risk 
reporting after 2005. 
 
 Within the first period of risk reporting the use of alarming phrases increased by an average 
of 5.9% per year. In total, there were 1983 instances of alarming phrases between 1985 and 1994. 
There were two years where a disproportionate proliferation of alarming phrases was observed. 
In 1986 and 1989, the use of alarming phrases increased by 61.8% and 86.5% respectively. These 
years of high alarm appear to correlate with the news reporting on the Chernobyl disaster and 
BSE. The use of reassuring phrases increased by an average of 1,6% per year across the first 
period of risk reporting. In total, there were 1575 instances of reassuring words between 1985 
and 1994.There was also two years with a disproportionate increase in reassuring phrases. In 
1986 and 1990 the use of alarming phrases increased by 59.5% and 59.4% respectively. Again, 
this proliferative increase in reassuring phrases appears to coincide with reporting on Chernobyl 
and BSE. This data appears to suggest that, during the first period, peak moments of risk 
reporting reflect an increased use of alarming and reassuring language.   
 
Fig 6. Count of references to institutional sources 
within the Health risk corpus across the periods of 




Within the second period of risk reporting, there was a steady, and rapid, increase in the use 
of alarming and reassuring phrases. Across the second period of risk reporting, the use of alarming 
phrases increased by a yearly average of 13.8%, resulting in a total 7,776 recorded instances for 
the decade. Conversely, the use of reassuring phrases increased by a yearly average of 12.4%, 
resulting in a total of 5,153 recorded instances for the decade. In 1996 there was an observable 
peak in the use of reassuring phrases which represented a 56.1% increase from the previous year. 
From interrogating the news reporting, it appears that much of this increased use of reassuring 
phrases was based upon incorporating official safety assurances into the reporting on BSE related 
deaths. Across the third period of risk reporting, the use of alarming phrases declined by an 
average of 0.3% per year. In total there were 10,073 instances of alarming words between 2005 
and 2014. The declining rate of proliferation for the use of use of alarming words was mirrored 
by a 1.9% growth in the average yearly use of reassuring words. The declining rate of 
proliferation for alarming words lends further evidence to suggest between 2005 and 2014 was a 
period of reorientation for the British press in how they reported on risk information. Data from 
the emergent fourth period suggests that further changes are becoming more apparent. For 
instance, while the use of alarming phrases increased by an average of 0.9% per year, the use of 
reassuring phrases increased by an average of 12.2% per year. The proliferative rate of reassuring 
phrases during the emergent fourth period is comparable to the proliferative rate during the 
second period of risk reporting.  
 
Analysing Politicising Language 
Institutional sources 
Politicising phrases were clustered according to apparent themes to enable comparative analysis 
across the reporting period. The first thematic cluster that was identified regarded the expression 
of institutional sources of risk information within the corpus of Health risk reporting. It was 
observed that the expression of both Scientific sources and Government sources increased at a 
linear rate, although Government sources were more likely to exhibit more notable peaks across 
the reporting periods (fig 7). Across the news reporting, there appeared to be a general attempt at 
balancing information provided by Governmental and Scientific institutions as sources of 
information for hazards and risk management. Overall, there were 37,951 references to 
Government and 20,272 references to Science. Across the four periods of risk reporting the 
proportional differences in expression between Government and Scientific sources generally 
declined. During the first period of risk reporting, Government constituted an average of 66.1% 
of institutional references per year. However, there were some years where the proportional  
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difference appeared particularly skewed. In 
1989, Government constituted 80.1% of 
institutional references. Conversely, 
Government only constituted 48.8% of 
references in 1986.  
 
The degree of discrepancy between 
institutional source attribution appears to be 
influenced by the nature of amplified risk 
issue. For example, during the coverage of 
Chernobyl in 1986, risk reporters appear to 
highlight scientific voices to address residual 
uncertainties regarding nuclear energy. 
Furthermore, during the coverage of BSE in 1989, risk reporters appear to highlight (and dispute) 
government safety assurances regarding the safety of British beef. Within the second period of 
risk reporting Government constituted an average of 51.1% of institutional references per year. 
Within the second period of risk reporting a more general trend could be observed where 
references to scientific institutions became more popular over time. For example, in 1995 
Scientific institutions represented only 32.6% of all institutional references. By 2004, references 
to Scientific institutions grew to represent 56.1% of all institutional references. The general 
growth of references to scientific institutions lends evidence to suggest that, by the end of the 
second period of risk reporting, risk reporters had become more accustomed to including 
scientific sources to balance news reporting on risk issues (for a more detailed analysis, see 
chapter 5). Within the third period of risk reporting, references to Government institutions 
represented a yearly average of 42.3% for all mentions of hierarchical institutions. This lends 
evidence to suggest that risk reporting in the third period tended to better represent scientific 
views, rather than relying upon statements from government departments.  
 
There does not appear to be a stable trend in the diminishing references to Government 
institutions across the third period of risk reporting. Between 2005 and 2015 the proportion of 
references to government generally ranged from between 29.0% to 52.1%, depending upon the 
year. This lends evidence to suggest that the proportional difference between references to 
Governmental or Scientific institutions is dependent upon the sociopolitical nature of risk being 
reported on by the media. For example, in 2009, references to Government represented a 
disproportionate 58.5% of all institutional references. From interrogating the newspaper 
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reporting, there is evidence to suggest that the disproportionate representation of Government 
institutions was based upon concerns regarding Government stockpiles and distribution of 
Tamiflu during peak news coverage of the Swine flu pandemic. However, in 2013 the proportion 
of references to Government institutions declined to 34.8%. The low presentation of 
Government institutions within risk reporting for 2013 was unique as this year exhibited the 
largest peak across the Health risk corpus, which was mostly predicated upon the reporting of the 
Horse Meat scandal. From the reporting, it was revealed that risk reporters did not appear to 
amplify the risks from phenylbutyrate within tainted meat products, and mostly emphasised the 
role of organised criminal gangs in circumventing food standards regulations. Both cases lend 
some evidence to suggest that the policies and procedures of Government can further amplify 
risk where they can be blamed for failing in their duty to protect the public from a speculated 
health crisis (for a more detailed analysis, see chapter 5). Within the emergent fourth period of 
risk reporting references to Government institutions was at a historic low, representing an 
average of 37.1% for institutional references per year. However, unlike the previous two period, 
the proportion of Governmental references increased over time from 29.9% in 2015 to 40.2% in 
2015. This data lends some evidence to suggest that there may be an emerging trend where news 
reporters begin to re-focus their attention on the role of government institutions in managing risk,  
information, and public safety.  
Institutional Actors  
Analysis revealed that there were several key 
phrases which identified specific classes of 
institutional actor within the risk reporting. 
Ministers of government departments, scientific 
Experts, and industry Chiefs are regularly 
highlighted within risk reporting as having some 
responsibility for, or influence upon, risk 
management policies and (re)distribution of 
apparent technological dangers across society. By 
mapping the count of references to Ministers, 
Experts, and Chiefs, it was possible to conduct a 
more refined analysis on the changes to politicising language (fig 8). In total, there was 14,380 
references to Ministers (32.3% of sample), 17,813 references to Experts (40% of sample), and 
12,325 references to Chiefs (27.7% of sample) across the entire corpus of Health risk reporting.  
There were changes in comparative distribution of identified political actors which further 
suggests that risk reporting is influenced by a periodisation effect. Within the first period of risk 
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reporting, ‘Minister’ was the most well represented political actor, representing 47.2% of all 
mentions. The number of mentions for Minister increased at an average rate of 25.3% per year. 
‘Expert’ received the second most attention from risk reporters, reflecting 30.1% of all mentions 
and growing at an average rate of 20.2% per year. ‘Chief’ received the least amount of attention 
from risk reporters during the first period, representing 22.7% of all mentions. However, ‘Chief’ 
was the fastest growing political actor, increasing at an average rate of 27.2% per year across the 
first period of risk reporting. Within the second period of risk reporting, ‘Minister’ was again the 
most well represented political actor within risk reporting however the overall proportion of 
mentions decreased to 37.6%. The proliferative rate for mentions of Minister also decreased to an 
average of 11.2% per year across the second period of risk reporting. The proportional share for 
mentions of Expert grew to comprise 38.6% of references to political actors within the second 
period of risk reporting. The proliferative rate for Experts was also the highest for all three 
political actors, with an average increase of 20.7% per year. However, the proliferative rate of 
mentions for Experts was the highest for all political actors during the second period of risk 
reporting, with an average growth of 20.7% mentions per year. The proportional share for Chief 
increased slightly to 23.8% of mentions within the second period of risk reporting. However, the 
proliferative rate declined to an average increase of 17.9% per year. Within the third period of 
risk reporting, Experts became the most popular political actor, representing 39.8% of mentions 
for all expert actors.  
 
This data provides evidence to suggest that the share of mentions for Chief underwent a 
slight increase to represent 29.7% of references to political actors. The average yearly rate of 
proliferation sharply declined across all three classes of political actors during the third period of 
risk reporting. In general, the average rate of proliferation for references to Expert, Ministerial, 
and Chief political actors declined to 4.0%, 2.7%, and 7.4% respectively. The data generated 
from the third period of risk reporting lends evidence to suggest that there had been a paradigm 
shift within risk reporting. This paradigm describes a change in professional practice, where risk 
reporters had become more inclined to highlight risk information generated by scientific Experts than 
other classes of political actor. This data lends evidence to support the claims from media observers 
such as Fiona Fox (director of the Science Media Centre) who has previously identified a 
concerted effort from within the British establishment to raise the profile of expert voices within 
risk-based news reporting (Fox and St Louis, 2013).  
 
 The observable decline in proliferation of mentions across all three classes of political actors 
lends evidence to suggest that there is an observable plateauing effect on the production of risk 
104 
 
reporting within the third period. Within the emergent fourth period of risk reporting the 
proportional share of mentions for Expert political actors continued to increase; representing 
46.3% of the sample. The proportional mentions of Chief increased to 30.1%, becoming the 
second most popular political actor within the emergent fourth period. Finally, the proportion of 
Ministerial mentions continued declining to represent 32.6% of the sample. The data provided by 
this analysis provides evidence to suggest a periodisation effect on the role of political actors to 
disseminate risk information within news reporting. The proportional changes in source 
attribution between Ministerial and Expert sources suggests a shift in professional attitudes 
towards the underlying value of risk information from specific classes of political actor. Across the 
first and second period of risk reporting, the press appears to hold the authority of government minsters in 
high regard as a source of risk information. However, from the third period of risk reporting onwards, 
scientific credentials appear to have become far more valuable to risk reporters. The relative under-
representation of industry Chiefs as information sources during the second and third periods of 
risk reporting appear to suggest that news reporters were more concerned with publishing a 
polarised debate on risk issues between government authority and scientific expertise, rather than 
incorporating the perspectives from a broader selection of hierarchical risk managers (Boykoff, 
2007; and Nisbet and Fahy, 2015).  
 
Institutional publication 
The seeming conflict between Ministerial and Scientific sources (outlined above) appears to 
represent definitional battles over risk information embedded within institutional Reports. A 
word count analysis revealed that “Report” was a popular phrase across amplified risk reporting 
and signified the medium by which risk information was made public. From interrogating the 
news reporting, it was revealed that the phrase “report” was contextualised by two key prefixal 
modifiers - Governmental Reports or Scientific Reports. A word count analysis revealed that 
there were 20,605 instances of “Government Report”, and 20,945 instances of “Scientific 
Report” across the corpus of Health risk reporting. Observable changes across the reporting 
periods (fig 9) demonstrate that risk reporters became increasingly more accustomed to 
prioritising risk information embedded within Scientific Reports over Government Reports 
across the chronology of risk reporting. Within the first period of risk reporting, Scientific 
Reports was underrepresented within risk reporting. Scientific reports only constituted 36.7% for 
all mentions of institutional reports. There was also a large disparity in the rate of proliferation as 
the average mentions for Scientific Reports increased by 14.1% per year, while the average 
mentions for Government Reports increased by 22.9% per year. Within the second period of risk 
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reporting, the proportion of mentions for Scientific Reports increased to 47.4% of reporting. This 
increase in mentions for Scientific Reports is explained by an increase in the average proliferative  
rate to 14.6% increase per year. 
Conversely, the proliferative rate for 
mentions of Government reports declined 
to 10.9% per year across the reporting 
period. Within the third period of risk 
reporting, there was relative parity in the 
proportion of mentions between 
institutional reports. The proportion of 
mentions for Scientific Reports continued 
to increase to 51.3% of all mentions. 
However, the average proliferative rate for 
both Scientific Reports and Government 
Reports declined, falling to 5.5% and 6.6% 
respectively. 
 
 Within the emergent fourth period, Scientific Reports emerged as the dominant form of institutional 
report, increasing the proportional share to 58.6% of mentions. There was also a deviation in the 
change of proliferative rate, with the number of mentions for Scientific Reports increasing to an 
average of 6.5% per year, while the number of mentions for Government Reports declined to an 
average of 2.3% per year. From this data there is evidence to suggest that, across the reporting 
periods, the press had increasingly chosen to prioritise risk information embedded within 
Scientific Reports over that of Government Reports. There is further evidence to suggest that the 
first and second periods of risk reporting were moments of particularly high proliferation of risk 
information within news reporting, and that there was a relative stagnation in the proliferation of 
risk information across the third and emergent fourth periods.               
 
Conclusion       
This chapter aimed to investigate the changes to the amplification of risk by assessing the 
volume of information, the expression of sensationalist language, and the expression of 
politicising language. Across this chapter, evidence was provided which demonstrated that risk 
reporting is subject to temporally bound influences that describe distinct periods of risk reporting. 
The first period of risk reporting extends from 1985 to 1994 and is characterised by a relatively 
 
Fig 9 Count of references to institutional publications 




low volume of information, relatively low sensationalism, and relatively high politicisation. The 
high degrees of politicisation appear to correspond with a number of peak years of reporting, 
where the volume of information and sensationalist language are disproportionately high. From 
the data, two years of peak reporting emerge, one in 1986 and one in 1989. The 1986 peak in 
reporting corresponds with news coverage of the Chernobyl disaster. It is characterised by 
disproportional expression of reassuring language, and an emphasis upon both governmental and 
expert news sources.  
 
The 1989 peak in reporting corresponds with news coverage of BSE. It is characterised by an 
emphasis on Governmental news sources, and the disproportional expression of alarming 
language. The second period of risk reporting extends from 1995 to 2004 and is characterised by 
a rapid proliferation in volume of risk information, disproportionately high expression of 
sensationalist language, and increasing levels of politicisation. From the data, it was revealed 
that the rapid proliferation in the volume of risk information was heavily influenced by ongoing 
media attention towards Food Alert stories. Across the second period of risk reporting, news 
stories incorporated increasingly alarmist language when reporting on risk information. It was 
also observed that, during the second period, risk reporting became more focused on utilising the 
risk information provided by governmental and scientific sources. However, across the second 
period, risk reporters began to prioritise risk information from scientific sources over official 
government reports. The third period of risk reporting extends from 2005 to 2014 and is 
characterised by a high volume of information, declining sensationalism, and decreasing 
politicisation. The high volume of risk information was primarily due to risk reporters 
maintaining a focus on Food Alert stories. Furthermore, risk reporters began to prioritise 
Environmental Pollution stories within the reporting.  
Despite the high volume of risk information, there was a general stagnation in the 
proliferation of news stories across the third period of risk reporting. Furthermore, the trajectory 
of published Vaccine & Disease stories generally declined across the third period of risk 
reporting.  The decline in sensationalism was expressed as a general decline in the proportion of 
alarming language, and subsequent increase in reassuring language, across the third period of 
risk reporting. The decline in politicisation was observed as the increased prioritisation of 
scientific experts as news sources within risk reporting. Risk reporters also continued to 
emphasise the role of scientific reports and academic research papers as the key source for risk 
information. Furthermore, across the third period of risk reporting, risk reporters became more 
accustomed to including the statements from industry sources regarding risk management. The 
emergent fourth period extends from 2015 onwards and is characterised by a declining volume of 
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risk reporting, low levels of both sensationalism and politicisation. Within the emergent fourth 
period of risk reporting, both the overall volume of risk reporting and the proliferative rate of risk 
reporting exhibited a general decline. The emergent period of risk reporting was also the first 
moment across the entire corpus of Health risk reporting where there was near parity in the 
expression of alarming and reassuring phrases. Finally, the utilisation of scientific sources for risk 
information was at its highest during the emergent fourth period of risk reporting. Despite the 
apparent changes within the emergent fourth period, it must be reiterated that these observations 
are based on a limited sample and are speculative at best.  
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Chapter 5 - Narrative Changes to Risk Reporting  
 
Introduction 
This chapter analyses the data generated from the qualitative content analysis performed 
across moments of peak news reporting. The qualitative content analysis sought to explore 
changes to risk amplifying narratives across the different periods of risk reporting (identified 
within chapter 4). Changes to risk news narratives were investigated by assessing shifts in the 
framing of risk information and rhetoric of risk reporting across sixteen highly amplified news 
cycles identified using the peak reporting data for each of the four strands of popular risk 
reporting obtained in the previous 
chapter (table8). The highly amplified 
news cycles were identified as a six-
week period of news reporting which 
extended one week before and five 
weeks following am instigating news 
item. The framing analysis was 
conducted across seven media frames 
of risk amplification: Uncertainty, 
Certainty, Blame, Trust, Dread, and 
Stigmatisation. The rhetoric analysis 
was performed using the three 
traditional concepts of rhetoric: logos 
(reason), ethos (credibility) and pathos 
(emotion).  
 
Shifting Expression of Risk Amplifying News Frames 
Across the reporting periods, it was observed that the number of news articles contained within 
amplified news cycles reflects the proliferative trends observed within the previous chapter. 
Overall, there were 1,491 news articles included in this study. As fig 10 illustrates, Uncertainty, 
Certainty, and Blame appear to be commonly exhibited frames within risk reporting across all 

















































































































Table 8. Moments of peak publication of risk-based news 
across each of the reporting periods. Includes the number 
of articles used for content analysis.  
112 
 
media template may exist which guides the conventions around selecting news sources who 
more readily frame risk as an ongoing dispute over health management as it is presumed to 
resonate better with audiences regardless of temporal context (Kitzinger, 2000; De Vreese, 2005; 
Nisbet, 2009).   
There generally seemed to be little variation 
in expression of Uncertainty, Certainty, and 
Blame frames across temporal periods. 
However, expression of these frames within 
the second period appears uncharacteristic 
and lend further evidence to suggest that the 
second period was a moment of particularly 
high risk amplification (fig 11).  
Expression of Uncertainty characteristically 
ranged from between 44.2% to 45.5%. 
However, expression of Uncertainty declined 
to 31.2% in the second period. Expression of 
Certainty increased from 13.6% in the first 
period to 26.0% in the second period, before 
declining to between 22.1% to 23.1% in the 
third and fourth periods. Expression of Blame 
also increased from 13.6% in the first period 
to 20.9% in the second period, before 
declining to between 15.6% and 16.3% in the 
third and fourth period. This data lends some 
evidence to suggest that the relationship 
between Uncertainty, Certainty and Blame is 
a key motivator for the amplification of risk information within news reporting (see Clarkson et 
al, 2008; Liu and Zhang, 2018; Holton et al, 2018).   The uncharacteristic expression of common 
frames within the second period suggests that, within the media template on risk, Uncertainty 
may function to mitigate risk amplification while Certainty and Blame may be more directly 
related to risk amplification. It is acknowledged that this observation regarding Uncertainty 
frames is contentious and disputes pervious research that has linked the concept of uncertainty 
with risk amplification (see Pidgeon et al, 2003; Petts and Niemeyer, 2004; Fjaeran and Avan, 
2019). As such, there is a need to further explore the relationship between Uncertainty, 
Certainty, and Blame frames within this study.  
 
Fig 10 Proportions of observable risk amplifying 
frames across the periods of Health risk reporting. 
 
Fig 11 Proportions of common frames across the 




Framing Certainty  
From the analysis conducted so far within the thesis, there is evidence to suggest that the 
framing of Certainty is more closely aligned to risk amplification than previously expected. There 
appears to be a confluence between the high expression of Certainty frames and the rapid 
proliferation of risk-based news stories within the second period of risk reporting. There is further 
evidence to suggest that the second period of risk reporting was a decade where professional 
conventions were adopted which amplify risk information within news stories. The first 
convention regarded the choice of modal verbs used to communicate scientific evidence. Modal 
verbs are subjective linguistic markers of probabilistic harm and range from more-certain 
signifiers (such as can cause and could cause) to less-certain signifiers (such as might cause and 
may cause) (Katz et al, 2020). The Certainty expressed by more-certain modal verbs may amplify 
risk by confirming readers expectations that the likelihood of harm is more than likely true 
(Rubin, 2010). The example below demonstrates how modal verbs (italicised) can modulate the 
presentation of risk information to suggest an increased likelihood of harm: 
 
The research follows [Dr Singh’s] previous study which showed that exposing some babies 
to measles and herpes viruses could cause their immune systems to malfunction.  (Johnson and 
Fletcher, 2001 - The Sunday Express, January 28) 
 
A word count analysis revealed that across the entire corpus of Health risk reporting, the 
more-certain modal verbs were greatly overrepresented (30,390 mentions) compared to the less-
certain modal verbs (824 mentions). Within the second period of risk reporting, the expression of 
more-certain modal verbs proliferated by an average of 14.8% per year. However, within the 
third period of risk reporting, the expression of more-certain modal verbs declined to an average 
increase of 0.6% per year. There is further evidence which demonstrates a decline in the 
expression of more-certain modal verbs. It was calculated that there was around one more-
certain modal verb for every two published articles of risk reporting during the second period of 
risk reporting (calculated average rate = 0.6 mentions per article). However, within the third 
period, it was calculated that there was around one more-certain modal verb for every three 
published articles of risk reporting (calculated average rate = 0.4 mentions per article). This data 
provides some evidence to suggest that, within the third period of risk reporting, a professional 
convention emerged where the press began to shy away from using modal verbs when linking risk 




While it may have been expected for a decline in use of more-certain modal verbs would 
have been mirrored by a notable increase in less-certain modal verbs, there was little evidence to 
support such a claim. Kitzinger (1999) provides one potential explanation for this observation, as 
it is uncommon for risk reporters to write stories which do not suggest a future possible risk of 
harm of an identified object.  Considering this point, it was contended that perhaps risk reporters 
had begun to move away from using ’cause’  to forecast potential future harms and move 
towards using ‘caused’ in the past tense in an attempt to better report on the facts of a news story 
by linking an object to a provable negative impact on health. However, it was discovered that the 
use of ‘caused’ notably declined over time in relation to ‘caused’. Across the second period of 
risk reporting, ‘caused’ was used an average of 42.3% less than ‘cause’. Across the third period of 
risk reporting, ‘caused’ was used an average of 47.1% less than ‘cause’. This data suggests that 
journalists may have moved away from using different linguistic forms of ‘cause’ (either future or 
past tense) to communicate risk potentials to their audience. The declining use of modified forms 
of ‘cause’ over time (both future and past tense) may be related to the deterministic connotations 
of the phrase. It may be a case that journalists have selected more ambiguous terminology to 
imagineer risk potentials for their audience. However, despite close interrogation of the corpus 
across several forms of analysis, no generally recognisable term has been identified.  
 
 
Journalistic balance is another press convention which appears to have influenced the 
disproportionately high expression of Certainty during the second period of risk reporting. There 
is evidence to suggest that the convention of journalistic balance primarily emphasised the risk 
information provided by Pressure Group Campaigners (PGC’s) to challenge the risk information 
provided by institutional sources. Within the second period of risk reporting, PGC sources were 
referred to only 29% less than Ministerial sources. Furthermore, the use of PGC statements 
increased at a rate of 0.5% more per year than Ministerial statements across the second period. 
PGC sources often utilised curated facts to undermine Government safety assurances. Curated 
facts were usually presented as a mixture of empirical evidence and rhetorical argumentation that 
underpins a conclusory worldview on risk. Conclusory worldviews are statements which rely on 
a perspective of certainty that applied technologies are inherently dangerous and pose a threat to 




Environmentalists further fear that humans eating meat or dairy products from livestock 
fed on GM crops could be at risk, although so far there is no evidence that bacteria in human 
guts have been affected. 
 However, earlier this year, The Observer revealed the work of a German scientist who 
had found that genes from GM crops could be found in bacteria in the guts of bees. (Barnett, 
2000 - The Observer, October 15) 
 
In the above example, the use of “Environmentalists further fear” presents a subordinate 
clause to the reader which may provide an interpretive schema to process the conclusory 
worldview. The above example reinforces the “fears” of environmental PGCs by suggesting that 
there is empirical support for their claims by ‘revealing’ the findings from “a German scientist” 
as a form of institutional authority. Also present within the second period of risk reporting is the 
specific framing of Government safety assurances as inherently falsifiable and myopic in scope, 
with further suggestions that Government had somehow manipulated scientific data to generate 
preferable policy outcomes:  
 
An independent study… reveals that alien genes used by scientists to modify crops are 
surviving the manufacturing process which turns GM crops into animal food. 
 The report heightens fears that products …may be contaminated with modified genes if 
the animals they are from were raised on GM feed. Until now Ministers and industry bodies 
have reassured consumers that a heating process kills any DNA in animal fodder.  (Barnett, 
2000 - The Observer, October 15) 
 
As the above example seemingly demonstrates, the core contention does not revolve around 
the hazards of “alien DNA in feedstock”. Rather, the key issue appears to be that the perceived 
certainty by which Government sources are assured that GM DNA is “killed” was demonstrated 
to be false. The above example is representative of a convention within the second period of risk 
reporting, whereby apparent contradictions between Government safety assurances and PGC 
risk information drives a risk-based story. Where contractions between Government safety 
assurances and PGC risk information is made apparent, risk reporters are invited to utilise PGC 
sources to provide balance to institutional information, and further expound upon the issues by 
offering their conclusory worldview as a publishable statement. The apparent prioritisation of 
PGC risk information to balance news stories seems to have been generated from residual 
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concerns regarding the independence of scientific expertise from the influence of Government 
power. The residual concerns over scientific independence was a core theme across the entire 
reporting on BSE as “government scientists” seemed to agree that there was little evidence for 
cross-species transmission of BSE. This was proven to be a false assertion in 1996, when the 
Government admitted that nCJD was developed from human consumption of BSE tainted beef.    
 
Framing Uncertainty  
There is strong evidence to suggest that the expression of Uncertainty is linked to the 
utilisation of scientific sources within risk reporting. From the previous chapter, it was 
discovered that scientific Experts became the most popular source for risk information across the 
third, and emergent fourth, periods of risk reporting. This chapter provides data which 
demonstrates that the expression of Uncertainty frames constituted 43.3% and 45.5% of 
observable frames within the third and emergent fourth periods of risk reporting. One reason for 
the link between Experts and the framing of Uncertainty made by this chapter is the 
conventionally tentative language used by scientists to communicate risk information embedded 
within their research (Yore et al, 2002).  
 
“The exact role that [Aircraft] noise exposure may play in ill health is not well established” 
Said Dr Hansell. “However, it is plausible that it might be contributing… The relative 
importance of daytime and night-time noise also needs to be investigated further”. (Smyth, 2013 
- The Times, October 9)  
 
Within the above example, the verbatim statement provided by Dr Hansel exhibits several 
points of observable Uncertainty (italicised). These points of Uncertainty reflect the underlying 
convention of ‘scientific uncertainty’, which acknowledges the possibility that inferences drawn 
from individual scientific research papers may be based upon (unintentionally) incomplete, 
methodologically biased, or misinterpreted data (Shuchman and Wilkes, 2010). It appears that 
the role of scientific sources was to provide scientific balance to the safety assurances provided by 
governmental sources. However, from the third period of risk reporting onwards, there seems to 
be a move towards including balancing scientifically derived risk information across several 




People who live close to an airport and are exposed to constant loud aircraft noise may 
face an increased risk of cardiovascular disease, according to studies from the UK and the US 
published on Tuesday night… The UK study was carried out by researchers at the UK Small 
Area Health Statistics Unit and MRC-PHE Centre for Environment and Health… The US 
study was carried out by scientists at the Harvard school of public health and Boston 
University school of public health… 
Other scientists agreed that the studies showed a possible link between aircraft noise and 
cardiovascular disease, but said more evidence was needed if noise was to be established as 
the actual cause of illness… (Boseley, 2013 - The Guardian, October 8). 
 
As the above example demonstrates, one news story can be built upon presenting the 
findings from across several scientific studies which mutually agreed each other’s conclusions, 
even if the methodology varied somewhat. This approach to risk reporting emphasises the 
“scientific consensus” around risk information to narrow the Uncertainty inherent to tentative 
scientific language and suggest authoritative Certainty on the subject (Carvalho. 2007). 
Emphasising the scientific consensus within risk reporting became far more prevalent from the 
third period of risk reporting onwards. Evidence to support this claim is provided by the 
increased use of University sources across the reporting periods. A word count analysis within 
the Health risk corpus demonstrated that “University” was mentioned an average of 125 and 462 
times per year across the first and second periods of risk reporting. Within the third and emergent 
fourth periods of risk reporting, the average mentions of “University” increased to 1049 and 1599 
times per year. Another change in risk reporting which appears to have aided the increased use 
of scientific sources is the general increase in length of news articles over time. For example, 
within the first period of risk reporting, the average length of risk-based news stories was 683 
words. The average length of risk-based news stories grew to 703 words by the emergent fourth 
period. While an average increase of twenty words across a thirty-three year time period may not 
seem like a large increase, it may provide risk reporters with enough space to include further 
reference to scientific research. For instance, the following example uses just 22 words to signify 
that risk pertinent risk information was derived from scientific collaboration between two leading 
research Universities, but is otherwise superfluous to the overall story:  
 
The US study was carried out by scientists at the Harvard school of public health and 




Framing Blame  
The expression of Blame frames also demonstrated a notable change between the second and 
third periods of risk reporting. The proportion of Blame frames decreased by 5.4% between the 
second and third period of risk reporting, lending evidence to suggest that risk reporters became less 
interested in utilising blame within risk reporting over time. Like Certainty frames, the expression of 
Blame frames appears to be dependent upon the use of statements provided by PGC, and other 
non-institutional sources.  “Parents” were one of the key non-institutional sources exhibited 
across the reporting. Within the second period of risk reporting, the expression of “Parents” 
increased by an average proliferative rate of 13% per year. The average proliferative rate for the 
expression of Parents declined to 3.1%  within the third period of risk reporting, and further 
declined to -0.3% within the emergent fourth period. This data provides evidence to suggest that, 
over time, “Parents” became less integral as news sources within risk reporting. As non-
institutional news sources, Parents appear to play a key role within the second period of risk 
reporting, usually by directly blaming the Government for policy failings, and suppressing 
information, which has resulted in their children being exposed to risks (Jewell, 2001). Parents 
also appeared more likely to offer harsh criticism aimed at the government for apparent 
hypocrisies whereby the families of Government ministers were believed to receive privileged 
protections which are unavailable to ordinary people. Often, these two strands of Blame were 
combined into a single statement reported within risk-based news stores, for example:  
 
Sarah, of Billericay, Essex, believes the Government is to blame. She said: "The 
Government tend to sweep things under the carpet… The Government want children to be 
vaccinated but if it is not 100 per cent safe why should we? They're just saving money. It'll be 
interesting to see if Leo Blair is vaccinated " (The Express, January 13 - 2001) 
 
By contrast, during the third period of risk reporting, University-based scientific sources 
appeared to demonstrate a tendency to blame Government for failing risk management policies.  
The Blame provided by expert sources usually referred to missed targets and improper allocation 
of funds, often legitimised by expert recommendations on policy improvements (see Hood, 
2006;. McKean, 2015).    
 
Professor Jonathan Grigg said: "The introduction of the low emission zone in London, 
UK, has had little effect on concentration of particulate matter... UK policymakers have 
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shied away from radical solutions to the issue, such as changing diesel-powered black cabs 
(which contribute 20% of London's locally generated particulate matter) to cleaner petrol-
powered alternatives.  (Bosley, The Guardian - October 15).  
 
The above examples demonstrate how the framing of Blame changed between the second 
and third reporting periods. The prioritisation of Expert sources, at the expense of non-
institutional voices, appears to have brought about a shift in the language used when Blaming the 
government within risk reporting. Within the first example, the government is Blamed for 
“sweeping things under the carpet”, reflecting a resonant concern during the second period of 
risk reporting regarding Government secrecy, and the manipulation of scientific data to suit 
policy aims. Within the third period of risk reporting, the general shift in language appears to 
have brought about accusations that the government “shied away” from their precautionary duty 
to protect the public from harm (Cross, 1996) . The idea that the Government is failing to address 
pertinent risk issues draws upon resonant concerns during the third period of risk reporting that 
Government policy aims may be misplaced, or that there is a lack of political will to use “radical 
solutions” to reduce the publics exposure to risks (Owens, 2000).   
 
It was observed that much of the reduction of Blame frames was brought about by the shift 
away from public, PGC, news sources towards prioritising the statements provided by scientific 
experts within risk reporting. Much like the expression of Uncertainty, the conventionally 
tentative language of scientific experts often forgoes directly blaming the Government for policy 
failures, and instead recommends policy improvements. The decision to prioritise scientific 
experts as news sources within the third period of risk reporting appears to coincide with a rapid 
proliferation of news stories based upon the initiatives of professional healthcare organisations 
(PHOs). For example, references to the ‘World Health Organisation’ increased by 72% within 
the third era of risk reporting. The average yearly rate of proliferation for World Health 
Organisation sources also increased from 18.5% in the second period, to 21.1% in the third 
period of risk reporting (this data does not account for the ‘WHO’ appreciation). Risk 
information provided by PHOs is often rapidly received by risk reporters and combines empirical 
data on hazards with personal experiences of danger that aids the story writing process (Shih et 
al, 2011).  This contrasts with the statements provided by PGCs, which often tends to twin social 
facts on risk with the personal outrage felt by PGC members towards institutional risk 




 Jackie Fletcher, founder of pressure group JABS, which is campaigning for single 
vaccines to be available on the NHS, said: "We have parents who are so desperate to get 
single vaccines they are travelling to other countries or paying extortionate prices to private 
doctors. The Government says there is an epidemic on the doorstep because children aren't 
being inoculated. Why on earth don't they give us the choice? (Johnston and Fletcher, 2001 - 
Sunday Express, January 28) 
 
While PGCs may have been de-prioritised as news sources within the third period of risk 
reporting, the role they fulfilled as a representative of the public voice was adopted by Opinion 
Writers. Within their columns, it was observed that Opinion Writers (usually from the politically 
right wing newspapers) would position themselves as the ‘common sense’ voice of the general 
public. Opinion Writers often blamed intuitional risk managers for restricting civil liberties 
drawn from their own observation, without the need to corroborate their statements. One of the 
key issues for Opinion Writers was the prospective reduction in civil liberties believed to be 
caused by the precautionary measures put forward by government minsters and scientific experts 
when managing risk, for example:    
 
Much of [The Food Standards Agency’s] time, however, was spent promoting healthy 
food, in a manner that many saw as the worse form of nannyism. During the most recent 
football World Cup it published a guide to encourage fans to drink fizzy water with a slice of 
lemon while watching the games in their local pub.” (Wallop, 2013 - Daily Telegraph, 
Feburary 14).  
 
the UK's chief medical officer Dame Sally Davies said she thought about the raised risk of 
breast cancer every time she reached for a glass of wine… 
… [Drinking] a glass of wine a night is probably only as risky as driving to work every 
day. When it comes to breast cancer, the research shows that drinking one glass of wine per 
day causes about three extra women out of every 100 to develop breast cancer - that's 14 
rather than 11 women. So it's up to you to decide if that's a risk worth taking. (Jones, 2017 - 




As the above two examples illustrate, both columnists (Harry Wallop and Caroline Jones, 
respectively) blame the UK’s health and safety apparatus for promoting risk puritanism; where 
risk information is amplified by elite actors to control the public’s responsible enjoyment of life’s 
excesses. Both examples frame statements from the health and safety apparatus as being both 
culturally absurd and adhering to a radical worldview of extreme risk aversion (FØrde, 1998). 
The crux of most risk-based opinion columns is that state sponsored positions of radical risk 
aversion undermine public trust in government by constructing an ‘Us vs Them’ paradigm. 
Within this paradigm it is commonly suggested that elite social actors are granted privileged 
access to risk information, which is then used to reduce civil. The reduction of civil liberties can 
take the form of policy controls but can also be through social coercion by stigmatising risk-
seeking behaviours as culturally unacceptable (Bayer and Colgrove, 2002). 
 
Narrative Shifts in Risky Rhetoric    
During the qualitative content analysis, it became apparent that the risk information was 
incorporated into wider narratives on risk and social control through the utilisation of risk 
rhetoric within risk reporting (see Lupton, 1993; Russell and Babrow, 2011; and Dahlstrom, 
2014). Risk rhetoric outlines a process by which the frame setting of risk amplifying frames is 
aided by logos, ethos, and pathos - the traditional forms of rhetoric within news narratives (Mral et 
al, 2010; Bakir 2007; McComas and Trumbo, 2001). There appeared to be a clear delineation in 
how coded instances of risk amplifying frames corresponded with the constituent forms of 
rhetoric. Coded instances of Certainty and Uncertainty generally presented narrative appeals to 
legitimise risk information from both empirical data and social facts, corresponding with 
conceptualisations of logos. Coded instances of Trust and Stigma generally presented narrative 
structures that sought to appraise the credibility (and believability) of sources of risk information, 
corresponding with conceptualisations of ethos. Coded instances of Blame and Dread generally 
presented narratives which impressed affective appeals which seemed to validate visceral 
responses of the readership, corresponding with conceptualisations of pathos.  
 
Through conducting a selective coding of text for rhetorical themes within the text of risk 
amplifying frames, sociohistorical narratives emerged from the sample. From this thematic 
analysis, the coded documents were treated to a narrative analysis to explore if and how the 
rhetorical structures altered across reporting periods. The broad temporal range of selected news 
texts aids the generalisability of the narrative analysis by expanding the scope of investigation 
beyond specific news cycles. Where possible, this analysis also incorporated word count methods 
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to better substantiate the generalisability of observations between key cases to the wider corpus of 
risk reporting.  
 
Longitudinal content analyses of logos, ethos, and pathos seemingly demonstrates that risk-
based narratives revolve around an ongoing chronology of failure. Generally, the ongoing chronology of 
failure proposes that sociohistorical narratives, of Government’s inability to protect the public 
from harm, are embedded within journalistic conventions to writing risk-based news stories. 
Each of the rhetorical forms appear to work in concert across risk amplifying news stories to 
(re)establish and (re)enforce the ongoing chronology of failure.  Drawing from historical failures, 
risk reporters were able to employ rhetorical structures to help reinterpret developing events to 
contextualise sociopolitical concerns over risk governance for the general public.  This appears to 
have entrenched a professional convention whereby risk information is recontextuliased around social facts to 
aid speculation on future damages.  There also appears to be intentional ambiguity around ‘future 
damages’ which can include physical harm, but often includes suspected erosions to civil liberties 
and democratic harms.  The example (below) from Peter Hitchens (Opinion Writer, Daily Mail) 
demonstrates how logos (bold), ethos (underlined), and pathos (italicised) outline the chronology of 
failure to seemingly undermine confidence in the safety of technological developments and 
further legitimise scepticism towards institutional risk management:  
 
Trust us, for we know better. This is an astonishing piece of State bossiness in an age that has 
seen a catalogue of mistakes, panics, and mysteries in the world of disease and medicine.  
 They told us thalidomide was safe. They said that we would all get AIDS… The wise person 
responds with deep caution to the words 'Trust me, I'm a doctor', and with even more caution to the 
words 'Trust us, we're the Government’. (Hitchens, 2001 - Daily Mail, January 28) 
 
In this example, Hitchens appears to use logos to suggest a historiological order to risk events 
arising from failures of governance. By using “a catalogue of mistakes”, Hitchens proposes that 
the number of risk events has been recorded, indexed, and traced to a point of origin. While this 
“age” of risk is ambiguously framed, Hitchens asserts that the Thalidomide case (1950s/1960s) 
provides a logical start to the ongoing chronology of failure.  Next, Hitchens appears to use ethos 
to highlight the damaged credibility of institutional risk managers. As a rhetorical form the use of 
“They told us” suggests that the institutional messaging around risk information has repeatedly 
shown to be untrue, and that the public has little reason to trust institutional sources. 
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Furthermore, it is suggested that privileged institutional access to information should no longer 
be considered as a factor of credibility, especially if the resultant messaging endorses public 
behaviour which could be harmful. This appears to draw from wider sociopolitical concerns 
around the use of risk information within institutional messaging that supports hidden agendas 
and policy goals. For example, some media outlets have contended that the US-led ‘War on 
Terror’ in Iraq / Afghanistan relied on messaging around the risks of nuclear war to covertly 
prosecute military intervention that supported US oil interests  (Juhasz, 2013 - CNN).   
 
Finally, Hitchens seemingly uses pathos as affective motivation for personal precaution 
against institutional misinformation. By stating that the “wise person” responds with caution to 
government messaging on risk, Hitchens appears to validate readers who may feel deep 
scepticism towards government institutions. Hitchens’ use of pathos reflects ‘calls to action’ 
apparent throughout risk reporting, where news sources place moral, ethical, or social currency 
on enacting precautionary behaviour. Hitchens’ example illustrates how the rhetorical structures 
of risk draw from an ongoing chronology of failure to orchestrate narratives which assist readers 
with the interpretation and contextualisation of risk information. When logos, ethos, and pathos 
are analysed independently across the wider dataset of amplified risk reporting, changes become 
apparent within the rhetorical forms between the different reporting periods. While changes to 
the structure of rhetorical forms did not appear to impact the wider narrative of the ongoing 
chronology of failure, they do appear to indicate reorientations in press conventions around 
narrative construction.   
 
 
The Narrative of logos within Risk Reporting 
From the thematic analysis, it appears that logos provided risk reporters with a narrative tool 
for negotiating the ‘facts’ of risk information. This narrative seemingly contributes to the ongoing 
chronology of failure by presenting risk information as a contest between parallel perceptions of 
truth. Embedded within this narrative is the apparent sociopolitical concern that, if uncontested, 
institutional information (truths) will form policy responses to risk which endanger vulnerable 
publics. The narrative of logos appears to transition from considering how the public can know 
that institutional risk information is true within the earlier (first and second) periods, to 




Within the earlier periods, narratives developed from logos generally revolved around a 
pervasive concern regarding the integrity of scientific data, public health management and 
institutional voices:  
 At the moment, the Government appears to be firmly on the mobile phone industry's 
side. Julie Matthew, joint coordinator of Mast Action, says this is because the Government 
sold mobile phone companies the licences needed to launch 3G services for a staggering 
Pounds 22.5 billion last April… 
The guidelines - which were recommended by the government-sponsored Stewart report 
[on Mobile Phone Telecommunications and Health] last year - do not deal with cancer links 
because there is no evidence yet that masts can cause the disease. (Ayres, 2001 - The Times, 
January 6) 
 
Within the above example, a pressure group source is apparently used by Ayres as a proxy 
for public scepticism over the completeness of data and institutional manipulation of risk 
information. This perception may be developed from a worldview which presumes that technical 
assessments of risk is inseparable from Government policy agenda. While the wider article does 
not outrightly support this perception, it is possible for risk reporters to be sympathetic to the 
sociopolitical concerns voiced by pressure group sources and may have their perceptions of truth 
influenced during the story writing process (Ropeik, 2002). As highlighted by the Chernobyl 
reporting, in situations of limited, contradictory, or incomplete information provided by 
institutional sources, risk reporters may have been inclined to develop professional scepticism 
over the relationship between government and risk. This may have impacted risk reporting by 
prompting coverage, which was amenable to sceptical positions, and placed significant focus 
upon sceptical news sources as a proxy for their own concerns.  
   
This thesis has previously established that risk reporters appear to have developed their 
stories around information provided by institutional and non-institutional news sources. 
However, the narrative analysis suggests that each type of news source offers a distinct version of 
‘the truth’ (Covello, 1992), leaving risk reporters in the position to negotiate between disputed 
positions with limited information. It is this role of truth negotiation which appears to underpin 
the convention of journalistic balance exhibited in the earlier periods. It appears that risk 
reporters aimed to present a select range of possible truths to their audience in the expectation 
that individual readers would assess the statements on their merits and reach their own 
conclusions on the reality of risk. Readers were generally presented with contradictory truths on 
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risk based upon technical assessment, ministerial assurances, and social facts. However, the 
narrative discourses which appear to arise from a convention of journalistic balance often 
appeared to privilege statements from news sources which presented skewed perceptions of 
events to readers. It was observed that, during the earlier periods, emerging narratives around 
institutional sources of information commonly suggested that scientific actors were being coerced 
by government to obfuscate risk information that was damaging to policy agendas. Conversely, 
emerging narratives around the social facts from non-institutional sources commonly suggested 
to be an honest attempt at truth-seeking exercises by members of the public to debunk ministerial 
safety assertions.    
 
Then, with magnificent timing, someone leaked a four-year-old report warning the 
British army that soldiers exposed to dust from DU [Depleted Uranium] ammunition risked 
developing lung, lymph and brain cancer.  
 The Government responded by dismissing the report as inaccurate, but could not dispel 
suspicions of a cover-up. 
 The World Health Organisation says there has been no rise in leukaemia among Kosovan 
Albanians… Yet Nato troops were photographed in white radiation suits and masks last 
week…  
So does the debris pose a danger or not? (Smith, 2001 -Independent on Sunday, January 
14)  
 
In the above example, Smith highlights how contradictions between news sources facilitated 
the narrative around logos within amplified risk reporting.  Smith’s example identifies two key 
contradictions: (1) Contradictions between institutionally accepted safety levels and seemingly 
contrary social facts. (2)  Contradictions between institutional actors over safety levels. Smith 
juxtaposes the Government’s dismissal of a leaked army report with photographs of NATO 
troops in safety equipment to illustrate a contradiction where the Government’s (presumedly) 
evidence-based response does not reflect the reality that people were taking risk precautions. 
Smith also juxtaposes the risk claims made within the leaked Army report with the 
Government’s dismissal of the report to illustrate contradictions over acceptable safety levels 
between institutional actors. Discovering such contradictions may have aided narratives around 
logos by providing a fundamental basis of public interest in the story as behaviours from different 




Within the later periods of risk reporting, the narrative of logos appears to have undergone 
notable reorientation, becoming more focused on how risk information can be used to publicly 
assess government risk management policies. The public assessment of risk appears to inform the 
narrative of logos primarily by relying upon scientific credibility to identify where precautionary 
policies had failed, and secondly by using statements from credible scientific sources to speculate 
upon future damages.  
 
 
Sir Liam Donaldson [Chief Medical Officer] said [bird flu] would kill some 50,000 people 
in the UK…  Health spokesman Andrew Lansley accused the Government of complacency 
and being too slow to stockpile antiviral drugs… 
Sir Liam [said]…it was 'not impossible' that 750,000 Britons could die [from Bird flu]. Sir 
Liam admitted that the Government had some way to go to meet its target for stockpiling 
14.6million doses of the Tamiflu drug…' 
…Dr Martin Wiselka, consultant in infectious diseases at Leicester Royal Infirmary [said] 
it was an 'unanswered question' whether the virus would mutate sufficiently. (Wooding, 
2005 - The Daily Mail, October 17) 
 
In the above example, Wooding seemingly relies on a narrative hook revolving around the 
Government’s inability to “meet its target for stockpiling Tamiflu”. Following this narrative 
hook, Wooding compiles several statements from credible sources which reinforce the narrative 
focus of the story, while providing supplementary information that broadens the impact of risk 
facing the public. It was also noted that non-institutional sources were absent from the wider 
story, reinforcing evidence provided earlier in this chapter that risk reporters began to prioritise 
institutional voices in the later periods. Wooding’s example reflects general trends of the later 
periods which suggests that the press transitioned towards a professional convention of providing 
scientific balance within risk reporting.  
 
Unlike the journalistic balance of earlier periods, the prioritisation of scientific balance 
appears to rely upon a principle that upholds scientific processes, empirical evidence, and expert 
interpretations, as an inherently more accurate method to assess risk information; rather than 
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extrapolating insights from social facts (Murcott and Williams 2013; Fox, 2012; Fox, 2016). By 
upholding scientific integrity within risk reporting, the press have seemingly shifted towards 
adopting scientific accuracy as a more truthful ontology compared to constructivism around 
social facts of risk. The scientific ontology appears to suggest that public understanding of risk is 
distilled, by news media,  from an accurate scientific authority. The assumed accuracy of 
scientific authorities, which legitimises risk information, appears to rely upon several key 
presumptions that underpins scientific modes of knowledge transfer. First is the presumption that 
scientific credibility is conferred by the peer-review process in academic publications  (Goldbeck-
Wood, 1999). Within the analysis, “peer-review” was observed to be generally used as a 
narrative short-hand to signify the integrity of scientific expertise. “Peer review”, as a term, 
appears to encapsulate wider concepts of objectivity, clarity and the reproducibility of data to 
assure readers of scientific accuracy. A word count analysis conducted upon the corpus of Health 
risk reporting demonstrated that the average number of news articles which mentioned “peer 
review” increased from 72 stories in the earlier periods of risk reporting  to 554 in the later 
periods.  However, some contention was noted regarding the journalistic value of peer-review  
 
Peer review is the modern sacred cow. "Has it been peer-reviewed?" people ask, breathlessly, 
when presented with a finding. But peer review is not definitive… 
…You might suppose no scientist would publish a brilliant new idea ("vitamin supplements kill 
you") without comprehensively validating it, yet the vitamin paper did not report what the patients 
died of. (Kealey, 2008 - The Times, April 28) 
 
Peer review, the process by which the merit of scientific ideas is judged, is regarded as a certificate 
of excellence. Peer-reviewed journals set the standard; peer-reviewed grant applications are supposed 
to be proof positive against bias or conflict of interest… 
..It is a tribute to the essential honesty of almost all scientists that the system works at all. The 
temptation to turn down a piece of work that undermines a referee's pet theory, or to reject a grant 
award from a deadly rival, must at times be overwhelming. Yet examples are hard to find. (Hawkes, 
2008 - The Times, March 12) 
 
Both above examples seemingly illustrate resonant dissatisfaction towards the assumptions 
made of peer-review as a process to ensure scientific accuracy.  However, they perhaps present 
the best evidence to demonstrate how integral the use of peer-review had become within the 
latter periods of risk reporting.  Both examples outline the core contention that journalists 
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seemingly relied upon the respectability of peer-review, rather than considering how human 
flaws that can influence the accuracy of published risk information (for a more detailed analysis 
of such concerns, see chapter 6). Despite these concerns peer-review remained a key tool for risk 
reporters to communicate the scientific accuracy of their news stories, possibly demonstrating a 
change within newsrooms to prioritise scientific voices (rather than disputing them) within risk 
reporting.  
 
The second aspect of scientific credibility is the presumption that scientific news sources are 
politically independent social actors. Political independence is considered to be a cornerstone of 
scientific integrity (Grunwald, 2006). Data from analysis within this chapter suggests that news 
narratives within the earlier periods were more inclined to suggest that science was a tool of 
government power, which news narratives in the latter periods were more inclined to suggest 
that science was an independent watchdog of government. One possible reason for this was 
possibly due to the increased profile of professional health organisations (PHOs) as news sources 
in the latter periods. Supranational organisations such as the World Health Organisation 
(WHO), the European Health Care Agency (EHCA) and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) were just some of the PHO sources identified during the narrative analysis. Such PHO 
sources may aid the perceived political independence of science by being information sources 
which produces evidential information and are independent of domestic policy goals (McCoy et 
al, 2009). Furthermore, such PHO sources may hold some authority to sanction national 
governments which fail regulatory commitments (Portela, 2010; Gowlland-Debbas and 
Tehindrazanarivelo, 2004).  Additionally, PHO sources may provide a better standard of 
scientific evidence by drawing upon large, geographically diverse, datasets to generate inferential 
statistics.  
 
The Narrative of ethos within Risk Reporting   
From the thematic analysis, it appears that ethos provided risk reporters with a narrative tool 
for establishing the ‘authority’ of scientists to speak on risk issues (Sagal and Richardson, 2003; 
Miller, 2003). It was observed that narratives of ethos were subject to change between the earlier 
and later reporting periods as scientific sources became viewed as more credible and politically 
independent. Within the narrative of ethos, the image of scientists was initially intertwined with 
narratives of dogmatic technocrats who were willing to introduce hidden risks for the sake of 
technological development. In the latter periods, narratives around scientists became more 
focused on the image of hope, that technology would be able to find solutions to our 
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contemporary risk issues. Within the earlier periods, scientific information was usually 
disseminated to the public in official reports and usually accompanied by a statement from the 
relevant minister. Scientists rarely commented on their findings and were generally absent as 
news sources, unless they were particularly media friendly (for further analysis, see chapter six). 
The seeming closeness between modes of scientific production and ministerial power may have 
formed the bases for journalistic scepticism towards ‘government science’ (Durant, 1999).  
 
The signifier of ‘government science’ was used as a narrative shorthand by risk reporters to 
suggest that governmental policy agendas had influenced the scientific assessment of risk in the 
early periods of risk reporting. It was seemingly presumed that ‘government science’ reached 
conclusions where the dangers surrounding particular risk objects were omitted to ensure the 
profitability of particular industries. “Government science” carried narrative connotations across 
news cycles, suggesting that scientists were generally willing to abandon scientific principles to 
either forward their own career or avoid punitive reactions from government ministers. This 
appears to have facilitated narratives which questioned the trust afforded to scientists from the 
public: 
 
Scientists, too, have been affected. They used to rank close to the top in the trust ratings, but in the 
post-BSE era they have lost their place. A striking aspect of the debate over genetically modified food 
is the way in which scientific advice is not trusted to settle the matter: consumers dismiss official 
statements as mere "opinions", not much more valid than their own. Government scientists told them 
beef was safe when it wasn't - and consumers won't be fooled again.” (Freeland, 2000 - The Guardian, 
October 4). 
 
Freeland’s characterisation (above) of scientists as seemingly villainous actors appears to 
have been contrasted by the seemingly heroic characterisation of maverick scientists (Seale, 
2003). Within the earlier periods of risk reporting, maverick scientists presented an appealing 
hero to the story by appearing as lone voices of dissent against the power of “government 
science”. Maverick scientists were generally seen to be presented as wise, prophetic, and 
trustworthy characters, who risked their career to provide the public with revelatory knowledge 
of hidden risks. Dr Richard Lacey and Andrew Wakefield are two key maverick scientists which 
appear to map the rise and fall of the narrative tool. Both Lacey and Wakefield were portrayed as 
‘noble crusaders’ of truth against governments safety assertions (Eldridge and Reilly, 2003). 
Lacey claimed in the late 1980s that BSE was potentially transferrable across species, and 
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Wakefield claimed in the late 1990s that the MMR vaccine could potentially cause neurological 
issues in children. While both Lacey’s and Wakefield’s claims were granted trustworthiness by 
being dissident in nature, Wakefield’s claims were offered further credibility by being published 
in the Lancet:  
   
[Wakefield] first provoked a storm in 1998, when he and leading colleagues published a paper in 
the medical journal The Lancet describing a new form of serious bowel damage in 12 children with 
autism and reported that several parents had said their child's physical and mental decline followed 
MMR vaccination. (Fraser, 2001 - Sunday Telegraph, January 21) 
 
 The heroic characterisation of Maverick Scientists in the early periods appears reliant upon a 
cultural favourability towards dissenting scientific voices. Galileo’s heliocentric solar model and 
Einstein’s rejection of Nazism serve as two key examples of principled scientists rejecting 
authority, being on the right side of history, and contributing to popular scientific folklore for 
doing so (Lessl, 1999; Rowe; 2012). The cultural mythologisation of maverick scientists may 
have entrenched a professional, journalistic, heuristic which views maverick scientists in a 
similar fashion to Whistleblowers - Institutional actors who dissent against authority who appear 
to be suppressing information (Santoro and Kumar, 2018). In the case of BSE, this approach 
served the press well, enabling newspapers to promote themselves as champions of the people for 
being seen to pressure the government into finally admitting what they suspected was true - that 
there was a causative link between BSE and nCJD (Burgess, 2010). However, during the 
coverage of MMR, risk reporters appear to have prematurely concluded that Wakefield’s 
findings were indicative of a government mis-step in withdrawing the Measles, Mumps, and 
Rubella single jabs form the NHS. News reporting heavily emphasised Wakefield’s proposal to 
reinstate the single jabs and give parents the option to choose which vaccination regime they 
would prefer for their children (Lewis and Speers, 2003). While the concept of parental choice 
within a liberal western democracy had value to right-leaning newspaper newspapers, left-
leaning newspapers generally sided with the mounting evidence suggesting that the MMR 
vaccine was safer than the potential diseases. Fragmentation of the press over MMR was 
unprecedented. During the BSE coverage, the British Press presented a unified front against the 
government by spotlighting and supporting the claims of Richard Lacy. Press divergence over the 
Wakefield affair lends evidence to suggest that the role of maverick scientists within media 




Within the later periods of risk reporting there was a notable change in the characterisation 
of maverick scientists by the press. It seemingly became commonplace for maverick scientists to 
be characterised as crackpots and scientific oddities, individuals who should not be taken 
seriously, but whose apparently absurd claims offer a sense of entertainment for a discerning 
audience: 
Last week a thrilling but unsettling goal appeared to have come a step closer with the 
announcement by Craig Venter, the maverick scientist, that his laboratory had constructed the world's 
first completely synthetic genome… 
The feelings [Venter] provokes are so intense that one profile in The New Yorker magazine from 
2000 began with a quote from a string of fellow scientists, saying: "Craig Venter is an asshole. He's an 
idiot. He is a thorn in people's sides and an egomaniac.” (Leake, 2008 - The Sunday Times, January 27 
- 2008) 
 
As Leake’s example illustrates, Venter’s known reputation as a maverick scientist appears to 
directly de-legitimise his reputation. Although the story, and Venter’s maverick profile appear to 
be engaging enough to publish within the British press, the overt caveat is  that Venter’s 
“breakthrough” should be considered with  scepticism as it breaks from the scientific consensus 
on what is possible. 
 
 The role of the scientific consensus within the narrative of ethos became more apparent over 
time. For instance, there were 543 stories in the early periods which featured “scientific 
consensus”and 2,902 within the latter periods.  
If there is a scientific consensus that what you do is bad for you - smoking, drinking yourself into a 
stupor every night, eating chips, shagging Kimberly Fortier - then I'm afraid you have to give it up. 
Don't look at me like that, it's not my fault  (Mangan, 2005 - The Guardian, January 3)   
 
While global warming is affecting the entire planet, there is a scientific consensus that it is 
impacting the Arctic much faster… Scientists tell us that polar bears, ice living seals, walrus, and some 
birds are very likely to decline. (Watt-Cloutier, 2005 - The Guardian, January) 
 
 The above examples seemingly illustrate how appeals to a scientific consensus exhibits trust 
towards scientific risk information through the narrative of ethos.  This is achieved by suggesting 
that risk information has been authenticated by a global network of professionals who desire 
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positive social change. The examples do, however, exhibit the rhetorical tactics of this narrative 
as appeals to the scientific consensus are stated and not evidenced. Mangan’s article 
demonstrates this by juxtaposing two irrefutable risks - smoking and binge eating - before 
claiming there is scientific consensus on the risks of “shagging Kimberly Fortier”. While this 
appears to be an attempt at tongue-in-cheek humour, it appears to demonstrate how integral 
scientific credibility had become to the narrative of ethos in building a relationship between 
reporters and their audience over risk information. Watt-Cloutier’s example illustrates how 
allusions to scientific consensus can help promote a biased position on social activism over risk. 
Watt-Cloutier asserts that a scientific consensus exists over the risk of global warming to the 
Arctic, without contextualising the statement with information from the wider research 
community over the risks to vulnerable global populations from climate change. (Rosenzweig et 
al, 2001; Carmine et al, 2012). Both examples seemingly rely upon appealing to an ambiguous 
scientific authority for the purpose of improving the prestige of the story for their audience.  
Utilising the scientific consensus in such a manner may amplify the agreeableness of the story by 
situating the core contentions of the article within the domain of ‘settled science’ (Segal and 
Richardson, 2003). For news sources, this may provide them with rhetorical leverage to defend 
their claims by refuting criticism as being anti-science or conspiratorial in nature.  
 
 
The Narrative of pathos within Risk Reporting 
From the thematic analysis, it appears that pathos provided risk reporters with narrative tool 
to ‘recall’ salient emotional states to serve lessons for the future (Langman, 2003). It was noted 
that narratives of pathos more robust than narratives of logos and ethos and altered little between 
the early and later periods of risk reporting. Narratives of pathos exhibited a well-used structure, 
where select moments of British risk history were used to forecast potential events within the 
ongoing chronology of failure. The criteria used by risk reporters when selecting key moments of 
British risk history is unclear. However, a resonant theme of ‘risks to women and children’ 
emerged from the news stories. This suggests that narratives of pathos provide the press with a 
media template when writing risk-based news stories. Kitzinger (2000) suggests that media 
templates are a standard approach to news production which helps readers to make sense of risk 
information by replicating themes between news cycles. By focusing on risks to women and 
children, reporters may effectively prime their audiences for affective responses to risk, while 




 Within amplified risk reporting, the Thalidomide scandal (1958-1962) emerges as a repeated 
point of reference. A word count analysis demonstrated that, across the wider corpus, there were 
97 news stories in the earlier periods and 175 news satires in the later periods which mentioned 
Thalidomide. It was also noted that the majority of mentions for Thalidomide occurred within 
peak periods of risk reporting, suggesting a relationship between amplified risk reporting and the 
selection of Thalidomide within narratives of pathos. For risk reporters, the Thalidomide scandal 
presents a foundation for a robust media template on risk, Thalidomide provides an early 
example of where regulatory oversights and unconditional trust in institutions resulted in a novel 
healthcare technology having a profoundly negative impact on ‘normal life’ for many families 
(Chisholm, 2019).: 
“I took Thalidomide regularly during the pregnancy. My GP prescribed it, not for morning 
sickness, but as a sedative because I was having trouble sleeping…   
We often felt as if we were in a running battle with the authorities and the medical profession… 
They gave her false arms, horrible plastic ones, but Mandy hated them. (Welch, 2008 - The Daily Mail, 
July 8) 
 
In the above example, Walsh goes beyond detailing the risks associated with taking 
Thalidomide during pregnancy to depict how ‘normal’ life was subverted by the drug. Rather 
than blaming the mother for taking the drug, Walsh portrays the mother as another victim of 
Thalidomide, alongside her daughter. In the example, victimisation begins with the doctor 
intervening in the ‘normal’ discomforts of pregnancy and reoccurs through the lack of 
government support and mental anguish at raising a physically deformed child. When analysing 
the broader themes within narratives of pathos, subversion of ‘the normal’ appears constituted by 
three distinct elements: (1) The hidden threat of technology to progeny. (2) The permanency of 
damage to ‘normal life’ from risks. (3) The struggle for recognition from government faced by 
victims of risk. 
 
In many cases, the hidden risk of technology to progeny is identified as direct risks to 
children (Kitzinger, 2000). However, as the analysis revealed, risks often is presented as a threat 
to more abstract aspects of reproduction such as a woman’s sexual attractiveness or fertility 
(Kitzinger, 2004). Within the narrative of pathos, themes emerged which suggested that readers 
who adhere to a precautionary logic around risk will be rewarded by avoiding damage to their 
ability to attract a partner, bare children, and/or raise a family. The press appears to rely upon a 
media template where technology risks significantly diminishing a woman’s ‘normal’ physiology 
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by introducing bodily trauma that renders them less (attractive, fertile, sexual) than precautious 
women. Such a template was particularly notable in stories around ruptured breast implants, 
breast cancer and mastectomy, and the Zika virus.    
 
When suggesting the permanency of risk impacts on ‘normal life’, the press generally rely 
upon a presumed hegemony of cultural values underpinning audience understanding   (Douglas 
and Wildavski, 1983; Sjöberg, 2000; Gramsci and Hoare, 1971; Sallach, 1974; Hall, 1978). 
Within risk reporting, this hegemonic sense of ‘normal’ is seemingly presumed to be an 
anticipated trajectory of symbolic life events. Risk reporting may encourage audiences to reflect 
on their status as a ‘good citizen’ by allowing readers to check what social benchmarks they have 
achieved across their personal biography (Richardson, 2004; D’Emilio, 2000; Lupton and 
Tulloch, 2001). Furthermore, by encouraging such a reflective exercise, risk reporting may also 
permit readers to consider the potential for socially deviant (risky) actors to disrupt (harm) their 
anticipated trajectory of symbolic life events. From analysing narratives of pathos, anticipated life 
events appear to describe six phases of life: (1) Develop as a child in a safe and loving family. (2) 
Acquire life and employment skills through education. (3) Secure financial independence 
through stable employment. (4) Form long term sexual relationships and have children. (5) 
Provide a safe and loving environment for children to grow. (6) Be supported in retirement by 
family and the social security apparatus.  
 
Within narratives of pathos, when an applied technology is suspected to interrupt the 
expected flow of anticipated life events, and disrupt normality, risk reporters appear to respond 
with suspicion and cynicism. For example, there was a resonant concern across the reporting 
that industrialised farming methods would greatly impact different aspects of anticipated life 
events: 
Meadows sing of the unfurling of spring and the bounty of late summer, reawakening the childlike 
sense of wonderment in each of us… I was brought up among the meadows of rural Somerset and my 
childhood memories are filled with these experiences. I wanted my daughter to grow up with them, 
too, but as a mother I found that the fields I loved had vanished… The decline of our meadows is due 
to modern, intensive agricultural practices and the conversion of pasture to arable land. (Pascoe, 2017 - 
The Guardian, Feburary 5) 
 
In the above example, Pascoe draws upon her personal biography to suggest that her child’s 
anticipated life events will have been negatively impacted by the loss of meadows from industrial 
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farming methods.  Using this lens of nostalgia, Pascoe narratively bridges the loss of childhood 
‘wonderment’ at the natural environment to suggest a loss of identity with cultural heritage is 
detrimental to personal biography (Routeledge, et al; 2011)  Underpinning the technological 
scepticism  in Pascoe’s narrative further highlights a presumed disgust towards industrial farming 
methods, which renders food as little more than the systemic optimisation of sustenance through 
technological intervention (Scott et al, 2016). As such, technology is rendered as a degenerate 
social force which divorces children from their environment, heritage, and community. This is 
presumed to  place children at risk from developing a stunted understanding of the world, which 
harms their ability to navigate through the phases of ’normal life’.  
 
When outlining how victims of risk will struggle for state recognition, within narratives of 
pathos, risk reporters tended to spotlight events which undermined audience presumptions in the 
suitability of Britain’s social security system  (Berndsen and McGarty, 2010).  The seeming 
invisibility of those reported to have been victimised by risk appeared to be a reason for 
extending news cycles beyond the initial reporting. Such reporting appeared intent on 
establishing a link between government policies which permitted the widespread use of untested 
(risky) technologies and the injustices faced by victims:    
 [Former Prime Minister John Major] said: "BSE… has been a dreadfully scarring experience, 
above all for the victims and families of victims of this terrible disease, who must have suffered an 
agony of mind and body we can barely imagine."  Last night bereaved dad Roger Tomkins, whose 
vegetarian daughter Clare, 24, was reduced to howling ‘like a sick animal’, said: "At least now there is 
more protection for public health." (Prince and Hardy, 2000 - The Mirror, October 27)  
 
In the above example, Prince and Hardy report on the outcomes of the BSE inquiry, drawing 
upon the statements made by a former Prime Minister in which he acknowledged the 
victimisation caused by nCJD. This is notable as a contrast to the general state of institutional 
denial of the risks surrounding British Beef, and by extension the cause of BSE being newer 
forms of cattle feed. It was the institutional obfuscation around BSE (presented earlier within this 
chapter) which appears to have prolonged news coverage of BSE over a decade. Institutional 
obfuscation over risks highlights how opaque institutional communications policies, general 
thoughtlessness about informing the public, or the intent to suppress public information 
(Dornbusch, 1998; Ford et al, 2013). Within narratives of pathos, such institutional obfuscation is 
often depicted upon a spectrum of frustration that ranged between annoyance at institutional 
irresponsibility to charges of institutional malfeasance. Perhaps one of the most egregious forms 
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of institutional obfuscation was when institutional news sources attempted to attenuate the 
dangers posed by applied technologies as being ‘acceptable risks’:    
 But the concept of acceptable risk, as highlighted by the BSE scandal, will always be subject to 
varying interpretations. And, the issue becomes even murkier when the impartiality of the quangos and 
bureaucrats is called into question. Consider how…the fact that the impartiality of the government's 
'independent' committee of experts - which is advising the government on whether GM food is safe - 
has also been queried.” (Born, 1999 - The Guardian, February 18)   
 
 As the above example seemingly illustrates, ‘acceptable risks’ raises journalistic questions 
over the methodology used by institutional actors to define risk, and therefore harm and 
victimisation (Chapman and Wutzke, 1997). For risk reporters, the methodology used to identify 
“acceptable risks” outlines a seemingly arbitrary process where a proportion of the population 
have been bureaucratically identified as unfortunate recipients of danger for the sake of 
technological development. Such an approach to defining risk renders those reportedly 
victimised by technology as being inconsequential, and not warranting social support (as 
demonstrated by the Thalidomide example earlier in this chapter).  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter synthesises a range of evidence to suggest that the framing and narrative 
rhetoric surrounding risk information was subject to temporal changes which roughly map upon 
the previously identified periods of risk reporting. The data presented within this chapter suggests 
that changes to the manner in which risk-based news was reported is likely to have occurred at 
the boundary between the second and third periods. From the framing analysis, a relationship 
was observed between Certainty and Blame which is likely influenced by selection of news 
sources by risk reporters. For instance, in the second period, there was an uncharacteristically 
high expression of Certainty and elevated expression of Blame which appears to be related to the 
platforming of non-institutional sources by the press. The expression of Certainty and Blame 
appears related to mediated confrontation between government ministers and pressure groups 
over assertions of safety and risk respectively. There is also evidence suggesting that decisions to 
raise the profile of pressure group sources within risk reporting was predicated upon proactive 
newspaper campaigns. The overlapping newspapers campaigns on risk within the second period 





It further appears that, following the fallout from the House of Lords third report and 
misreporting of risk information around MMR, the risk reporters sought to better represent the 
profile of scientific news sources. While this change came at the cost of effectively deplatforming 
non-institutional perspectives, there appears to have been a substantial shift towards providing 
scientific interpretations of risk information within the press. The decision to platform a more 
professional, credible, and tentative news sources appears to have influenced the character of the 
Uncertainty frame towards being built upon scientific uncertainty, rather than being built around 
a general state of public unknowingness. The increased profile for scientific sources appears to be 
a result of risk reporters moving away from prioritising journalistic balance towards scientific 
balance within news stories. However, there is some tentative evidence to suggest that the 
character of scientific balance has changed around the boundary between the third and fourth 
periods of risk reporting. Scientific news sources appear to have become more inclined to offer 
policy recommendations within their statements to the press, offering the presumption that their 
policy advice is drawn from a consensus on evidence.  
 
There was also evidence suggesting that rhetorical narratives around risks were also subject 
to change over time. Again, the locus of change appears to be at the boundary between the 
second and third periods. The narrative elements of logos and ethos appear to be the most likely 
rhetorical structures to exhibit temporal changes. Narratives of logos appear to have shifted away 
from disputing science as a form of government power and towards relying upon scientific 
credentials to dispute government power. The function of peer-review emerged from the data as 
a narrative shorthand to confer acceptability and trust towards interpretations of risk 
information. However, there appear to have been contentions by journalists about the social 
currency placed upon peer-review, and credentialism as a whole, to provide accurate 
interpretations of risk. Such concerns seemingly raise journalistic questions around the 
objectivity of science when placed under pressures from neoliberal systems. Narratives of ethos 
also appear to have changed over time, reorientating around the respectability of credentialism. 
The value of renegade, controversial, or maverick scientists appears to have declined after the 
mid-2000s, while the value of the credible scientific consensus appears to have increased within 
risk reporting. This shift highlights a change in the nature of credibility within the press, moving 
away from individual voices which dispute ministerial statements on risk, towards prioritising 
the idea that policy decisions are based upon a well-considered evaluation of available data. 
Where statements from scientific news sources highlights areas of improper risk management, it 
may be presumed that an evidence-based re-evaluation of policy could ensure a proper 
precautionary approach.  However, It was also noted that the scientific consensus, as an abstract 
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concept, can be used as a narrative short-hand for news sources to confer believability to their 
claims without necessarily providing scientific balance within their statements.  
 
The narrative of pathos did not appear to have undergone any major changes over the 
reporting periods. Generally, narratives of pathos built upon an ongoing chronology of failure 
which sought to recast historic missteps of governance within contemporary contexts to forecast 
how disastrously risk events could resolve. There does, however, appear to be a well-established 
media template to narratives of pathos, which may be intended to produce visceral emotional 
responses within audience in an attempt to promote precautionary social organisation. This 
media template generally focuses upon risks to women and children and suggests that their 
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Chapter 6 - Paradigmatic changes to Journalistic Conventions 
of Risk Reporting 
 
Introduction 
Whilst the two previous chapters in this thesis has provided evidence to establish at least four 
distinct periods of risk reporting, there has not been any substantial explanation as to why these 
periods can be observed. The aim of this chapter is to contextualise previous findings by drawing 
upon the lived experiences, professional observations, and expert knowledge from members of 
the British press. Drawing from interviews with interviews with twenty members of the British 
press, three distinct paradigms of risk reporting were suggested which comprise distinctly 
different approaches to risk-based newswork.  The Traditionalist approach appears to have been 
the dominant form of risk reporting until the early 2000s, proceeded by the Scientific approach 
until the early 2010s, which was followed by the Digital approach in recent years.  
 
Each approach outlines how press conventions appear to be largely guided by the 
presumptions made of audience attitudes towards science journalism, the contemporary 
pressures upon newswork, and the impact of technology on story writing. It is these changing 
press conventions over time which provides evidence to suggest paradigmatic changes in risk 
reporting over time. The remainder of this chapter will better establish these paradigms using 
interview data from British risk reporters.   
 
The Traditional Paradigm of Risk Reporting - 1980s/1990s     
Across the interviews, risk reporters generally contended that the key journalistic principles 
guided newswork. Interrogating the truth behind risk information, being an independent voice to 
critically evaluate institutional risk management, and providing a fair, representative, platform 
for debate were widely considered to be central to risk reporting (Hargreaves, 2003). However, 
interviews also acknowledged the the limitations and pressures of news creation often tempered 
such principled ideals. Interviewees suggested that, during the 1980s, a focus of risk reporting 
was to generate public interest in science journalism. The drive to generate interest appears to 
coincide with concerns over the value of science journalism to improve the profitability of 
newspapers. To develop interest, and produce value, risk reporters appear to have relied upon 
traditional media strategies of sensationalism and politicisation to make the story behind risk 
information more relatable to newspaper audiences (Schiro, 2016; Ahern and Connolly-Ahern, 
2019). Interviewees suggested that, by using this strategy, scientific accuracy was sacrificed to 
146 
 
establish a linguistic framework which contextualised risk information within the presumed 
experiences of a general audience:  
By calling it ‘mad cow disease’, which I know probably makes you cringe now, but it put BSE on the 
radar. it was kind of our best stab at getting the gist of the issue over to the readers… You know - It’s 
much more subtle and interesting, the relationship between ‘the truth’ and the way things pan out in 
reality. So, strangely enough, journalists can get things on the agenda by sensationalising them so then 
they can be properly discussed. - Interview Delta 
 
In the above example, the interviewee outlines a key convention to risk reporting within the 
Traditional paradigm that sensationalises risk information to illuminate potentially contentious 
policy and facilitate public debate. Given that, prior to the ubiquity of internet technologies, 
news media were the only viable platform to inform the public of risk information, this appears 
to have placed a particular value on the role of risk reporters as ’truth seekers’ (Miller, 2001). As 
risk information was generally embedded within institutional reports during this period (see 
chapter five), and occluded from the public view, it seems likely that risk reporters were among a 
limited selection of the public that were capable (or willing) to access these reports. While 
interviewees acknowledged that, within the Traditional paradigm, the scientific literacy of the 
British press was limited they also contended that the traditional journalistic techniques to probe 
information was suitable to report on risk. The general scheme of newswork followed a structure 
where reporters would encounter risk information, assess if it warranted further examination, 
contact a range of sources to both contextualise the information and provide their own 
interpretations of the potential impacts. As such, interviewees placed particular emphasis on 
triangulation methods to verify if interpretations of risk information were largely accurate.  
 
Interviewees largely agreed that the verification of risk information relied upon the range of 
available sources. As such, it was suggested that a professional expectation of risk reporters was 
to develop and maintain a network of sources which could provide authoritative statements on 
risk information when needed. However, pressures such as limited access to research scientists 
and tight deadlines, often encouraged risk reporters to rely upon readily available sources who 
appeared knowledgeable on matters of risk. Given that, during this period, the majority of 
Britain’s national newspapers were headquartered at Fleet Street, London, this appears to have 
encouraged risk reporters to rely upon apparently knowledgeable news sources from pressure 
group organisations who intentionally sought them out in the local pubs:  
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When we was in Fleet Street you had, not only the head of the Central Electricity Generating 
Board, but the guys from Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth all meet up and have a pint in the 
Cheshire Cheese. Oh, the arguments we all used to have about nuclear power (laughs). I can’t see that 
happening nowadays. I mean, information has never felt so tightly controlled as it seems today. - 
Interview Eta 
 
There was this sort of innocence to the way things ran in the Eighties. It was much more, kind of, 
porous and leaky and slipshod back then. Back when people really did go out for lunch and get all the 
gossip from the day before. - Interview Delta 
 
As the above examples suggest, Fleet Street’s central location provided a hub for those 
looking to sell an interesting risk-based story to come into contact risk risk reporters. For 
journalists, being approached by a potential story lead may have been more exciting, and 
potentially rewarding, that repackaging information obtained from newswire services. After the 
press victory regarding BSE, the value of risk reporters to pressure group sources appears to have 
become more established. Several interviewees recounted events where there were approached 
by story leads looking to capitalise upon a risk-based media event or possibly developing one 
themselves:  
Well, before Wakefield did his infamous Lancet Paper, he actually a patient my way. I remember 
doing the interview in the mid 90s. It was a straightforward patient case study, you know - ‘Family 
torn asunder by mystery disease’, human interest type thing. There was a very loose culture to health 
reporting back then. I mean, do you remember Cherie Blair and her healing crystals? I had a lot of 
people approaching me to do stories after that one. - Interview Eta  
 
What the above example suggests is that, towards the end of the Traditionalist paradigm (late 
90s) the value of risk reporters appears to have developed away from dogged truth seekers 
towards a possible marketing platform for pressure groups and other parties interested in 
profiteering.   
 
The politicisation of risk information was another journalistic strategy, suggested by 
interviewees, which was integral to placing risk on the public agenda during the Traditionalist 
paradigm. The ability to politicise risk information apparently draws upon the privileged position 
of the press to broadcast political information. As a functionalist account of their job roles, 
interviewees contended that a key responsibility was to maintain awareness of political actors 
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who were suspected of influencing (presumedly surpassing) the institutional management of 
risky technologies. As such, the press operated as a de facto public watchdog by being aware of 
the political relationships that would be hidden from the general public (Trench, 2007): 
On health scares, such as ‘mad cow disease’, the big issue for us was that Government didn’t 
know who it was there for. It acted on behalf of industry and farmers, rather than the public. Only 
when [reporters] understood that, and saw every health scare in that context - through that lens - did 
we start reporting things accurately. [Reporters] started to think ‘why have [the government] done 
that?’… [The Politicians] all came from a landed gentry background. They owed land, therefore they 
appreciate farming. So you got health crises because they saw things through that lens, and not 
through a lens of public protection. - Interview Alpha 
 
As the above example seemingly illustrates, there was a resonant presumption that, across 
the 80s and 90s, politicians considered the application of risky technologies under a veil of 
secrecy. Generally, interviewees considered a dichotomy to risk-based news stories where the 
general public were being forced to accept novel health risks from applied technologies, and that 
the benefits of these technologies would accrue as profits for elite actors invested in the projects. 
Interviewees reported that, by the late 90s, there was increasing attempts at news management 
from institutional sources within government. Such news management was perceived as 
increasing restrictions in access to, and the framing of, risk information (otherwise called ‘spin’) 
(Quinn, 2012).  
 
When ‘spin’ was perceived around institutional risk information, it apparently confirmed 
journalistic instincts of controversy, cover-up, or corruption within government. Such concerns 
legitimised the perception that the risk-based news story had ‘legs’ and was in the public interest 
to be reported on. However, the presumptions of secrecy around institutional relationships 
provided journalists with a cognitive framework to anticipate that something was being suppressed 
by institutional power, even if there was little evidence of institutional malfeasance initially. The 
something may have been completely unrelated to the actual hazard facing the general public, but 
may still be interesting to the readership (E.g. Abuses of power, misappropriation of funds, 
corruption). As such, the claims of risk from non-institutional actors appear to have provided a 
vehicle for journalistic probing into government wrongdoing, even if the claims of risk lacked 
factual substantiation. Trying to uncover what the something was seemingly formed a key aspect 
of risk reporting within the Traditionalist paradigm. Interviewees suggested that when one 
newspaper ‘broke’ a story over risk, other rival and sister newspaper would often marshal 
resources to pursue their own angles on the story. One reason for a cascade of risk reporting 
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around specific events may be because risk reporters shared a journalistic ethos of holding power 
to account (Kitzinger, 2009). Within a risk reporting cascade, each news desk at their respective 
newspaper would leverage their own, unique, collection of news sources in an attempt to ‘break’ 
new information on the developing situation:  
 
Listen, as a journalist, you had a sense of being a part of some great tradition in which we had a 
responsibility to democracy. I mean, our responsibility was not to science - or even to our own 
proprietor  - it’s actually to the reader. That’s what I meant by ‘doing things properly’. You had to 
think very responsibly, and it might not be the same kind of ‘responsibility’ that a Research Council 
chief, or some Cambridge researcher would want, but they were not our chief concern.   - Interview 
Mu 
 
As the above example illustrates, risk reporters within the Traditionalist paradigm may have 
shared a sense of duty to interrogate the events around a risk-based news story in order to shed 
light on occluded decision making process for public scrutiny. However, this sense of duty 
appears to have informed amplified risk reporting as there appears to have also been a general 
permissiveness towards scientific inaccuracies, mistakes, and errors within risk reporting. During 
the Traditionalist paradigm, there seems to have been little emphasis on challenging the 
inaccurate statements from news sources, so long as those statements were accurately reported 
(Gunter et al, 1999). Interviewees suggested that there was a conventional presumption of 
audience ambivalence towards scientific accuracy at the time which dissuaded them from 
seeking higher standards of risk reporting. Furthermore, interviewees justified this position by 
suggesting that the time needed to ensure scientifically accurate reporting would have negatively 
impacted their ability to rapidly produce a high volume of news stories within tight deadlines 
(Adam, 2013). Interviewees identified five factors which were considered to have negatively 
impacted their ability to produce scientifically accurate risk reporting during the Traditionalist 
paradigm.  
 
1) Time pressures 
One of the key factors put forward by interviewees was that the time pressures of news 
production had a major impact on the scientific accuracy of risk reporting. Several interviewees 
suggested that they often were allocated mere hours to investigate an issue and write a story. 
They also claimed that they were expected to submit several stories a day. During the story 
writing process, interviewees often encountered conflicting, incomplete, or irrelevant information 
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and would have to rely upon their own intuition to make sense of events before embedding 
statements within the story. Time pressures may have been compounded by the limited 
communications technologies available in the 80s/90s (Winston, 1998). Interviewees suggested 
that potential scientific sources were often unreachable by telephone outside of office hours or 
would take too long to return calls. As such, risk reporters may have frequently discounted 
research scientists as ideal news sources and chose more reliable, readily available, sources who 
were somewhat knowledgeable on the topic in question (Conrad, 1999; Major and Atwood, 
2004).  
 
2) Lack of scientific background 
Much of the daily risk reporting appears to have been conducted by dedicated science 
journalists who were attached to science, health, or environmental news desks. Interviewees gave 
the impression that their understanding of science was at an enthusiast level and were able to 
articulate complex scientific ideas. However, it should be noted that amplified risk reporting 
cascades often attracted reporters from other news desks such as politics, consumer affairs, or 
rural affairs (Ashe, 2013; Kitzinger, 2009). Interviewees suggested that the stories from non-
specialist reporters often diversified the focus of reporting around risk events and exacerbated the 
degree to which risk was sensationalised and politicised. This impact may have been due to the 
broad socio-political connotations of risk extending beyond the scientific domain to incorporate 
issues which were of interest to non-specialist news desks.  
 
3) Editorial oversight  
Interviewees suggested that the primary role of editors during the Traditionalist paradigm 
was to set an interesting direction for their news desk. Interviewees readily described how editors 
endorsed stories which were expected to draw and maintain readers attention, with the ultimate 
goal being awarded a front-page status. However, if a story was viewed as being less valuable by 
editors, it was expected that the story would be heavily edited and positioned towards the end of 
the newspaper. Interviewees raised a notable point of contention being that editors would often 
request risk reporters to write stories on seemingly facile issues such as fad diets, homeopathic 
practices, and pseudo-scientific oddities (such as crop circles). Due to their perceived   precarious 
employment, interviewees admitted they were often reluctant to refuse such assignments and 
applied the same level of professionalism to stories they knew to be scientifically baseless:   
It happens with alarming frequency. You’ll have editors walk past your desk and ask you to do a 
story on something you know is complete and utter bollocks. But, you gotta do your job. And if you 
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keep refusing to do your job, you suddenly find yourself out of a job. I’ve seen it happen far, far, too 
often. - (Interview Delta).  
 
Another contentious issue was that the headlines which accompanied news stories was often 
written by sub-editors. Interviewees felt that headlines were constructed without input from the 
reporter, who would be named in the by-line. While interviewees felt that headlines served the 
purpose of being interesting, they often misrepresented the story and amplified risk in their own 
regard. One final point of contention was editorial absence during holiday periods around 
summer and Christmas. Some interviewees described these periods as the ‘silly season’, 
suggesting that particularly low-quality risk-based reporting was more than likely to be published 
than at other points in the year. Some interviewees recounted examples where newspapers would 
have to issue retractions of stories which completely lacked scientific and journalistic merit but 
were otherwise published due to the lack of editorial oversight. The summer ‘silly season’ was 
particularly notable for interviewees as it coincided with the parliamentary recess, providing 
reporters from political news desks the opportunity to try their hand and risk reporting in lieu of 
emerging stories from their traditional news beat.  
 
4) The transience of newspapers.  
When reflecting upon the Traditionalist paradigm, interviewees candidly suggested that 
audiences lacked general interest in the science of risk reporting. It was apparently presumed that 
reporting on the scientific intricacies of risk was too boring for general readers (Reed, 2001). 
Interviewees further suggested that the general lack of objections from audiences over scientific 
concerns provided evidence to confirm that the science of risk was not interesting aspects of the 
story. Where letters to the Editor did object to scientific misinformation, these were usually from 
readers with scientific credentials and were perceived as a fastidious nuisance which ignored the 
pressures of newswork.   
 
 The intended disposability of newspapers may have also encouraged risk amplifying 
approaches to newswork. Some interviewees emphasised that the purpose of risk reporting 
within newspapers was to be a cheap thrill, which was likely to be forgotten when the reader 
disposed of their newspaper (Obsolescence AND Lewis, 2010. As such, risk reporters may have 
justified modes of working which encouraged a permissive attitude towards amplification 
through providing exaggerated interpretations of risk information. Given that physical 
newspapers were rarely archived by the general public, risk reporters may have felt that previous 
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stories which exaggerated risk would only be scrutinised by small academic circles and not the 
general public.  
  
The Scientific Paradigm of Risk Reporting - 2000s  
All interviewees considered the fallout from the MMR coverage (see chapter five) to have 
been instrumental in facilitating major changes to modes of newswork around risk reporting 
(Dobson, 2003; Jackson, 2003; McCartney, 2013). This resulted in the dominance of a Scientific 
paradigm of risk reporting which extended from the early 2000s into the early 2010s. 
Interviewees suggested that a turn towards the   Scientific paradigm was based upon concerns 
that the British press needed to repair its reputation by producing scientifically accurate risk 
reporting and that there was an emerging market of readers who were specifically interested in 
science-led stories.  
 
Interviewees described how reputation is a significant social currency for the press as it is 
seen to facilitate trust and confidence in readers that their chosen newspaper produces truthful 
stories (Shmatikov and Talcott, 2005; Jempson, 2005). There appears to be a concern that, if a 
newspapers reputation is tarnished by inaccurate, misleading, and false reporting, then readers 
would begin purchasing papers from competitor news organisations.  However, some 
interviewees made the distinction between journalistic accuracy and scientific accuracy to 
highlight the decision-making process of some risk reporters which may lend itself towards 
misrepresenting science within news stories: 
Ok, so you can brought up to IPSO (Independent Press Standards Organisation) for ‘inaccurate 
reporting’. But, and here’s the trick, ‘accuracy’ doesn’t mean ’scientific’. Lets say, hypothetically, I 
am interviewing you right now. And you say something silly like ‘eating cheese causes cancer’. Well, 
in my story, I write ‘UK Academic suggests that eating cheese causes cancer’. My story is accurate, I 
am accurately reporting your statement. But, scientifically, it’s false. Accurate, but false. That’s what 
needed to change. - Interview Tau.  
 
 The distinction between scientific accuracy and journalistic accuracy has not been addressed 
within British press standards. While journalistic accuracy is outlined as the good faith 
interpretation of statements provided by news sources (Editor’s Codebook, 2019), scientific 
accuracy is the suggestion that the press interprets scientific information in accordance with a 
well-established scientific consensus  (National Research Council, 1989). While interviewees 
identified the MMR coverage as particularly damaging to the reputation of the British press, 
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others were quick to mitigate responsibility for their reporting. This was achieved by highlighting 
how the credibility of Wakefield’s claims were conferred by being published in the Lancet:  
The MMR story had the same spark as BSE, but with different ingredients. Basically you had sick 
babies, autism, devastated parents.  Easy pictures. Easy Human interest interviews. And umm - 
actually, to be fair on the reporters back then, the reason that story took off back then was because the 
Lancet ran it and made it a big thing…For Science journalists, their benchmark is - ‘has the claims 
been published in a peer-reviewed journal’, or is it being discusses in a conference of decent standing, 
or whatever. And the Lancet publishing the paper was a big, big, thing to lift off the whole debate. - 
Interview Lambda 
 
If the MMR claims hadn’t appeared in the Lancet, it wouldn’t have been covered. If the GM food 
story hadn’t appeared in the Lancet, it wouldn’t have been covered…it was purely the prestige of the 
Lancet itself which made a huge difference. I mean, if the Lancet publishes something, that’s 
obviously the top journal. It has a lot of credibility. Perhaps it shouldn’t, but it does. So, on that basis 
it was very har to say to a journalist ‘oh, you can’t believe the Lancet’ and it was just very difficult for 
journalists to actually stand in the way of a story like that. -Interview Kappa 
  
The examples above perhaps best demonstrate why notions of scientific accuracy have yet to be 
codified within press standards. Whilst it is simple to suggest that risk reporters draw from a 
scientific consensus as a benchmark of scientific accuracy, there are still few guidelines on how 
this may be achieved. It would be similarly simplistic to assert that risk reporters should be up to 
date with the contemporary literature across scientific disciplines. Such a suggestion would 
presume that risk reporters become experts across all fields of science and have the resources to 
access all scientific journals.   
 
It was suggested that increased public scrutiny of the press was one of the major reasons for the 
change towards science-led risk reporting.  For some newspapers, particularly The Guardian, it 
appears that there were editorial decisions to appeal directly towards an emerging market of 
readers looking for more scientifically detailed coverage of risk-based news stories. Interviewees 
contended that Dr Ben Goldacre’s Bad Science column (published in the Guardian between 2003-
2011) was a hallmark of excellence for a wider public movement which sought to challenge and 
debunk some of the more egregious forms of scientifically misleading risk amplification (Bonetta, 
2007; Krimsky, 2007; Colson, 2011):  
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One of the more helpful innovations was actually down to the Guardian, funny enough. It was Ben 
Goldacre and his Bad Science column. It essentially, I mean, he actually told us what it was we should 
and shouldn’t be doing with statistics and science and that. He then proceeded, in his column and blog, 
to ruthlessly vilify all those who defended the status quo. And that, of course, included the popular 
papers. - Interview Alpha 
 
You know, it’s funny, because around that time Ben Goldacre started his column - Bad Science - which 
was doing, in a very explicit way, what was needed to be done in journalism - calling out the really bad 
coverage at that point. And it was something that I was trying to do too, just slightly more gently 
(laughs).  - Interview Delta 
 
Similar to many other forms of public scrutiny of risk reporting, Bad Science was originally 
published as a blog in the early 2000’s. The Guardian syndicated Bad Science as a dedicated 
column which spanned the entirety of the Scientific paradigm. The draw of Bad Science for 
Guardian readers appears to be the novelty of witnessing a scientific expert passionately excoriate 
the press on the appropriate use of facts, scientific balance and the principles of the scientific 
methods - all couched in the language of sardonic humour (Best, 2015). Bad Science may also 
have provided readers the chance to see their own objections towards amplified risk reporting 
being addressed by a newspaper, without the need to write letters to the editor. Within Bad 
Science, Goldacre encouraged his audience to submit examples as the basis for his upcoming 
articles. By working in partnership with his audience to act as a media watchdog, Goldacre may 
have empowered other news audiences to demand higher standards of risk reporting from other 
newspapers (Jönsson and Örnebring, 2011; Lewis et al, 2010).  For journalists, Bad Science 
represented a shift public attitude away from the sensationalisation and politicisation of risk, which 
was common within the Traditional paradigm, towards a more measured treatment of scientific 
information within risk reporting which characterised the Scientific paradigm (Colson, 2011). 
 
The elevation of Bad Science from fringe internet blog to a mainstream newspaper column 
seemingly represents an acknowledgement from the press that scientific discourse had become 
integral to public discussions around risk. It also acknowledges that prior modes of risk reporting 
could produce problematic coverage of risk events that negatively impacts risk perceptions 
(Bauer, 2005; Massarani and Moreira, 2004). Being published on the Guardian’s website also 
provided Goldacre’s column with a highly visible archive of press failings. For risk reporters, this 
may have been an uncomfortable stimulus to produce science-led reporting by posing a risk to 
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career progression, as being exhibited on bad science may have been unattractive to potential 
employers.  
 
Interviewees also suggested that Goldacre did not limit his involvement with risk reporting to 
just documenting poor examples on bad science. They suggested that, once Goldacre became 
published in the Guardian, he sought to embed himself in the wider journalistic community. It 
was suggested that Goldacre offered guidance and practical advice in personal conversations 
with journalists who were amenable to science-led risk reporting. Goldacre’s advice appears to 
have followed best practice guidelines outlined by Science Communication research and 
included a better understanding of statistics, understanding the principles of scientific 
investigation, an appreciation of the scientific consensus, the value of scientific credibility, and 
the need for scientific balance (Spiegelhalter, 2008; Spiegelhalter, 2017; Homig, 1993; Nisbet and 
Scheufele; 2009; Ceccarelli, 2011; Clarke, 2008).  
 
While interviewees identified Goldacre as a highly visible influence on the British press, it 
cannot be suggested that he was the sole actor campaigning for press reform. The Science Media 
Centre (SMC) was established as a response to the House of Lords third report on Science and 
Technology with the stated goal of improving British risk reporting, which mirrored the intent of 
other organisations such as Sense About Science (SAS) (Fox, 2012). While the scale of 
involvement by these social actors is difficult to assess, even by the methods used in this thesis, it 
appears that such actors helped orchestrate the establishment of the Scientific paradigm of risk 
reporting. The central convention of the Scientific paradigm was to shift away from describing 
what the potential dangers of applied technology could be, towards explaining how applied 
technologies could help manage the risks facing society. Interviewees suggested that 
developments in communications technologies assisted with changes to the conventional 
approach to risk reporting. Interviewees identified the ubiquity of mobile phones, and later smart 
phones, across the 2000s as a liberating force for risk reporting. Such technologies improved the 
ability of risk reporters to contact suitable scientific experts at all times of the day to help 
contextualise risk information and provide impactful statements (Reich, 2013). Coupled with the 
decentralisation of newspaper headquarters away from Fleet Street, interviewees suggested that 
they became less dependent upon the availability of seemingly knowledgeable sources to provide 
risk information.  The ubiquity of Email within the 2000s also assisted risk reporters broaden the 
range of potential sources to a global pool of scientific expertise, who had apparently become 
increasingly eager to speak to the press: 
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What has made a fantastic difference to [journalist’s] lives is email and the internet. It has become 
quite easy to get hold of someone. Once upon a time, we would never have dreamt to contact a 
professor in Tuckahoe, or wherever, and ask them about the astrophysics of a blackhole. But now, it’s 
easy to get hold of him, or the Harvard, or the Smithsonian people. And, of course, the Oxford and 
Cambridge lot too. So, in that sense, science has become much more democratised and it’s much - 
much - easier to get hold of an expert. - Interview Gamma 
 
  [British Universities] were not very good at public relations, and the European universities were 
unspeakably bad. I tell you, the number of times there would be some professor who had a paper out in 
Nature, or the Lancet, but they wouldn’t be there to be questioned - They’d gone away! You’d ring a 
university switchboard you’d they operator hadn’t ever heard of a Professor So-and-so. All this has 
changed in a big way since the internet. Now you have press departments who actually email out press 
releases, all in English! It’s so different now. I mean, once upon a time, it was the role of the press 
office to keep a University’s name out of the paper, now they are all looking to make sure they get 
good publicity - Interview Beta  
 
The developments in communications technologies also appears to have impacted the public 
sharing of scientific information. Aside from blogs dedicated to debunking bad science, a wider 
cultural movement appears to have emerged in the early 2000s which sought to prioritise facts, 
logic, and scientific knowledge. Dubbed the ‘New Atheist Movement’ this counter-cultural 
identity seemingly sought to challenge anti-science religiosity which was perceived to have 
become entrenched within the decision-making processes of Western governments (Pigliucci, 
2013). For New Atheists, the apparent relationship between evangelicalism and political power 
was problematic as it was fired that appeals to divine authority would undermine evidence-based 
decision making across policy domains (Schulzke, 2013). Perhaps the most poignant example 
would be, then US president, George W Bush’s claim that God had instructed him to “end the 
tyranny in Iraq” as a justification for the War of Terror (MacAskill, 2005). In a more abstract 
sense, there were wider concerns that the dominance of evangelical religiosity would encourage 
structural support for anti-science positions around creationism, anti-vaccination movements, 
and climate change denial  (Kettell, 2013; Amarasingam and Brewster, 2016; Pucci et al, 2018). 
While some of these concerns are drawn particularly from American social contexts, internet 
access provided a nexus by which the British public could engage in these debates.  
 
Similarly, to the debunking strategy of Goldacre’s Bad Science blog, New Atheist actors also 
used internet platforms to identify, and excoriate, outrageous examples of anti-scientific decision 
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making. (Cimino and Smith, 2010). By producing discursive content which contested religious 
claims with scientific facts, appeals to scientific authority, and logical thought exercises, New 
Atheists were seemingly able to establish a social identity which seemingly challenged powerful 
institutions (Cimino and Smith, 2011). The growth of New Atheism online appears to have 
fostered an offline consumer market, which was seeking to engage with more professionally 
produced material from credible and popular scientific sources (Bullivant, 2010; Amarasingam, 
2010). Publishers of popular science books appear to have capitalised upon this market trend by 
(re)publishing works by controversial, pro-science authors, which directly attacked superstitious 
irrationality (Pigliucci, 2013).  While it is not suggested that perceived irrationality of risk 
reporting, and public risk responses (Frewer, 2004), was developed from religiosity, there may 
have been enough overlap in terms of scientific illiteracy to conflate both issues as evidence for 
the public being in need of better scientific understanding.  
 
While the New Atheist movement was largely an American phenomenon, cross-cultural 
adoption of a pro-science cultural identity may be linked to public disquiet towards the British-
American ‘special relationship’, which involved Britain in the US-led War of Terror (Marsh, 
2012). Across the 2000s, the British press had increasingly introduced the British public to 
American policy issues, posing a journalistic critique of the US as the Western cultural hegemon 
(DeFoster, 2010; De Benedictis et al; 2019).  
While newspapers sought to critique the seemingly illogical American resistance to liberalism 
over issues of gun control, abortion, and gay marriage (Clements, 2012; Clements and Field, 
2018), pro-science voices appeared to critique the seemingly harmful American healthcare 
system. Goldacre’s column (and subsequent popular science books Bad Science (2010) and Bad 
Pharma (2014) highlighted some of the questionable practices of American pharmaceutical firms 
and health insurance companies, which appeared to be anathema to the British cultural context 
entrenched in the lionisation of the NHS.  
 
By establishing an online presence during the 2000s, Newspapers were granted virtually 
unlimited space to spotlight the idiosyncrasies between British and American policy decisions 
and to provide context to risk information that sought to improve the public understanding of 
science (Shema and Bar-lain, 2011). During the Scientific paradigm, almost every newspaper 
featured a dedicated science blog which offered supplements and highly detailed reporting on a 
range of scientific issues. Newspaper science blogs were often given a broad remit, limited 
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editorial oversight, and uncontested press freedom to pursue the issues the news-desk fancied 
(Wolinsky, 2011): 
It was the bloggers, really. They changed things. The Freelancers, and other such people who were 
independent and particularly interested in scientific topics. They were the ones who really put the effort 
in and were actually giving out the correct information. So, they they were kind of a free-market 
counterbalance within journalism as a whole.  - Interview Zeta 
 
Press releases are a great resource for freelancers. You kind of get all the correct information you 
need to update your blog - data, facts, quotes. Everything really. It’s good to help you get work. 
Although, once get are commissioned, the editors expect you to go beyond the press release. - Interview 
Iota 
 
As the above examples illustrate, the virtual freedom afforded to journalists by newspaper 
blogs enabled them to engage in risk reporting on their own terms. It appears that science-led risk 
reporting was the preferred mode of newswork, and that the institutional orientation of the 2000s 
facilitated it. Furthermore, interviewees suggested that, by engaging with science-led risk 
reporting, they were able to build relationships with scientific organisations. Such networking 
appears to have encouraged a good faith transmutation of information, with risk reporters 
increasingly encountering scientific press releases being emailed directly to them. This process of 
direct email appears to have replaced the reliance upon newswire services, which was common 
within the Traditionalist paradigm. Both press releases and newswires contained all the basic 
information necessary to write risk-based news stories. One of the key differences appears to be 
that press releases were written by dedicated personnel who understood the needs of risk 
reporters when writing science-led stories, while newswires were aimed at more generic reporting 
and highlighted the political aspects of risk.  
 
The Digital Paradigm of Risk Amplification - 2010s 
All interviewees suggested that, by the 2010s, news reporting had become well integrated 
into the framework of ubiquitous internet technologies.  (Doyle, 2013). Interviewees suggested 
that their stories were developed from online risk information, information sources were 
contacted via the internet, and that stories were published online first before being repackaged for 
physical newspapers. However, while this Digital paradigm of newswork was seen to have 
expedited news production cycles, Interviewees identified several issues of contemporary risk 
reporting that appear to have helped establish a post-truth perspective on risk: (1) the struggle 
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generating revenue online. (2) the routinisation of risk reporting. (3) the uncritical handling of 
risk information.   
 
The key issue for interviewees was that the difficulties generating revenue online had 
negatively impacted the resources available to health, science, and environmental news desks for 
risk reporting. It was suggested that, as news audiences increasingly preferred to read news 
stories online for free over purchasing newspapers this had caused a decline in revenue for news 
organisations. It was further suggested that declining revenue had caused the reduction of news 
teams dedicated to risk reporting and the shuttering of services such as blogs and other science-
led feature writing. A resonant theme emerged where interviewees felt that risk reporting had 
become a public relations platform for science, rather than a journalistic platform: 
That’s the thing with this ‘post-truth reality’, or whatever it is we’re in now. Science is governed 
by money, and reporting on science is governed by money. People these days don’t know what to 
believe when they read it.” - Interview Nu 
 
“That’s where this whole ‘post-truth’ aspect comes into play. People don’t trust the experts any 
more, but the experts don’t know that. Sometimes even we forget that, and then we say ‘this is right 
and it’s good and you have to listen. - Interview Xi 
 
As the above examples illustrate, interviewees generally felt that the generally pro-science 
messaging around risk reporting in the Scientific paradigm has helped develop a public 
perception of mistrust towards scientific institutions. Interviewees further suggested that risk was 
becoming antagonistically amplified by alternative media platforms which act as public 
watchdogs over the apparent relationship between scientific, journalistic, and political 
institutions (Cooke, 2017).   
 
The routinisation of risk reporting was suggested to be a direct result of the difficulties 
generating revenue from online news reporting. It appears that the time pressures on risk 
reporters to turn over stories had increased far beyond the pressures experienced during the 
Traditionalist paradigm. These new time pressures were viewed as antithetical to the modes of 
newswork established during the Scientific paradigm where risk reporters were encouraged to 
dedicate time to fully exploring the scientific contexts behind risk-based news stories: 
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Nowadays you don’t have the same problem of ‘space’ when it comes to writing a story, but there’s a 
‘time’ problem. It’s become very important to be the first with news on the web. If you can publish a 
story ten seconds before the others, then you have scored. But, doing it quickly isn’t the same as doing 
it properly. I mean, right now, you have all the sources for your story already available on the web, so 
it’s become bloody difficult to come up with anything new. - Interview Alpha  
 
As the above example suggests, a new convention has emerged within risk reporting which 
prioritises rapidity and turnover of news stories which caters to an increasingly online audience 
that is dependent upon the algorithmic selection of news stories by online search engines 
(Nielsen, 2016; Carlson, 2007). Interviewees also suggested that Search Engine Optimisation 
(SEO) has become the primary focus of risk reporting, indicating that risk reporters may be 
inclined to (rapidly) produce stories which fit a specific template that ensures the maximum 
possible visibility from search engine results (Guan and Cutrell, 2007). As such, interviewees 
admitted that they were largely dependent upon press releases from scientific institutions as they 
often contain all of the necessary elements to write a risk-based news story as quickly as possible. 
Interviewees further suggested that, during periods of intense media focus on specific risks, they 
would often be inundated with a range of press releases which shared similar language that made 
the process of SEO optimisation easier to achieve. As such, some interviewees felt that risk 
reporting within the Digital paradigm was more akin to ‘churnalism’, which blurs the lines 
between journalistic integrity and organic marketing campaigns (Jackson and Moloney, 2016).  
 
The suggestion that the uncritical handling of risk information is endemic to the Digital 
paradigm is one of the more problematic themes emerging from the interviews. It was suggested 
that, as a result of ‘churnalism’, reporters were simply repackaging risk information embedded 
within press releases without taking the appropriate steps to verify the claims:  
You know, I don’t like that assertion. The quality of science reporting hasn’t improved at all.  Twenty 
years ago there were big science teams producing pages and pages of coverage every day. Today,  it all 
looks a bit broken down, you know? Blogs have gone by the wayside. There are  far, far, fewer 
correspondents. Now, we just have the sort of science journalism where people are copying and 
pasting press releases It doesn’t look all that great to me. What I’ve seen with my own eyes is the loss 





As the above example illustrates, there appears to be a professional distinction between more 
inquisitive science journalism and less inquisitive science writing. The boundaries between these 
two professional identities appears to be located at the trust afforded towards scientific 
institutions to be truthful about the risks from technology and the idealistic prospect for science 
to mitigate contemporary risks. Those risk reporters who tended to be sceptical of the power of 
scientific institutions (or at least the capitalist incentives underpinning scientific research and 
technological applications) tended to self-identify as science journalists, while risk reporters who 
generally trusted scientific institutions to provide the best solutions for social progress tended to 
self-identify as science writers. Within interviews, self-identifying science journalists suggested 
that being critical of scientific power was detrimental to career progression and have since 
transitioned into freelance journalism or out of journalism completely. Furthermore, those 
interviewees suggested that, due to financial pressures on news organisation, they were actively 
encouraged to leave mainstream journalism as editors wished to replace older science journalists 
with younger (and less expensive) science writers. Such a perspective was corroborated, in part, 
by science writers who admitted to accepting precarious, underpaid, positions or unpaid 
internships at mainstream newspapers. One interviewee suggested that, due to their lack of 
experience, science writers often exhibited a skills deficit when it came to interrogating risk 
information. Again, this was corroborated by science writers who contended that the lack of 
senior journalists within newsrooms had produced a culture which lacked suitable routes for 
mentorship:  
 Now, another trend I have noticed is the growing innumeracy within science reporters today. They 
are utterly unable to figure out a graph, or compare two data points and come to a sensible answer. It 
often leads to them making these large, exaggerated, claims. They can write about science, sure. They 
have degrees in it.  But they don’t come with the mathematic or scientific wherewithal to interrogate 
data. So now you are seeing selection bias and political bias from young reporters. It annoys me, this 
lack of systematic thinking.  It’s easy nowadays, you see a statistic in a press release from a supposedly 
reputable source and just not think too much about it, and write the story. That’s the kind of attitude 
which comes from people being forced to work harder in smaller teams - Interview Sigma 
 
The one thing that would really help me is a mentor. It’s daunting to try and find really good stories. 
Sometimes I really don’t know where to start. I know the older science journalists - that’s a lot of what 
they had to do. They kind of learnt as they went along. But it’s difficult because science writing isn’t 
exactly growing. We’re at a bit of a bottle-neck and we don’t seem to have the jobs available, so the 




 Both of the above examples above provides evidence which disputes the idea that science 
training has particular value in improving the quality of risk reporting (Waksman, 1991; Reed 
and Walker, 2001; Besley and Tanner, 2011) for research which supports the evidence within this 
chapter, see Dunwoody, 2004). It appears that currently, training in science writing do not 
incorporate the full range of necessary journalistic skills into their curricula. Several interviewees 
recounted their experiences of science writing training at university. They suggested that there 
was an over-emphasis on press failings around risk reporting (such as MMR) rather than a focus 
on data inquiry, data visualisation, and general employability skills: 
One of the big ideas they have is that ‘all you need is better science training for your journalists to 
write better  health risk articles’. And, I mean, there is definitely a long way to go on this. We get told 
that we ‘should be aware of basic statistics’, not taught how to do statistics. We get told about 
misinterpreting data, not taught how to avoid it. We get told about biased data, and not what to do 
when data confirms our own bias. And then, we go off to some press conference, and everyone else 
there is young, you know? And we just sit there and nod. Sometimes it’s like, are we even doing 
journalism?  - Interview Pi  
 
As the above example suggests, interviewees who self-identified as science writers also feel 
that they are lacking the necessary journalistic skills to probe, and question risk information 
provided by institutional scientific sources. Furthermore, these interviewees generally agreed that 
the lack of available, and approachable, senior journalists at news desks has produced a culture 
which lacks mentorship and skills development.  
 
Almost all interviewees identified the over-reliance on press releases as a problematic 
hallmark of risk reporting within the Digital paradigm. While press releases were seen as as 
aiding risk reporting within the Scientific paradigm by containing and contextualising scientific 
information, interviewees suggested that the structure of press releases changed by the Digital 
paradigm and are more likely to contain partially complete stories. Based upon the credentials of 
scientific institutions, some interviewees admitted that there was little reason to verify risk 
information presented within press releases as scientific accuracy could be presumed. A handful 
of interviewees who appeared knowledgeable of University processes claimed that the 
phenomena of press releases presenting to risk reporters as partially complete news stories had 
become more common since British Universities adopted the Research Excellence Framework in 
around 2010. Other interviewees claimed that, more recently, university press officers have 
become conditioned to writing sensational press releases which attempt to attract media attention 
and satisfy the REF’s ‘impact’ criteria: 
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Look, there’s a lot of pressure now on scientists to be really dramatic. I think that’s one of the real 
driving factors of this ‘post-truth’ reality that’s coming our way.  One  pressure is managerial, the  
other is financial.  Over the past few years there are socially constructed pressures to be dramatic with 
your findings and attract funding. I mean, the government want to be able to demonstrate a return on 
investment, right? They put taxpayer money into universities, and now universities are judged by the 
impact factor of their research. You now have the REF which is all about measuring performance in 
terms of social impact. It’s all gone very ‘metrics’ in the past five year. like everything else in business, 
it’s problematic. - Interview Theta 
 
Concerns over the relationship between the sensationalism of university press releases and the 
uncritical management of press releases by the press has previously been addressed within 
academic critiques of the REF (see Smith et al, 2011; Martin, 2011, Sousa and Brennan, 2014). 
There has also been some evidence suggest that University press releases exaggerate research 
findings and that news reporters are not inclined to dispute press releases (Sumner et al, 2014; 
2016).   
 
The social media amplification of risk was identified by interviewees as the final hallmark of 
poor risk reporting in the Digital paradigm. Whilst it was not intended for the research to explore 
this dimension of risk reporting. The relationship between social media and the risk-based 
newswork emerged as a substantial concern for all interviewees. Identifying social media as a 
democratising force for discussions around risk, interviewees suggested that, within the Digital 
paradigm, the general public have acquired access to their own political voice, circumventing the 
need for mainstream news to platform their perceptions (Mythen, 2010). As such, for risk 
reporters, social media platforms provides both an information rich source for newswork and a 
litmus test of public opinion for their own reporting.  Some interviewees suggested that social 
media was a positive technology which championed a ‘marketplace of ideas’, where fact-
checking is crowdsourced by truly independent actors.  
Ultimately, social media is a force for good. You know that there is an army of people out there who 
are ready to take to social media and point out where risk has been misinterpreted, or a particular 
angle has sensationalised risk. It’s good. It acts as a check and balance for the press, and for 
government - Interview Beta  
 
However, the majority of interviewees were more pessimistic. They argued that social media 
encouraged ‘echo chambers’ which reinforced biases, perceptions and worldviews on risk. Such 
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echo-chambers are conceptualised as selective communities online which reinforce risk 
perceptions by developing conspiratorial narratives around risk management and presumed 
intent of political power (Walter et al, 2018; Del Vicario et al, 2016a). One of the common tactics 
of ‘echo-chambers’ is to view institutional risk information as a manipulative tactic of powerful 
institutions which aims to nudge public perception to coerce public behaviour which suits elite 
agendas (Del Vicario et al, 2016b, Quattrociocchi et al, 2016; Törnberg, 2018). Online ‘echo-
chambers’ tend to readily exhibit selection bias which favours radical interpretations of risk 
information, while outlining discourses that delegitimises the framing of risk presented by 
mainstream news platforms (Sasahara et al, 2019; Van Dalen, 2019). Furthermore, ‘echo-
chambers’ are often in conflict with one another, seeking to legitimise their own perceptions over 
their idealogical rivals in order to reinforce group cohesion (Edwards, 2001). Some interviewees 
suggested that this fragmented social media landscape had produced an ontological crisis in the 
public perception of risk, where information becomes interpreted through identitarian lenses:  
The worrying thing about social media is that people tend to only listen to other people who share 
their outlook. So you can get two completely parallel streams of commentary on risk issues on social 
media. Look at vaccines for example. Now you have researchers saying ‘vaccines are safe, don’t be an 
idiot, protect your children’. On the other hand, you have the anti-vaxxers saying ‘The scientists are 
liars for big-pharma. Look at all the side effects Vaccines can cause. Don’t trust them, they just want 
to make a profit off your kids’. Completely parallel streams of information with absolutely zero 
overlap, and often little to do with the actual science. - Interview Alpha 
 
Some interviewees contended that the monetisation of social media platforms was 
instrumental in amplifying risk and fostering identarian division. By permitting users to generate 
revenue though becoming ‘influencers’, social media platforms had effectively permitted the 
capitalisation of conspiracy on an unprecedented scale (Conway, 2020).  By being able to engage 
in risk reporting at a fraction of the cost compared to mainstream news outlets, these social 
media influencers may be able to compete with mainstream media platforms, in terms of reach. 
By presenting audiences with content which blurs the boundaries between scientific 
entertainment and politically incorrect showmanship, social media influencers may amplify risk 
with the intent to achieve internet virility and further boost their audience:      
The legacy media is having real trouble at the moment with making money in a digital world. 
Everyone can find anything out for free. Right now, people just don’t want to read science content. It’s 
boring. But fake news? Now that’s exciting. Look at the meteoric rise of conspiracy theorists like Alex 
Jones. He’s a showman. He’ll say things like ‘the Government are turning fricking frogs gay with 
chemicals’. Then he’ll slap a journal article on screen where scientists used a chemical which 
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stimulated hermaphroditic developments in frogs like it’s proof of some nefarious plot. How can we 
compete with that? (Laughs). - Interview Delta  
 
Journalists have a duty to represent people’s views, even if they are quite wacky. At the moment, 
we are failing to do that. We got too concerned about not platforming the wackos, rather than 
disproving them. So, now you have personalities like Alex Jones who are actively courting fringe ideas 
and are getting popular off them. The wackos have social media on lock-down because they know 
exactly what they are doing. They are amplifying risk for attention. And, that’s because most experts 
and journalists don’t see science as something entertaining, but rather as a black and white part of the 
job. Ok, sure, you have Brian Cox but he’s too dull and overproduced. Those scientists with quiet 
voices are trying to be rational and give you context, but they are being drowned out by people yelling 
about gay frogs and globalist agendas. - Interview Epsilon 
 
As news production moves increasingly into the Digital paradigm, interviewees expressed 
some concern that mainstream news platforms will lose the authoritative voice to disseminate 
risk information as the public begins to trust fringe, but seemingly authentic, information sources 
(Lews, 2018). This produces a dilemma for risk reporters who appear stuck between the 
institutional demands for accuracy (outlined by the House of Lords Report) and a growing public 
appetite for news narratives which satisfy their risk perceptions. The social media amplification 
of risk signifies a substantial shift in risk reporting where the general public have begun to write 




This chapter provided evidence from the lived experiences and observations of risk reporters 
which contextualised the observable changes in risk-based news stories (chapters 4 and 5). Three 
distinct paradigms of risk reporting appear to have established, which roughly correspond with 
the temporal ubiquity of communications technologies. The evidence provided by this chapter 
illustrates the impact of communications technologies on the process of newswork and risk 
reporting. Furthermore, this chapter outlines how the limitations of technology aided the 
amplification of risk prior to the 2000s (the Traditional paradigm), and that personal 
communication technologies assisted in deamplifying risk reporting across the 2000s. However, 
the deamplifying impacts of personal communication technology appears to be dependent upon 
the resources made available to risk reporters which encourages long-form reportage of science, 
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health, and environmental risk issues. This chapter also provides evidence which suggests that 
the media amplification of risk may also be cyclical as new audience markets emerge which may 
demand different forms of risk interpretation within their media content.  
 
Transition from the Traditionalist to Scientific paradigms appears lately influenced by efforts 
to adhere to the recommendations made within House of Lords third report on science and 
technology. While the work of organisations such as the Science Media Centre does not appear 
to have directly influenced modes of work for interviewees, it does appear that well entrenched 
actors may have a profound effect on altering journalistic practice by drawing attention to the 
shoddy work of their peers. The dispersal of newspaper headquarters across London appears to 
have had an impact on amplified risk reporting, as journalists became increasingly 
unapproachable to those from pressure group organisations. Additionally, the increased 
willingness of scientific sources to speak to the press appears to have a profound impact on risk 
reporting, encouraging risk reporters to rely upon scientific expertise as a highly valuable news 
source.  
 
There is evidence to suggest that developments across the 2010s has resulted in a Digital 
paradigm which has placed risk reporting in a more precarious position. The transition towards 
online delivery of news stories appears to have resulted in difficulties in generating revenue for 
news platforms, which has led to a loss of journalistic skill in risk reporting. Demands for 
cheaper labour appears to have encouraged the hiring of inexperienced science writers who lack 
the confidence to be critical of scientific power and are overly reliant upon press releases for their 
risk-based news stories. Conversely, internet technologies appear to have encouraged alternative 
media structures which are able to produce risk-based content which can compete with 
mainstream media. Furthermore, there appears to be a new media market emerge which actively 
seeks bias-confirming content from alternative media structures which amplifies conspiratorial 
interpretations of risk information.  
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Chapter 7 - Conclusions and Limitations 
 
     
Conclusions 
This thesis explored the changes to risk reporting within the British daily newspapers 
between 1985 to 2017. The aim of this study was to use a mixed methods analysis to identify 
linguistic markers of change for amplified risk reporting and contextualise textual observations 
through the lived experiences of risk reporters. This thesis fills a prominent gap in existing 
knowledge by substantiating observations that risk reporting within the British press has changed 
over time. This thesis further affirms that amplification is not simply given by the scale or 
frequency of events but is the product of a complex interplay between amplification factors, 
previous experience of risk events, and the context of trust in institutions of risk management. 
 
With the changes over time, four distinct periods of risk reporting were observed which 
reflect different conventions in risk-based news work. Each of the four different periods of risk 
reporting reveal differentiated expression of key markers for the amplification of risk. The first 
period of risk reporting was characterised by a low volume of published risk reporting, and high 
uncertainty within news stories over the meaning of scientific information. Risk reporters 
explained that the limited availability of scientific expertise as a news source and a general lack 
of oversight were major contributing factors to the narrative framing of risk information during 
this period. The second period of risk reporting was characterised by a rapid proliferation of risk-
based news across the decade, mirrored by increasing sensationalism and politicisation of risk 
reporting. The rapid proliferation of risk reporting appears to follow the media victory of BSE, 
where media campaigning on the risks of British Beef forced the Government to retract their 
previous assurances of safety. Linguistic markers demonstrated that there was a disproportionate 
expression of alarming language, alongside news narratives which sought to blame the 
government for failing to keep the public safe from harm.  At the time, risk reporters felt a need 
to amplify risk information within their news reporting to draw public attention to the perceived 
abuses of power and corruption from government. Within amplified news narratives, a framing 
contest were readily observed where inexpert and Maverick news sources actively disputed 
Government safety assurances with their own perspectives on risk and danger.  
 
The third period of risk reporting signifies a notable change in amplified risk reporting. The 
third period was characterised by a high volume of risk reporting, but a stabilisation in the rate of 
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proliferation, sensationalist, and politicising language. Also observed within the third period of risk 
reporting was a decline of alarming language and an increase in expression of uncertainty. These 
linguistic changes were linked to a prioritisation of scientific sources within risk reporting. 
Statements provided by scientific sources were generally observed to be more tentative in nature, 
often framing risk information in ambiguous possibility and downplaying the likelihood of harm. 
Furthermore, scientific sources were less inclined to blame the government for failing to protect 
the public from harm but were more inclined to blame the government for failing to achieve 
safety targets.  
 
The prioritisation of scientific sources within risk reporting appears to have emerged an 
emerging scientific convention of risk reporting which sought to better utilise credible scientific 
expertise and better represent scientific balance within news stories. The scientific approach to 
risk reporting was aided by the increasing ubiquity of advanced communications technologies 
such as mobile phones, email, and the internet.  Improved access to communications 
technologies allowed risk reporters to more easily, and swiftly, access credible, and substantiated, 
risk information from reputable scientific sources. University press releases and mobile phones 
were specifically highlighted as facilitating the ease of access to scientific sources of information. 
Another impetus for change within the British press was the perceived damage to professional 
reputations caused by the MMR triple vaccine debate, which coincided with public calls for 
improved scientific quality within risk reporting from institutions, bloggers, and the public. 
 
Dr Ben Goldacre’s Bad Science column in the Guardian was identified as a key mechanism of 
self-regulation for the press, as it provided a critical oversight of the general press failings 
regarding poor quality risk reporting. While there was only a limited amount of data available for 
the emergent fourth period of risk reporting, there still exists enough data to suggest some 
speculatory trends. The emergent fourth period is characterised by a high volume of risk 
reporting, and rapidly declining rates of sensationalism.  Within the emergent fourth period, the 
was a tendency for the press to use reassuring language when reporting on risk. However, 
emergent conventions around digital publishing have highlighted some concerns regarding the 
journalistic quality of risk reporting. It has been suggested that, while the scientific quality of risk 
reporting has improved, news production has become increasingly precarious, uncritical of 
scientific institutions, and politically identarian. It is feared that poor journalistic quality in risk 
reporting will further amplify risks, as the general public become increasingly distrustful of 




Aside from the observable periodic changes to risk reporting, this thesis highlights some other 
general trends of risk reporting which may impact future risk research. First, is the 
acknowledgement that the overall volume of risk reporting generally increased over time. It 
should not be presumed that the general increase in risk reporting can be conflated with a general 
increase in amplified risk reporting. It appears that the general increase in risk reporting over 
time was influenced by a move towards daily background reporting on risk. The daily 
background reporting on risk was generally linked to a media focus on the lifestyle choices which 
are linked with cancer. The second general trend is that the British press disproportionately cover 
food and dietary risks. As such, any general analysis on risk reporting should consider how 
analysis can be skewed by the chosen data collection methods.  There is still academic value in 
analysing risk amplification across different scientific disciplines (e.g., Nuclear issues), however it 
should be acknowledged that such issues only represent a fragment of overall British risk 
reporting. The third general trend is that analysis into risk communication should consider how 
the availability of   communications technologies influences a journalist’s access to information. 
News sources play the primary tole in framing risk information as journalists tend to build their 
stories around statements, rather than data. The available communications technologies facilitate 
a journalist’s ability to access institutional scientific sources, who would otherwise be discounted 
from the public debate.   
 
While the Social Amplification of Risk Framework (SARF) was the key theoretical approach 
to risk for this thesis, each of the four canonical approaches (the psychometric paradigm, the 
cultural theory approach, the governmentality perspective, and the risk society thesis) provided a 
degree of refinement to the analytical lens which aided different aspects of the analysis. For 
SARF, the conceptual structure of social amplification stations provided an anchor which 
grounded the analysis within cycles of news production that are embedded within distinct 
temporal moments. It is, perhaps, too easy to become immersed within news stories as 
documentary texts and forget the purposes by which risk-based news stories are written: (1) For 
the profitability of the newspaper, (2) to warrant the salary of the journalist, (3) for a journalist’s 
own career trajectory, (4) for the reader’s entertainment. SARF grounded this study by providing 
a consistent reminder that risk information flows between social stations of amplification, rather 
than privileging one specific social station as the ultimate arbiter of risk information. Where this 
became integral to this thesis was in dissuading interpretations of data which suggested that risk-
based news stories were the result of top-down pressure from news organisations to promote a 
specific sociopolitical agenda and encourage analysis which contended that news stories were 
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produced as a collaborative exercise between journalists and information brokers (news sources) 
guided by market pressures. Such an approach encouraged reflexivity within analysis by 
circumventing researcher bias on the process of news creation and encouraging analysis which 
placed conventional approaches to risk reporting within temporally-bound restrictions around 
information. Perhaps the biggest weakness when utilising SARF to analyse news texts is that 
there is no available benchmark to determine whether (what is observed as) amplification is 
warranted, appropriate, or justified. SARF adopts a scientistic perspective on risk information, 
and contends that exaggerating risk levels promotes irrational behaviour. From the studies 
conducted within this thesis, it can be suggested that the press may exaggerate risk levels in order 
to initiate public debate around the governance of applied technologies and technocratic public 
coercion. Whilst this may be an uncouth tactic, issues pertaining to social health or 
environmental justice may require a degree of showmanship to instigate positive policy reform, 
or risk being facing parochial esotericism.  
 
The psychometric paradigm offered of limited value to this thesis, as public perceptions of 
risk were not investigated. However, the theoretical insights developed from the psychometric 
paradigm did assist the methodological design of this study. Issues pertaining to risk perception 
and sociodemographic factors that have been identified within psychometric risk research - that 
white, financially secure, men tend to express lower perceptions of risk than other groups - were 
greatly considered during the interview analysis. While a relative degree of gender parity was 
achieved for the interviews, the vast majority of interviewees were white and financially secure. 
However, all participants appeared to be particularly sensitive to risk, or rather the sociopolitical 
ramifications of risk and public governance. It may be that future research within the 
psychometric paradigm that is applied to cosmopolitan groups (given their relative access to 
media influence) should consider how narratives around governance influence public perceptions 
of risk, rather than the potential health impacts of an identified hazard. Another contribution 
from the psychometric paradigm applied to this study was that the public perception of risk could 
not be presumed from the analysis of news texts. As outlined above, ‘the public’ does not exist as 
a hegemonic cognitive collective, nor so does a newspaper’s readership. As risk perceptions are 
mediated by spatiotemporal proximity, such a consideration was useful in guiding the analysis to 
consider the relationship more readily between risk reporters and their audience, rather than 
between a newspaper’s audience and their perception of risk. Whilst this approach prevented the 
analysis from addressing the higher order impacts and ripple effects of SARF, it installed a 
degree of robustness to the analysis by negating potentially coincidental links between risk 




The cultural approach contributed, perhaps, some of the key theoretical insights to this thesis 
outside of SARF. The relativist perspective of the cultural approach unshackled the concept of 
risk information from scientific accuracy and permitted analysis which considered how different 
social actors embedded risk information within wider discourses around governance and social 
coercion. While the categorisation of social actors identified across the analysis was confined to a 
limited range (e.g., government sources, pressure group organisations, scientists, professional 
healthcare organisations, and risk reporters / newspapers) general characteristics emerged from 
the data which facilitated the analysis of news texts. The analysis of news texts became 
structured around the approaches used by social actors to define risk, and the further use of 
narrative techniques to reinforce their definition within a contested political arena. In essence, 
this thesis more heavily utilised the concept of risk as a forensic resource, in that it presumed that 
linguistic changes within news texts were a condition of shifting professional conventions within 
risk reporting.  
 
The studies demonstrated that changes to the professional conventions around risk reporting 
were not just confined to newspapers, but also influenced how more professional risk 
information brokers addressed news media. Put simply, the technological advances of the 
internet enabled professional information brokers from more scientific establishments to provide 
risk reporters with information which was became more valuable to newspapers than non-
professional sources. Under the cultural theory approach, it is perhaps more apt to suggest that 
professionally brokered risk information (which is independent of government) has, over time, 
become the culturally dominant form of defining risk. Whilst such a conclusion draws 
inspiration from the concept that risk is a forensic resource, this thesis does not acknowledge the 
grid / group typology for which the cultural theory is notably famed. While risk reporters, 
professional information brokers, scientists and politicians may share common demographical 
features which may allow categorisation as a cosmopolitan social identity, there is little evidence 
presented within this thesis to suggest if the cosmopolitan identity corresponds to one of the 
grid/group typologies, or if risk reporting has become a contest to define risk between different 
cosmopolitan tribes that correspond with different typological identities.  
 
The risk society thesis offered rather limited theoretical contributions to this thesis. The claim 
that society has entered a state of reflexive modernity, in that we have become preoccupied with 
“the bads” of global industrialisation over production of “the goods” does not appear to be 
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substantiated within news texts. It is perhaps more accurate to suggest that, during the 90s, risk 
reporting was more concerned with amplifying “the bads”, while risk reporting has become more 
orientated around forecasting “the potential goods” from novel applied technologies. Similarly, 
while there is evidence to suggest that contemporary risk reporting has adopted risk positions - in 
that ethical issues around particular issues such as climate change are more readily identifiable, 
there is little evidence to suggest that traditional class positions are less prominent within risk 
reporting. Traditional class structures (specifically gender and race) appear to be a key element 
within contemporary risk reporting and may be an attractive story hook of risk amplification in 
the same manner as sensationalism and politicisation. The concept of individualisation is also 
scrutinised by this thesis as there is evidence to suggest that there is a dichotomy within risk 
reporting which both emphasises the power of individuals to govern risk exposure through 
dietary / lifestyle management, whilst simultaneously contending that other issues such as 
environmental hazards require regulatory control. However, there is strong evidence that 
organised irresponsibility is central to risk amplification as health-risk based news stories appear 
to be structured around the contradiction between governments confidence in it’s ability to 
control risk, and the reality where individuals are left victimised by risk exposure. 
 
Limitations  
Despite the robust attempts to mitigate methodological issues which may have influenced the 
analysis of data within this thesis, a range of limitations were encountered which need to be 
acknowledged and addressed. This section will approach each of the key studies in turn, 
beginning with the quantitative analyses conducted in chapter four, before addressing the 
limitations to the qualitative analyses conducted in chapter five, and finally addressing the 
limitations to the interviews conducted in chapter six.  
 
Embedded within chapter four are some of the more major limitations of this thesis. One of 
the major limitations is that analysis of media amplification was limited only to newspaper 
articles. It is acknowledged that newspaper reporting only forms one aspect of the British media 
landscape (alongside, TV, Radio, and Internet news platforms), and that the general circulation 
for newspapers have declined over the timeframe of this study. These two factors do make it 
somewhat difficult to extrapolate findings to make a statement on the wider state of risk 
amplification outside of newspapers, or even to link news amplification more directly with the 




The decision to focus specifically upon news texts was reached after considering the wider 
methodological problems which would have been produced from including a more diverse data 
set. In short, the decision to focus specifically on news texts was the best of a bad situation. The 
first issue is that Newspapers are, perhaps, the only form news media which is archived to any 
reasonable degree. By comparison, the only potentially viable archive of (select) broadcast TV 
and radio programming in the UK appears to belong to the BBC. Even then, the BBC archives 
appear to be inaccessible without special permissions, which led to further questions regarding 
the ability to remove archived content from the BBC to be subject to linguistic analysis. For the 
analysis of TV/Radio news over the past thirty years, a method was considered which would 
have involved retrieving hundreds of gigabytes (if not terabytes) from the BBC archives and 
processing the content though third-party speech-to-text software. This would have produced a 
transcript that could have been then imported into NVivo for further linguistic analysis. While 
technologically feasible, the current state of copyright law is not clear enough regarding the 
reproduction of archived content, especially if speech-to-text services are located online. Due to 
the lack of access to archives, the confinement of UK media archives to the BBC, and potential 
copyright issues around the use of audio/visual content, the decision to focus upon newspaper 
reporting was reached. As it pertains to this thesis, there is no evidence available to make wider 
generalisations to the UK’s broader media landscape. It is reasonable to suggest that the 
amplification of risk upon TV, radio, and digital platforms trace entirely different trajectories to 
that exhibited by British newspapers. Furthermore, it cannot be presumed that the pressures and 
conventions of risk-based newswork experienced by the press are translatable to other forms of 
journalism.    
 
Even after it was decided that newspaper articles would form the corpus of analysis, further 
limitations were made apparent. It is acknowledged that both the linguistic and narrative framing 
analysis of risk amplification was conducted solely upon the text of news stories, and omitted 
images as a form of risk amplifying news text. The decision to omit semiotic, or other forms of 
image analysis, from the studies was due an unfortunate compromise between breadth of 
analysis or depth of analysis when selecting which newspaper archive would be appropriate for 
this thesis. As previously outlined (in chapter three) LexisNexis provided an unparalleled access 
to a broad range of newspapers within their archives while other services, such as GALE, only 
provided access to a limited number of newspapers. LexisNexis’ archives better suited the aims 
of this research project by permitting comparative analysis across the broad range of national 
daily newspapers available in the UK, with the only key exception being the News of the World 
which folded in the 2011. The major drawback of LexisNexis was that images used within the 
newspaper were not included as accompaniments to the news texts. The lack of available images 
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meant that the value of graphical forms of risk amplification were not investigated within this 
thesis. Aside from the immediate signal value of images used to communicate risk, such as 
juxtaposing images of cattle against headlines regarding ‘mad cow disease’, there was also a lack 
of investigation into infographics, graphs, and other forms of epidemiological visualisation. As it 
pertains to this thesis, the general decline in amplification observed during the 2005 - 2014 period 
may be just a methodological artefact and that newspapers had turned towards images and 
graphics amplify risk. Such an outcome is certainly feasible, given that software packages are 
now readily available to large organisations which permits easy data visualisation through 
infographics and charts.  
 
The decision to not incorporate web-based news was also a major limitation for this project. 
It is acknowledged that, with the relative ubiquity of internet technologies within society, market 
forces have encouraged newspapers to begin publishing content online. It is uncontroversial to 
suggest that, nowadays, online news publishing is prioritised by news organisations to access 
advertising revenue from global news markets. With such an acknowledgement, it may seem 
strange that this thesis actively chose to omit web-based news from analysis. While there is 
certainly a great value in investigating contemporary web-based news, it became apparent that 
there were too many methodological complications when attempting comparative analysis 
between physical news stories and web-based news.  
 
One of the biggest methodological concerns was regarding an arbitrary distinction of “news” 
from online. While this thesis could have chosen to select online news from sources which also 
had a physical newspaper counterpart, this would have ignored valuable news contributions from 
newer forms of journalistic pursuits which rival traditional news platforms in terms of reach and 
penetration into the British news landscape (such as Buzzfeed or Vice). The question of “what 
counts as a news platform online?” was thoroughly considered, however a conclusion was 
reached where this thesis was not in the position to make such distinctions.  Another issue arose 
when considering which news platforms are accessed by British news readers. While it could be 
presumed that traditional news audiences followed their newspaper of choice into the digital 
space, the same presumption can not be made for younger generations whose access to news 
may have only been through online platforms. As such, there is little guarantee that 
contemporary audiences only access British-based news platforms, as internet technologies have 
provided global news platforms the opportunity to be read by British audiences. As it pertains to 
this thesis, the decision to omit web-based news challenges the validity of results produced from 
2010 onwards as there is the assumption that the stories published within physical newspapers 
181 
 
are just as integral to the public understanding of risk as stories published within earlier periods. 
Furthermore, it is difficult to generalise the conclusions generated by this thesis to encompass the 
wider digital media landscape (blogs, opinion pieces, or social media). There is also a lingering 
question of news selection when editors are deciding which online news articles to convert into 
physical newspaper stories.  It is feasible to suggest that news editors may choose to physically 
publish less-amplifying stories within newspapers to maintain an image of respectability, while 
encouraging more-amplifying interpretations of information from guest / opinion columnists to 
be published online only.  
 
Aside from the issues around news selection, the method used to build the corpus of analysis 
also presented some limitations. The corpus building method was beholden to the search 
algorithms employed by LexisNexis. While the search algorithms proved to be intuitive 
(especially after refinement using the ‘major mention’ tool), the specific approach to corpus 
building is occluded form the end user. As such, a trial-and-error method was employed during 
corpus building to ensure that the corpus that was representative of the British press, yet specific 
to the reporting on health risk stories. A trial-and-error method was employed where a range of 
potential search terms and optional modifiers were selected, and the results scrutinised for 
closeness of fit to the intent of this study. The ‘Major Mentions’ tool proved to be critical in 
separating news articles where health risks were the key component of the story, and news 
articles which simply mentioned the phrases “risk” and “health” somewhere within the story 
(e.g., Coverage of political party manifestos, non-specific opinion columns, or as rhetorical flair 
in non-health reporting). Although the “Major Mentions” tool was crucial to this thesis, there 
was no information available from LexisNexis which outlined the deterministic properties of this 
tool. It appears that the “Major Mentions” utilises an algorithm which weighs the uses of target 
phrases in linguistic context. Scoping exercises demonstrated that the “Major Mentions” tool 
was useful for disaggregating risk-based news stories from the ‘background noise’ of news stories 
which featured ‘risk’ as a phrase. Using the “Major Mentions” tool in conjunction with the four 
popular fields of popular health risk reporting appears to have produced a corpus that was a little 
too restrictive. 
 
While such a method may have introduced restrictive redundancies into the corpus, it was 
considered beneficial to the overall aims of the thesis to develop a corpus that lent towards 
restricted items (and therefore specific to health risk reporting) than a corpus that was too broad 
(and therefore incorporated higher volumes of generic reporting of limited value). While the 
obvious approach to generating a more accurate corpus would have been the manual discount of 
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non-specific health risk stories, such an approach was unfeasible given the time and funding 
limitations of the project.  As it pertains to this thesis, the limitations of the corpus building 
method produced a simulacrum of risk-based news reporting over the past thirty years. A 
reasonable criticism would be to suggest that the data gathering method produced an inaccurate 
corpus which omitted stories that may have evoked a risk amplifying / attenuating effect but did 
not include the phrases “Health AND Risk”. It is possible that some risk reporters may have 
favoured reasonable substitutions for “risk” (such as “danger”) which would have been missed 
by the data collection method, even if the phrase “health” were present in the article.  
 
The framing and rhetorical analysis of news texts also presented some limitations which will 
be discussed in turn. With the framing analysis, one major limitation was that the different risk 
amplifying frames were not weighted regarding cognitive impact on risk perceptions.  Due to 
this, certain frames (Uncertainty, Certainty, and Blame) were privileged within the analysis over 
other frames (Stigma, Trust, Dread) simply due to the differences in proportional expression of 
frames within news texts. Such an approach is somewhat reductive, in that it presumes that the 
most commonly expressed frames are key drivers for the news-led amplification of risk. The 
framing analysis did not consider the perspective that risk reporters are interpreters of risk 
information who are bound by codes of conduct to present the available ‘facts’ of a story.  
 
Less apparent aspects of risk amplification such as Stigma, Trust, and Dread may present a 
fulcrum by which journalists are able to imagine a catastrophic future, aiding the process of news 
selection in the first place. Conversely, more apparent aspects of risk amplification such as 
Certainty, Uncertainty, and Blame may simply be more tangible social proofs which demarcate 
the limits of what is known, what is unknown, and who is (seemingly) culpable for wrongdoing. 
Without such social proofs available it may be difficult for a reporter to argue that a story ‘has 
legs’, resulting in a story that would be based upon fantasy and speculation - something reputable 
editors may not have any interest in publishing.  As it pertains to this thesis, such a reductive 
perspective invites criticisms regarding the applicability of the framing analysis as the data was 
only drawn from moments of peak amplification and not compared with moments outside of 
peak amplification. Such comparative analysis may have permitted investigation which 
demonstrated which frames were specifically elevated or suppressed within moments of peak 
amplification. This may have provided a better evidential basis as to which frames were more 
integral to risk amplification (as a process) rather than identifying the frames which were more 
commonly expressed within moments of peak amplification. However, given the breadth of this 
study, drawing another sample of non-amplified texts risked drastically inflating the volume of 
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documents for analysis   to an untenable number which could reasonably be assessed within the 
time constraints of this study.  
 
The analysis of rhetoric also presented some limitations which impacted the qualitative aspects 
of this thesis. While the concepts of logos, ethos, and pathos are well defined structures of 
rhetoric, there presently does not exist a well substantiated method to exploring these concepts 
within risk-orientated literature. As such, the approach to analysing the rhetorical risk was 
guided by the grounded approach to data collection and analysis, which certainly invites 
criticism. The Narrative Policy Framework (NPF) was considered as a methodological tool to 
help guide the analysis, as the designers assert that the NPF can be applied to qualitative analysis 
to produce testable hypotheses which include the temporal changes to narrative structures over 
time. However, after interrogating the available literature on the NPF, it became apparent that 
the NPF needed further development before it could be used as an appropriate methodological 
tool for this study. The first issue was that although the NPF claims to help decode the ‘science 
of stories’ for sociological integration, there does not appear to be a dedicated acknowledgement 
for the purpose of rhetoric within narrative considered by the NPF. The second issue is that, 
while the NPF claims to be suitable for macro-level analysis (as performed by this thesis), the 
entirety of the research conducted under the NPF is performed at the micro and meso levels. The 
third issue may be one that is purely semantic, but is an issue nonetheless, in that the NPF 
appears to be primarily concerned with the interrelationship between narrative and policy, rather 
than the sociocultural interplay between risk and rhetoric. The end result was a concern that, if 
the NPF was used as a methodological tool for this study, then substantial portions of the 
analysis would have been spent demonstrating how the data corresponded with the NPF, rather 
than addressing the overall aims of this research. As such, it is possible to suggest that the 
analysis of risk rhetoric was inspired by, and aligns with, the goals of the NPF and may provide a 
suitable avenue for further analysis into the sociocultural relationship between rhetoric and 
narrative.  
 
Finally, the interviews conducted within this thesis were also subject to limitations which may 
have impacted the overall analysis. The key issue which was not reasonably controlled for was 
that of expressed bias within interviewees. It was generally noticed that interviewees held either a 
positivity bias or negativity bias towards mainstream news publishing. Such biases appeared to 
correspond with responses which viewed changes to press conventions as having a positive or 
negative impact on risk reporting. While bias was a concern that was acknowledged from the 
outset of the study, there was little opportunity to initiate controls. Ideally, a psychometric 
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questionnaire would have been sent to participants to test for positivity / negativity bias prior to 
the interview. However, it was concluded that pragmatic steps were necessary to avoid 
burdening potential interviewees as much as possible, and supplementary questionnaires may 
have risked an increased rate of withdrawal from the study. Such a decision appears to have been 
the correct choice, as many participants presented as being very impatient with academic enquiry 
into journalistic practices. For example, several interviewees openly stated that their decision to 
participate was due to democratic principles of open scrutiny, rather than any real interest in the 
research project. Other interviewees chided the need to provide informed consent as bureaucratic 
busy-work which was taking up too much of their time. The pragmatic demand of facilitating the 
ease of communication took priority over methodological concerns.  
 
This thesis may have included disproportionately more participants with negative bias than 
positive bias. It was noted that interviewees who generally expressed a more positive bias 
towards newsroom changes appeared to be those who were contractual employees of large 
organisations (I.e. Journalists, editors, columnists, communications directors, etc). Those who 
exhibited a more positive bias appeared to be more readily able to identify specific innovations 
and pronounce a positive impact on journalistic conventions around risk reporting (I.e. Ben 
Goldacre’s Bad Science column). Conversely, interviewees who generally appeared to express a 
more negative bias towards newsroom changes appeared to be those who were not contractual 
employees of large organisations (I.e. Freelance journalists, retired journalists, younger ‘science 
writers’, etc).  Those who exhibited a more negative bias appeared to be more readily able to 
identify general changes and suggest a negative impact on journalistic conventions (e.g., The 
interplay between press releases and the time pressures of online publishing). It was also noted 
that participants with a more positive bias were more likely to have been recruited from the 
Science Media Centre, while participants with a more negative bias were more likely to have 
been recruited from the Association of British Science Writers. Another limitation of the 
interview analysis was that it did not consider participants from other professional backgrounds 
who interface with the public but are not members of the press. Nurses, perhaps, may have been 
a suitable sample population as both media observers and frontline healthcare workers who 
encounter unwise decision making from patients as a regular occurrence. While interviews with 
nurses would not have produced any insights into the specific newsroom changes that may have 
impacted risk-based newswork, such interviews may have provided a means to corroborate or 
dispute claims from risk reporters that specific innovations or general changes had a profound 
impact upon risk amplification within the British press.  
